Awards
Stuart Starry has received a number of important awards and ratings. These ratings should not be confused with various contrived awards posted on many attorney websites that are merely purchased instead of being based on peer reviews, client reviews, or a rigorous selection process.
The Highest Peer Rating for Professional Excellence
The Highest Peer Rating for Professional Excellence
Martindale-Hubbell’s “AV – Preeminent” rating is the gold standard in attorney peer review. The qualification process is rigorous and requires not only high marks from fellow attorneys, but also from judges and opposing counsel.
“AV Preeminent” is the highest peer rating in the Martindale-Hubbell Peer Review system. It ranks above the “Distinguished” and “Notable” ratings, which any attorney should be proud of. But the “Preeminent” rating signifies more. It demonstrates that a large number of the lawyer's peers rank him or her at the highest level of professional excellence for their legal knowledge, communication skills, and ethical standards.
AVVO Client’s Choice Award 2019
The Avvo Client Choice Award is granted to attorneys who have earned consistently high ratings from clients on Avvo, the leading online legal services platform. Avvo is not an acronym. It is derived from the Italian word “avvocato,” which means lawyer. Avvo is a digital legal marketplace and lawyer directory that provides information about attorneys, including ratings, reviews, and legal services, and connects potential clients with lawyers. Avvo’s ratings are based on a mathematical algorithm that considers information publicly available about attorneys, such as their experience, disciplinary history, and client reviews. In 2019, Mr. Starry was honored to be added to the list of Avvo attorneys who have attained this status.
Top Rated Lawyers in Texas 2022
Stuart Starry was nominated by his peers and selected by Texas Lawyer Magazine as one of the Top-Rated Lawyers in Texas for the Year 2022. Mr. Starry was selected because of his reputation in West Texas for providing top-notch legal services to his clients. He is honored to have been selected.
United States Patent
Mr. Starry is also an inventor. He invented the “INTEGRATED POLE-TO-SKI COUPLING ARRANGEMENT,” U.S. Patent No. 8,235,423 B2.
The invention was marketed as a set of ski poles known as “Quickpoles.”
The utility of the patent is demonstrated in a video made to market the brand:
“Quickpoles Full Demo Video.”
Who’s Who in America
Being listed in Who's Who in America by Marquis signifies that an individual has been recognized for their noteworthy achievements and contributions to society, at a national level. It implies a certain level of prominence and recognition within their field, based on factors like leadership positions, educational attainments, creative works, and community involvement. Marquis looks for individuals who have demonstrated noteworthy achievements, such as holding leadership positions in significant organizations, achieving academic excellence, making creative contributions, or having notable public speaking or publishing experience. Mr. Starry was honored to be selected by Marquis for this prestigious and once‑in‑a‑lifetime award. Mr. Starry’s biography is published in the 2023 version of Who’s Who in America. Who’s Who in America (by Marquis) is the original and oldest professional directory and is recognized worldwide as the foremost register of honored professionals.
Rotary International – Paul Harris Fellow.
As a member of Rotary International, Mr. Starry believes in public service. He was selected as a Paul Harris Fellow by his fellow Rotarians in recognition of his mentorship of several at-risk youth in Houston Texas. Mr. Starry is proud to have helped those young persons achieve their goals.
Publications and News Coverage
Over Mr. Starry's extensive career he has authored numerous articles for well regarded lawyer magazines and publishing companies. Mr. Starry's achievements have also been covered by news organizations such as the Los Angeles Times, the American Lawyer, and Texas Lawyer.
Turning Off the ‘No Suing’ Sign: Pied Piper of Airline Torts Wins as 5th Circuit
Stuart Starry made the cover of the Texas Lawyer when he scored a spectacular victory at the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit. The case, Hodges v. Delta Airlines, 44 F.3rd 334 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) overruled a line of cases that Mr. Starry himself established when he was a defense lawyer. That line of cases effectively prohibited suits against airlines for personal injury and death occurring on board a commercial airliner. To read the article, click the button below.
Texas Lawyer
MARCH 27,1995 - VOL. I 1, NO. 2 o $6.00 - TWO SECTIONS
BY RICHARD CONNELLY
Five years ago, when he was a defense attorney, Houston lawyer Stuart Starry helped convince the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that federal law bars plaintiffs from pursuing personal injury claims against airlines in state court.
Then he became a plaintiffs' attorney.
Now Starry is basking in a victory that has the potential to stir up a world of litigation against airlines. He convinced the 5th Circuit last month to overturn its earlier ruling - the one he had argued so strenuously for five years ago.
"I think it's a case of perfect advocacy. I took the court and spun it 180 degrees," said the brash 34-year-old, an associate at Houston's Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson.
Starry was the plaintiff's attorney in Hodges v. Delta Airlines, No. 91-6307, a Feb. 15 a ruling that has been the talk of the aviation bar in the past few weeks. In an en banc decision, the 5th Circuit reversed its earlier decision and found that a Delta passenger could pursue a claim in Texas state court for injuries received when a case of rum fell from an overhead bin and injured her arm and wrist.
For the past five years, such suits have routinely been transferred to federal court, where airlines have won summary judgments because no federal law offers relief for such personal injury claims.
Starry helped establish that standard chain of events when he won O'Carroll v. American Airlines, 863 F. 2d 11 (5th Cir. 1989). That decision established in case law the doctrine that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 broadly preempted state law claims against airlines. O'Carroll was expanded a year later in the unpublished opinion Baugh v. Trans World Airlines Inc.,
SEE LITIGATION, PAGE 30
30 TEXAS LAWYER, MARCH 27,1995
Litigation May Engulf Airlines
CONTINUED FROM PAGE I
915 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1990).
Both cases relied upon language in the deregulation act that said states could not regulate anything "relating to rates, routes or services" of airlines. Plaintiff’s attorneys argued the language was intended simply to bar states from re-regulating what the act had removed; defense attorneys, and the courts, interpreted the phrase "or services" more broadly.
Starry urged that broader interpretation when he was an aviation defense attorney with Houston's Beirne, Maynard & Parsons. Three years ago, he switched sides and joined Fleming, Hovenkamp, then began looking for a case to take through the appeals process and overturn his earlier efforts.
"I was hired with the express purpose of overturning this law," he said. "Aviation is the bread and butter of this firm; [Hodges] is a case we selected through a network of referral attorneys."
Starry insists he is not the epitome of the lawyer who answers the question "How much is two plus two?' with "How much do you want it to be?"
"At the time [of O'Carroll], I truly believed that the preemption was meant to be broad," he said. 'But I hadn’t read the entire legislative history. Since then, Baugh and O'Carroll have been used to get almost any case preempted.
"It's been horrible for consumers for the past five years - the airlines won't pay you anything, and they'll pop you right away with a motion to remove to federal court and then get it dismissed. Legitimate cases were getting dismissed right and left."
The litigation that might be open to state claims now would include suits where passengers were injured aboard a plane or while getting on or off it, or passengers who suffered from food poisoning or experienced ear damage from sudden drops in air pressure.
"I defended a lot of ear cases," Starry said.
"Texas has an awful reputation nationwide
for its give-away, big lotto verdicts.
Any defense lawyer would rather be in federal court."
--- CHICAGO'S JOHN S. HOFF
JOHN S. HOFF & ASSOCIATES
He said a suit his firm is currently handling from the September USAir crash near Pittsburgh had been removed from state court in Houston; he now has a motion pending to return it from federal court.
Defense attorneys are not so sure about how far-reaching Hodges will be.
"I don’t think it will be the landmark or the panacea that a lot of plaintiffs' lawyers think it will be," said Ron Sprague, a name partner in San Antonio's Gendry & Sprague. "It's always been a gray area as to what's preempted or not. You end up doing a lot of litigation in state court knowing that the only remedy is to take it up on appeal to federal court, so you end up settling and the case goes away."
Sprague, whose past and present clients include Delta and TWA, said he routinely sought to remove cases to federal court and still would do so - if not on the grounds that the deregulation act pre-empts such suits, then on diversity arguments.
"Hodges closes one door, but there are others," he said.
An aviation defense expert in Chicago agreed. Defense lawyers will still try desperately to get their cases to federal court but might find that more difficult, said John S. Hoff of Chicago's John S. Hoff & Associates.
"Have defense lawyers been robbed of a tactic? No question about it, but hopefully there are other things we can keep in our quiver of arrows to neutralize the op- position," he said.
Hoff, immediate past president of the Aviation Insurance Association and a member of the Defense Research Institute's aerospace committee, said he had viewed the pre-emption rulings as "an aberration" that would eventually be overturned.
He added that defense lawyers in Texas cannot be thrilled about the prospect of facing more state-court suits. "Texas has an awful reputation nationwide for its give- away, big-lotto verdicts," he said. "Any defense lawyer would rather be in federal court."
The concurrence and dissent in Hodges also indicate that results are not so clear-cut. A concurrence -- in the result, but not the reasoning -- by Judge E. Grady Jolly says the ruling "promises uncertain and inconsistent results."
The dissent, written by Judge Patrick Higginbotham and joined by Judge Emilio Garza, found that stowing carry-on luggage is a "service" and is thus preempted.
The majority opinion was written by Judge Edith Jones and joined by 11 of her colleagues. In it, she said that a claim similar to that in O'Carroll -- in which a passenger won $260,000 in damages in state court for being removed from a plane for drunkenness -- could still be preempted by the deregulation act, because it clearly involved "services." But, Jones' opinion said, the 5th Circuit panel decision in Baugh went too far when it broadened the definition of "services" to a case where a flight attendant broke a passenger's ankle by stepping on her foot.
FULBRIGHT READS THE SIGNS
Starry is not the only plaintiffs' attorney who sees a widespread impact from Hodges. Grant Gealy, a partner in the Houston office of Galveston's Mills, Shirley, Eckel & Bassett, has a similar case pending before the Texas Supreme Court.
Continental Airlines is appealing an August 1994 1st Court of Appeals ruling where a divided panel said state courts need not follow 5th Circuit rulings when they find the decisions of other circuits to be better reasoned.
In his Supreme Court brief in Continental Airlines v. Keifer, No. 94-1143, Gealy doesn't rnince words: "Continental contends it was Congress' intent in the Deregulation Act to shield the airline industry from financial responsibility for killing or maiming the traveling public. In other words, a certificated air carrier has a license to kill without accountability to the victim's family."
Kiefer involves a woman injured when a briefcase fell on her head from the over- head bin.
Gealy said Continental's lawyers at Houston's Fulbright & Jaworski apparently anticipated Baugh would be overturned and did not cite it in their briefs.
"Fulbright saw the writing on the wall when Hodges was granted the motion for a rehearing en banc," he said. "They've briefed it to the nth degree to argue it without citing Baugh."
Continental's lead attorney on appeal, Jennifer Hogan, a participating partner in Fulbright & Jaworski, did not return phone calls. Fulbright handles much of the aviation defense work in Texas; partner Dudley Oldham said firm members could not comment on Hodges or Kiefer because they are pending litigation.
William Maynard, Starry's supervisor at his old firm, said he was too busy when contacted for an interview and did not call back by press time March 23.
The 5th Circuit opinion in Hodges did go to some pains to discourage the suit that surely has been contemplated, at least momentarily, by every lawyer who has been bumped from a flight: "Under ... the analysis advanced here, it is difficult to see how a lawsuit for overbooking would not 'relate to' the airline's contract for 'services' with its passenger," and thus be pre- empted, said the majority opinion.
Ruling Eases Way for Suits Against Airlines
Stuart Starry was interviewed about his key victory in Charas v. TransWorld Airlines, 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). In that case, the Federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Airline Deregulation Act does not prohibit suits against airlines for onboard injuries and death. The ruling came amid a growing trend of lower courts to dismiss such suits due to the language of the Act. To read the article, click the button below.
LOS ANGELES TIMES
Reprinted from Los Angeles Times,
December 1, 1998.
LAW: 9th Circuit Appellate Court Rules That Wording In Deregulation Act Should Not Shield Airlines From Liability In Personal Injury Cases
Passengers suing over injuries caused by beverage carts, falling luggage or other hazards aboard commercial jetliners got a major boost Monday by a federal appeals court.
The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco said passengers with personal-injury claims can go ahead and sue the airlines for negligence--without having their suits blocked by the Airline Deregulation Act.
"I feel like I just scored a touchdown," said Stuart J. Starry, a Houston lawyer who represented passengers in several suits before the appellate court.
The appellate court ruling is binding in California and eight other Western states, but Starry and other lawyers said the decision will have an effect nationwide, giving new life to hundreds of personal-injury cases pending against airlines.
"Now you'll see a lot of cases start to settle" out of court "because the parties will now have to come to the table" because of this decision, he said.
Phillip Kolczynski, an Irvine lawyer who specializes in aviation law, said the ruling also will prompt more lawsuits from airline passengers.
"I've personally turned down negligence cases like that because I didn't think that, under the current law, I could get an effective remedy for my client," Kolczynski said. "Now I'll have to rethink that decision. This is a big victory for consumers and travelers, and bad news for the airlines."
Jim Brown, a spokesman for Trans World Airlines, one of the carriers being sued, said it would have no immediate comment on the ruling. The other airlines didn't return telephone calls.
Until now, passengers' personal-injury suits would routinely be thrown out after the airline would cite the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which includes language that says states cannot tinker with the "rates, routes or service" of airlines.
The courts took "service" to include flight attendants, beverage carts and luggage equipment, and so would block the suits from going forward.
But the appeals court--reversing even its own past decisions--ruled Monday that "service," as used in the deregulation act, referred to the frequency and scheduling of flights, and not to matters such as passengers being injured by beverage carts or by flight attendants.
"When Congress enacted federal deregulation of the airlines, it did not intend to immunize them from liability for personal injuries caused by their . . . conduct," Circuit Judge Barry G. Silverman wrote for the 11-judge panel, which voted unanimously.
"To interpret 'service' more broadly . . . would effectively result in the preemption of virtually everything an airline does. That was not what Congress intended."
The appeals court decision also is unusual in that it was made by an 11-member panel chosen from all the appellate court judges in the region--not just the typical three-judge panel that hears appeals. In his opinion, Silverman indicates that the court has been bothered by past interpretation of the deregulation law banning personal-injury cases, and says that with several cases pending again, it was time for the full court to review the law.
Starry, the Houston lawyer, said it was the first time a court had so thoroughly rejected use of the deregulation law to preempt a personal-injury suit's going forward. "It's the first time that any court has delved into the legislative history of this act and understood it," he said.
Starry is representing four passengers of the five whose cases were before the appellate court. Two are suing TWA, another is suing Continental Airlines, and a fourth has a suit against American Airlines, a unit of AMR Corp. All four allege they suffered injuries at the hands of the carriers. One alleges that he suffered a dislocated shoulder and other injuries after a flight attendant hit him with a service cart. Another claims she broke her arm and suffered other injuries when she tripped over a piece of luggage allegedly left in the aisle by a flight attendant.
The court opinion means that three-judge panels that have dismissed passengers' suits will now have to reconsider their rulings.
Ruling Opens Door for PI Suits Against Airlines
Stuart Starry made the inside cover of the Texas Lawyer when he scored a second spectacular victory at the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. The case, Charas v. TransWorld Airlines, 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), overruled a line of cases that Mr. Starry himself established. For years, airlines successfully fought off PI cases by having them removed to federal court where they would prevail on motions for summary judgment because federal law offered no relief for personal-injury claims onboard commercial airlines. But like the Hodges case in the 5th Circuit, the Charas case reversed the dismissal trend in the 9th Circuit, leading courts to follow nationwide. To read the article, click the button below.
TEXAS LAWYER, Dec. 7, 1998
Ruling Opens Door for PI Suits Against Airlines in State Courts
By John Council
Plaintiffs have their choice of competent aviation attorneys in Texas. But if a federal appellate challenge to the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act is specifically what they need, then Stuart J. Starry is their man.
Last week, Starry, a Houston solo who represents plaintiffs, won a significant appeal before the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco. The rare, en banc decision opens the door for plaintiffs to file personal-injury cases against airlines in state courts within the 9th Circuit.
For years, airlines successfully fought off such cases by having them removed to federal court where they would prevail on motions for summary judgment because federal law offered no relief for personal-injury claims involving airlines. Starry ought to know. As a defense lawyer with Houston's Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, he worked on O'Carroll v. American Airlines (1989) and Baugh v. Trans World Airlines (1990), two 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals opinions that ruled that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 pre-empted state law claims against airlines.
Starry in 1991 jumped to the plaintiffs side of the bar, signing on with Houston's Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson. He was hired for the express purpose of overturning O'Carroll and Baugh, he says. And he did it with Hodges v. Delta Airlines, a 1995 5th Circuit opinion. [See "Pied Piper of Airline Torts Wins at 5th Circuit," Texas Lawyer, March 27, 1995, page 1.]
Hodges established that PI suits brought in state court related to airline "operations and maintenance" were not pre-empted, but suits that dealt with airline "service" were pre-empted.
"It was a victory for consumers, but it didn't go far enough," Starry says.
Then a San Francisco lawyer came calling and wanted him to argue a similar case before the 9th Circuit, which had consistently ruled that the deregulation act pre-empted suits in state courts against airlines, Starry says.
The result was Charas v. Trans World Airlines, in which one of the five plaintiffs sought damages for injuries suffered when a flight attendant allegedly rammed a beverage cart into the passenger's shoulder. Charas took Hodges a step further by holding that airlines are not exempt from suits filed under state law involving operations, maintenance or service.
"We conclude that when Congress enacted federal economic deregulation of the airlines, it intended to insulate the industry from possible state economic regulation," wrote 9th Circuit Judge Barry G. Silverman. "It did not intend to immunize the airlines from liability for personal injuries caused by their tortious conduct."
"Like 'rates' and 'routes' Congress used 'service' in . . . the public utility sense" in the airline deregulation act wording, Silverman wrote. "In that context 'service' does not refer to the pushing of beverage carts, keeping the aisles clear of stumbling blocks, the safe handling of luggage, assistance to passengers in need, or like functions."
Talk of the Town
While Starry's California victory is the talk of West Coast aviation lawyers, it is of note in Texas as well.
"I suspect it creates enough of a split in the circuits that you'll end up with a case going to the U.S. Supreme Court for clarification," says William L. Maynard, Starry's former boss and a name partner in Beirne, Maynard & Parsons.
"The Supreme Court could reverse that decision. But I suspect that's not going to happen," says Maynard, whose clients include Southwest Airlines. "I expect that 9th Circuit decision will stand and that's the way things are probably going."
John R. Howie, a Dallas aviation lawyer who represents plaintiffs, says the 9th Circuit decision may not have much impact in Texas since Hodges has stopped most airlines from arguing they are exempt from PI suits brought under state law.
"It's just another case that the plaintiff can throw in at mediation," says Howie, a name partner in Howie & Sweeney. "It's certainly encouraging for [the 9th Circuit] not to take a real restrictive approach."
For Starry, Charas is another notch in his aviation law belt - and one that may bring some notoriety to his 1-year-old aviation and mass torts solo practice.
"You can't compete with the John O'Quinns of the world. But he started like I did," Starry says. "That's the good news."
Copyright 1998, Texas Lawyer, All rights reserved
Preemption in the Skies
As a result of his extensive representation of airlines and then switching sides of the bar to represent airline passengers, Mr. Starry gained expertise in Aviation Tort Law. Trial Magazine, published by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), asked Mr. Starry to write an article explaining the preemption doctrine, through which some Personal Injury claims may be barred by federal law. Mr. Starry’s article, “Preemption in the Skies,” explains the doctrine and how it affects tort suits against airlines. To read the article, click the button below.
Preemption in the Skies
Stuart J. Starry
Stuart J. Starry is a partner with Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson in Houston. A version of this article appeared in The Brief, Fall 1993 (American Bar Association.)
It is typically assumed that an airline passenger who suffers personal injury may maintain a state common law action against the airline. However, in recent years lawyers have successfully argued that §105 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1978 preempts all state common law tort causes of action for wrongful air carrier conduct.1 Fifty-six years ago the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 created what would later become the Civil Aeronautics Board and charged it with regulating commercial aviation.2 The act also contained a "savings clause,"3 which provided that nothing in the act would "abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law."4 Thus, the state law duties of common carriers (including railroads and other means of public transportation) became the tort law for the airline industry.
The revised Federal Aviation Act of 1958 created the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) but did not change the tort law scheme.5 Finally, in 1978 the Airline Deregulation Act was passed to encourage reliance "on competitive market forces to determine the quality, variety and price of air Services."6 To prevent states from re-regulating the industry,7 the 1978 act contained what is now 49 U.S.C. §1305. It reads in part:
Federal Preemption
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to provide air transportation.8
Courts Expand Preemption
A line of federal decisions has slowly broadened the scope of §1305 since its adoption. Under these decisions, the section may apply to anything an airline does. The first cases involved passenger lawsuits for discriminatory seating policies, and the section was applied to preempt some, but not all, of the passenger's state law claims.9
Finally, in a 1989 case, O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., a passenger was removed from an airplane and later jailed because of his unruly behavior and apparent intoxication. The passenger sued the airline for false imprisonment, assault and battery, and negligence. He was awarded $260,000. However, the Fifth Circuit concluded that all his common law claims were preempted by §1305, and "thus the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction" over the action. 10
Reports of this newfound "shield" spread rapidly throughout the airline industry. 11 Since many courts have held a variety of state law claims preempted,12 including at least one case that involved a passenger's death. 13
To be prepared for an airline tort case, a practitioner should understand the arguments advanced by airlines and passengers. In general, airlines argue that all state law tort claims are expressly preempted by the plain language of §1305, which preempts any manner of state law relating to "rates, routes, or services" of air carriers. Thus, all state law causes of action for airline negligence necessarily "relate" to airline "rates, routes or services."
Passengers have attacked the "plain language" approach with a commonsense argument of their own: Congress could not possibly have intended to preempt all state tort claims. Under the airlines' argument, a passenger injured through the airline's negligence would have no remedy. Furthermore, Congress passed §1305 without changing the savings clause.14 Thus, airlines are unhindered by state economic regulation while they are still governed by common law negligence standards.
In areas that are traditionally occupied by state law,15 there is a strong presumption against preemption, which can be overcome only by clear congressional purpose.16 As with each analysis of a statute's preemptive effect, the intent of Congress must be explored first.17 What did Congress intend to achieve when it, passed §1305?
In Morales v. Trans World Airlines Inc., the Supreme Court interpreted the "relates to" language in the section broadly:
True to our word, we have held that a state law "relates to: an employee benefit plan, and is preempted by ERISA, "if it has connection with or reference to such a plan." Since the relevant language of the ADA [Airline Deregulation Act] is identical, we think it appropriate to adopt the same standard here: State enforcement actions having a connection with or reference to airline "rates, routes, or services". are preempted under 49 U.S.C. App. §1305(a)(1).18
Morales also makes it clear that §1305 is to be construed as limiting the savings clause in §1506. The Court stated that "a general 'remedies' savings clause cannot be allowed to supersede the specific substantive preemption provision."19
Morales involved the application of consumer protection laws; thus, it left some (*49) unanswered questions about the scope of §1305 with respect to an airline tort claim. In Hodges v. Delta Airlines, the Fifth Circuit, faced with preemption of a claim for personal injury received on an airplane, said, "Morales informs but does not squarely resolve this case.... While under Morales the scope of state laws that 'relate to' services must be broadly interpreted, the nature of the 'services' preempted by §1305(a) is more narrow than might at first be supposed."20 Just how narrow is it?
A personal injury action against an airline will rarely affect airline rates or routes. Therefore, airlines typically invoke §1305, alleging that the passenger's claim will affect its services. Regardless of the scope of the "relates to" language, if a passenger's claim is pleaded so as not to relate to airline services, it cannot be preempted by §1305. Thus, the breadth of the word "services" becomes the key to surviving a preemption attack.
'Plain Meaning'
In West v. Northwest Airlines, the Ninth Circuit applied the "plain meaning" of the statute and concluded: "[W]e believe that the plain meaning of 'services' clearly includes services provided to customers such as the boarding services at issue here. If Congress had intended to limit the word 'services' to something other than its common usage, it could easily have used the words 'types of services' rather than 'services.'21
Proponents of complete preemption argue that the word "service" is defined in Webster's dictionary as "useful labor that does not produce a tangible commodity."22 As such, virtually everything that an airline does, from distributing pillows to landing the airplane, is by definition service.
Yet, if carried to its logical extreme, this argument fails. For example, not only would it extend to the wrongful ejection of a passenger in O'Carroll, but it would further encompass the tragic deaths of many in the Air Crash Disaster at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport23 case. Both would fall under the broad definition of services. It is one thing to send an unruly passenger home without an award of damages, but to do the same to crash victims is unthinkable.
At least one court has drawn a distinction between maintaining or operating the aircraft and providing services incidental to the flight. In Stewart v. American Airlines, a passenger was injured when the nose wheel of the aircraft deflated during landing. The passenger sued the airline in state court, alleging state law claims. Upon removal, the U.S. district court determined that the passenger's claim fell outside the scope of §1305, and the court remanded the case, explaining:
In the instant case, Plaintiffs claims are more like those arising out of an air crash than those considered in O'Carroll. . . . Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant negligently provided such services as boarding, ticketing, and the like Rather, he simply alleges that he was injured when the airplane malfunctioned during the course of his flight, and that Defendants' negligent maintenance and operation was the legal and proximate cause of his injuries.24
The Stewart decision, however, does not explain the distinction drawn between providing incidental services and operating or maintaining the aircraft. Stewart blindly follows the results in air crash cases involving implied preemption by specific FAA provisions.25 Their results provide no precedent for limiting a general express preemption provision like §1305.
The Airline Deregulation Act did not change the FAA safety regulations governing incidental services or maintenance and operation of aircraft.26 They have always been minimum-requirement regulations that could be supplemented by consistent state tort laws.27 The chief sponsor of the House bill indicated the act was to affect economic factors, not tort law: "The existing declaration of policy, conceived and promulgated in 1938, is a reflection of the times in which it was born. Its orientation is toward the development and protection of an infant industry through public utility-type regulation over entry, exit, and pricing."28
Indeed, Congress almost always used the words "service" and "services" to describe the provision of air transportation from point to point, that is, to describe routes and flights, not the operation and maintenance of the aircraft.29 The House version of the bill was originally called the "Air Service Improvement Act"-and it did not require more careful flight attendants and pilots. Its goal was to increase the flight options available to the public.30
There is strong evidence that Congress intended to preserve the tort liability of air carriers. As part of the Airline Deregulation Act, Congress required air carrier to maintain liability insurance for bodily injuries to, or the death of, any person, or for loss of, or damage to, property of others, resulting from operating or maintaining aircraft."31
A panel of Fifth Circuit judges in an en banc review recently expressed the view that the current Fifth Circuit interpretation of §1305 should be reversed. In Hodges, the court considered the state (*50) law claims of a passenger whose hand and arm were severely cut by a case of bottles that had fallen from an overhead bin.32
The court held the plaintiff's claims to be preempted because it was bound by Baugh v. Trans World Airlines33 a previously unpublished opinion. Baugh held that a passenger's claim that a flight attendant negligently stomped on her foot arose "out of the services" of TWA and was thus preempted. Nevertheless, the Hodges panel said that Baugh was incorrectly decided:
Hodges alleged that Delta was negligent in allowing the case of rum to be stowed in the overhead storage bin. This tort claim for personal injury has no specific "reference to" airline services. Nor would enforcement of her claim significantly affect Delta's services, as defined above.... Nevertheless, under Baugh, we are compelled to affirm and to suggest en banc review.34
Is There a Federal Remedy?
If Congress did, in fact, intend to preempt all state law causes of action relating to air carrier services, are there any causes of action that exist at federal law?
Is there an implied statutory remedy?
Several provisions of the Federal Aviation Act and virtually every regulation promulgated under it impose duties on air carriers that if violated may result in injury to a passenger.35 One notable provision is 49 U.S.C. §1374(a), which requires air carriers to provide "safe and adequate service, equipment and facilities" to its passengers.
If this duty creates an implied remedy, it must satisfy an analysis of four factors set out in the U.S. Supreme Court case Cort v. Ash.36
(1) Is the person a member of a class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted (that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff)?
(2) Is there any indication of any legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
(3) Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
(4) Is the cause of action traditionally relegated to state law in an area basically the concern of the state, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
The airlines point to a host of cases holding that no implied remedy exists under various provisions of the FAA.37
However, none of these cases specifically considers §1305's effect.
Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service Inc., suggests that §1305 preemption would allow the creation of federal remedies.38 The plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against a fixed-base operator (FBO) for deaths in a plane crash. The plane was leased by a third party to the FBO, who, in turn, rented it to the pilot under an oral agreement.
Because the Oklahoma law of bailments precluded claims against the FBO, the plaintiff; sought to hold the operator vicariously liable for the pilot's negligence under federal laws that would create the desired vicarious liability if they implied a cause of action. 49 U. S.C. §1301(26) provided that lessors were, deemed to be operating the aircraft they lease, and 14 C.F.R. §91.9 stated that no person may operate an aircraft unsafely.
The court also held that the plaintiffs had no federal claim primarily for one reason: lack of congressional intent to preempt the state laws involved. The court stated, "We do not question that under its commerce clause powers Congress could preempt state law with regard to the liability for injuries resulting (*51) from air crashes. But we are not convinced that in this instance Congress has clearly indicated any such intent to supersede state laws."39
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' analogy to maritime law on the ground that maritime law was made the subject of exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution. In aviation, the commerce clause powers of Congress had not been exercised to create exclusive federal jurisdiction. The court said:
The Constitution of the United States extends the judicial power of the federal courts to admiralty and maritime cases, and the federal courts have therefore been obliged to fashion a general maritime law in the absence of federal statute.
Conversely, the commerce clause as interpreted by the courts has left state sovereignty unimpaired except where Congress has clearly indicated an intent to supersede state law. The development of the power of the federal government under these two constitutional provisions has been strikingly dissimilar. A clear mandate has been recognized in the maritime area for the establishment of uniform federal law, whereas the delicate problem of federal-state relations has resulted in a more stringent rule that federal preemption under the commerce clause will not be presumed in the absence of a clear indication of the intent of Congress.40
But the O'Carroll court held that §1305 "is a clear indication of congressional intent to preempt and is controlling."41 Whether §1305 indicates a congressional intent to federalize air carrier tort liability is another question. But if state tort claims are preempted, then Cort v. Ash may be satisfied. Otherwise, the act's liability insurance provisions would be rendered meaningless.
Is their a federal common law cause of action? If the airlines are correct in asserting that state law remedies have been preempted and no federal statutory remedy exists, Congress must have delegated to the federal courts responsibility for fashioning the rules of aviation law.
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,42 a maritime case, the Supreme Court fashioned a common law action for wrongful death under the authority granted by Article III, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution.
The Court noted certain anomalies that would result if the current law did not recognize a federal common law claim. Among them:
(1) In territorial waters, identical conduct violating federal law produced liability if the victim was injured but exculpated the defendant if the victim was killed.
(2) Identical breaches of duty resulting in death produced liability outside the three-mile limit but not within a state's territorial waters.
(3) A true seaman had no remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a longshoreman would have a remedy when allowed by a state statute.43
Under the broad view of §1305 --preempting all state law claims-- similar anomalies result. A passenger wrongfully forced to leave an airplane by a pilot would have a federal remedy under §1374.44 Likewise, a disabled passenger subjected to discrimination would have a claim under the Air Carrier Access Act.45 However, people physically injured by other wrongful airline conduct would have no remedy unless they happened to be flying in Alaska .46
Scholars have pointed to the factual likeness between the maritime and aeronautical settings. The nature of the "ocean of air" would suggest that matters in aviation be governed similarly to those in admiralty.47
The Rogers case can be used to assert the existence of a federal common law cause of action just as easily as it is used to create an implied remedy if all state law is considered preempted. The Rogers court noted that if Congress clearly indicated its legislative intent to preempt, federal courts would be granted the "comparable power to fashion their own common law remedies in tort cases arising in the airways."48
What Congress Intended
The injustice that would result from complete preemption of an injured passenger's state law claims tends to indicate that Congress never meant to preempt these claims. However, it is not completely clear what Congress intended to preempt when it used the term "services" in §1305.
What is clear is that Congress intended airlines to be liable for personal injury and death arising from their operations. Therefore, assuming that the section does preempt all such claims, the absence of a state law remedy compels recognizing a federal remedy.
The new application of §1305 renders all claims brought under state law vulnerable to summary judgment and dis(*52)missal. Dismissal may be avoided by pleading a viable federal claim. This assumes a specific federal claim may be implied in the federal aviation statutes and regulations, or a federal common law claim can be recognized. Pleading a federal claim may result in removal to federal court.
Finally, rendering judgment on either a state or a federal claim may result in appeal of the very issues that are presented in this article.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Notes
- 49 U.S.C. §1305 (1988).
- Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 706, 52 Stat. 980 (1938).
- 49 U.S.C. §1506 (1988).
- Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 706, 52 Stat. 1027 (1938).
- Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 744 (1958).
- Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
- 123 CONG. REC. 30,595 (1977).
- 49 U.S.C. §1305(a)(1) (1988).
- See, e.g., Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984): Anderson v. USAir, Inc., 818 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cit. 1987).
- 863 F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
- Calvin Davison & Lorraine B. Halloway, The Two Faces of Section 105-Airline Shield or Airport Sword, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 93 (1990).
- See, e.g., Smith v. America W. Airlines, No. H-91-1550 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3,1991); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. H-90-2276 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 1991); Garza v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. H-91-351 (S. D. Tex. Apr. 3. 1991).
- See Howard v. Northwest Airlines, 793 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
- See 49 U.S.C. §1506 (1988).
- California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989).
- Puerto Rico Dept of Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 4955 500 (1988); Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 755 F.2d 11925 1205 (5th Cir. 1985).
- Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 US. 1, 6 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 738 (1985).
- 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2037 (1992).
- Id.
- 4 F.3d 350, 353 (5th Cit. 1993).
- 923 F.2d 657, 659-60 (9th Cir. 1990).
- Brief for Appellee at 9, Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1993), citing WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1076 (1985).
- 919 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 276 (1991).
- Stewart v. American Airlines, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1194, 1196-99 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
25 E.g., Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport, 635 F.2d 675 74 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 734 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (N.D. M. 1990); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 721 F. Supp. 1185, 1187 P. Colo. 1988).
- See generally Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON PUB. WORKS AND TRANSP., 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULA(*53)TION ACT OF 1978 at 1-53 (1979) [hereafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
- 49 U.S.C. §1421(a) (1988).
- 123 CONG. REC. 30,595 (1977) (quoting from congressional testimony of representations of Civil Aeronautics Board) (emphasis added).
- See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 26, at 2 (providing transport from one point to another); id. at 14 ("nonstop service between any pair of points"); id. at 16 (between points); id. at 31 (serving eligible points); id. at 140 (through service and joint rates); id. at 171 ("prices, route structures, and nature and variety of services to be set by the independent forces of the free market").
- See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 26, at 509-12.
- 49 U.S.C. §1371(q) (1988).
- 4 F.3d 350.
- 915 F.2d 693 (5th Cit. 1990).
- 4 F.3d 350, 356 (citations omitted) (the full court has recently granted the author's request for en banc review).
- Subchapter VI of the Federal Aviation Act deals with Safety Regulation of Civil Aeronautics (e.g., §1425 (maintenance of equipment in air transportation)); 20 provisions in the Code of Federal Regulations mention de-icing requirements (e.g., 14 C.F.R. §135.149 (1993) (equipment requirements-general)); many provisions touch on aircraft engine safety inspections (e.g., 14 C.F.R.. §21.21 (inspection and tests)). It is fairly easy to see how failure to comply with such regulations could foreseeably result in injury to airline passengers.
- 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
- See, e.g., Diefienthal v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 681 F.2d 1039, 1048-50 (5th Cir. 1982) (no cause of action for "adequate service" under §1374(a)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1107 (1983); Caceres Agency v. Trans World Airways, 594 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1979) (no federal implied private cause of action under §1374(b) for airlines discrimination among travel agents), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1107 (1983); Rauch v. United Instruments, 548 F.2d 452, 457 (3d Cir. 1976) (no federal implied private right of action under §1421 for defective equipment).
- 435 E.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
- Id. at 1393.
- Id. at 1395 (emphasis added).
- 863 F.2d 11, 13 (emphasis added).
- 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
- Id. at 395-96.
- This cause of action has typically been asserted as an "abuse of discretion" case, asserting that the pilot in command abused the discretion given to him by 49 U.S.C. §1511 to remove passengers in the interests of safety. 49 U. S.C. §1374(b) prohibits giving unreasonable preference to one passenger over another and has been interpreted to limit the pilot's §1511 discretion. See, e.g., Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1975).
- 49 U.S.C. §1374(c) (1988).
- 49 U.S.C. §1305(a)(2).
- Lee S. Kriendler, 1 AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW §1.01 (1963) (citing at n.7, Arnold W. Knauth, Aviation and Admiralty, 6 AIR L. REV. 226 (1935); Van Vechter Veeder, The Legal Relation Between Aviation and Admiralty, 2 AIR L. REV. 29 (1931); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON THE LAW OF AVIATION 498-530 (1921); George G. Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 271, 303-5 (1921)).
- Rogers, 435 F.2d 1389, 1395.
Federal Preemption in Commercial Aviation: Tort Litigation Under 49 U.S.C. §1305
Southern Methodist University Law School publishes the prestigious Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Mr. Starry is honored to have published a short treatise on the Federal Preemption doctrine and how it affects tort litigation in Commercial Aviation. Unlike the magazine articles, the Law Review article presents an in‑depth and scholarly examination of the doctrine from a neutral standpoint, benefiting practitioners on both sides of the bar. To read the article, click the button below.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Copr. © West 1999 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
58 JALC 657
(Cite as: 58 J. Air L. & Com. 657)
Spring, 1993
*657 FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN COMMERCIAL AVIATION:
TORT LITIGATION UNDER 49 U.S.C. § 1305
Stuart J. Starry [FNa1]
Copyright © 1993 by the Southern Methodist University School of Law; Staurt
- Starry
- INTRODUCTION
FLIGHT 017 was an hour and ten minutes out of Baltimore when it ran into foul weather. Captain Bill Conrad flipped on the sign instructing passengers to buckle up and commenced a gradual 5000 foot climb out of the storm. The flight crew was just starting dinner service. Passenger Rick Keeton, seated on the aisle, was craning his neck to identify the culinary treat of the day. Plates began to rattle. Suddenly the starboard wing was thrust down by an erratic air current. The L-1011 simultaneously dropped 100 feet, effectively ruining what was left of Rick's appetite. Captain Conrad announced to the passengers that they could expect some turbulence for the next hour of the flight. Still the flight crew continued serving dinner. The turbulence worsened as Rick watched the beverage cart approach his row. Suddenly the aircraft lurched powerfully upward, then dipped. Flight attendants clawed frantically for support. Rick never saw the stainless steel coffee pot that was launched over his seat. The boiling contents of the pot poured out *658 onto his scalp, face, neck and shoulders, causing third degree burns. Over a year later, with the benefit of four skin graft operations, Rick is still disfigured. He contacted you for representation in his suit against the airline.
You file a negligence action in state court, knowing that Rick Keeton and the airline are both residents of the same state. Instead of answering your lawsuit and deposing your client, the airline removes your case to federal court, alleging federal question jurisdiction. Two days later you receive a motion to dismiss your case for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
While it seems farfetched to some, this scenario has been playing itself out in many courts across the country. It is perhaps taken for granted that when an airline passenger suffers personal injury or death as a result of tortious conduct on the part of an airline, he may maintain a state common law or statutory cause of action against the airline. However, in the wake of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 [FN1] and certain recent federal cases interpreting that Act, an issue has emerged that has sent shockwaves throughout the airline industry and, at the same time, created a rift among the federal circuit courts. That issue is whether section 105 of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 [FN2] preempts all state common law tort causes of action for wrongful air carrier conduct. The primary aim of this article is to set forth the arguments and strategies on both sides of the preemption issue. It will also consider (1) whether in light of preemption an implied federal statutory remedy should be recognized; and (2) whether in the absence of a statutory remedy the victims of airline negligence should be granted a federal common law cause of action.
Before commencing an analysis of the contrasting legal arguments, it will be helpful to first review the origins of *659 federal regulation and the subsequent deregulation of the airline industry.
- History of Airline Regulation and Deregulation
Airline regulation began fifty-five years ago when Congress promulgated the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. [FN3] This Act created the Civil Aeronautics Authority, which was changed to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in 1940, and charged it with the regulation of commercial aviation. [FN4] The Act also contained a "savings clause," which provided that nothing contained in the Act would "abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of [the] Act [would be] in addition to such remedies." [FN5] Thus, the state law duties of common carriers, which had been applied to railroads and other means of public transportation of the time, would be the applicable standard for the fledgling airline industry. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 continued the CAB [FN6] and created the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). [FN7] It also left untouched the § 1506 savings clause, thus providing viable common law and statutory remedies for airline negligence. [FN8] Finally, in 1978, Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act, the purpose of which was to encourage and develop an air transportation system that "relies on competitive market forces to determine the quality, variety and price of air services." [FN9] While § 1506 was again left unchanged, Congress enacted *660 a federal preemption provision at § 105 of the Act. [FN10] This provision is now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1305 and reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Federal Preemption
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no state or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to provide air transportation. [FN11]
Through § 1305, Congress intended that states be prevented from filling the regulatory void created by the Airline Deregulation Act which removed the preexisting utility-type federal regulatory structure. [FN12] Because a lawsuit can have a regulatory effect on airline conduct, some courts interpret this provision to mean that all state common law claims are preempted, so long as they relate to the rates, routes, or services of an air carrier. [FN13] This interpretation seems to be inconsistent with the Airline Deregulation Act's focus on utility-type regulation. [FN14] It is this preemption provision and its varying interpretations that *661 gives rise to the controversy which is the subject of this article.
- Post-Airline Deregulation Act Developments Involving § 1305
Since the adoption of § 1305, a line of federal decisions has slowly broadened its scope. Under these decisions, § 1305 may possibly apply to any action of an airline. This line of cases begins with Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines. [FN15] In Hingson, a blind passenger who was forced to sit in a bulkhead seat filed suit in federal court alleging that the airline's actions constituted unlawful discrimination. His complaint contained fourteen causes of action under both federal and state statutes as well as state common law. Among these causes of action was a claim for intentional infliction of mental distress and a claim under California Civil Code section 54.1 which required that handicapped persons be given "full and equal access" to air carrier accommodations. [FN16] In preempting the claim under the California statute, the Ninth Circuit rejected the passenger's argument that the California law did not conflict with federal law and stated: "Section 1305(a)(1) preemption is not limited to those state laws or regulations that conflict with federal law. It preempts state laws and regulations 'relating to rates, routes, or services.' Regulation of air carrier seating policies for handicapped passengers involves the regulation of services within the meaning of § 1305(a)(1)." [FN17] The Ninth Circuit, however, *662 also held that Hingson's common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress were not preempted. [FN18] Thus, Hingson can be read as holding that only enforcement of state legislative enactments that impose utility-type regulation are preempted by § 1305, leaving common law tort claims intact.
Three years later in Anderson v. USAir, [FN19] the District of Columbia Circuit was faced with an almost identical set of facts. In Anderson, a blind passenger was prohibited by the flight crew from sitting in a row next to an overwing emergency exit. The passenger brought suit against the airline, alleging among other claims, violation of a common law "obligation ... to provide equal and courteous service to all." [FN20] The court held that, even if applicable in the case at hand, a state common law obligation to give courteous service is expressly preempted by § 1305. [FN21] Interestingly, the court did not hold that Anderson's claim of the tort of outrage was similarly preempted, but rather dismissed the claim on its merits. [FN22] Thus, Anderson expanded the scope of Hingson by interpreting § 1305 to preempt at least some state common law claims.
Finally, in O'Carroll v. American Airlines Inc., [FN23] a passenger was removed from an aircraft and later jailed because of his unruly behavior and apparent intoxication. He subsequently brought suit against the airline for false imprisonment, assault and battery, and negligence, arising out of his allegedly wrongful exclusion from the flight. On appeal of a $260,000 verdict, the defendant airline argued *663 that § 1305 preempted any state law claim for wrongful exclusion. The Fifth Circuit agreed and stated that "[i]n view of this explicit manifestation of congressional intent, we conclude that O'Carroll's common law claims are preempted by § 1305, and thus the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the instant action." [FN24] All of O'Carroll's claims were held preempted, and the court vacated the entire lower court proceeding. [FN25] As one might expect, news of this freshly discovered "shield" spread quickly throughout the airline industry. [FN26] Since O'Carroll, many courts have held a variety of state law claims preempted, [FN27] including at least one case involving the death of a passenger. [FN28] Because of the seemingly unjust results, courts have not been unanimous in their interpretations of the breadth of § 1305. To fully understand the divergence of judicial interpretations, it is helpful to examine the arguments which have been advanced by both airlines and passengers.
- Airlines' Argument
The airlines, in effect, have taken the position that all state law causes of action for tortious conduct by an airline are expressly preempted by the plain language of § 1305. [FN29] They maintain that the Act preempts state law relating to rates, routes, or services of air carriers. The airlines have advanced the plain meaning of the word "services" and have cited such dictionary definitions as "useful labor that does not produce a tangiblecommodity." [FN30] Thus, any state cause of action for negligence of an airline necessarily "relates" to that airline's "services," since it is hard to imagine a single thing done by an airline that does not fall within the plain meaning of the word "services."
- Passengers' Argument
Opponents of the total preemption argument have interpreted the "plain meaning" approach differently. They maintain that Congress could not possibly have intended to preempt all state tort causes of action by enacting § 1305, since under the airlines' argument this would effectively leave a passenger injured through the negligent conduct of an airline with no remedy. [FN31] Rather, those cases that have extended § 1305 to all state law personal injury claims have interpreted the provision's preemptive effect in an overly broad manner.
Passengers argue that the primary objective of the Airline Deregulation Act was to increase competition in the airline industry by purposefully creating a void of economic regulation. [FN32] To accomplish this goal, the Act eliminated federal control of the rates airlines charge, the routes airlines fly, and the cities to which the airlines provide service. Congress never intended to protect airlines from all state laws (as supporters of complete preemption contend). Rather, Congress intended to ease the burden of economic regulation while still ensuring passenger safety. The passengers also invoke the savings clause in § 1506, which specifically saves remedies existing at common law from the regulatory effect of the Federal Aviation Act. [FN33] Even though § 1305 was enacted subsequently to § 1506, the application of both provisions is consistent with the intent of Congress. They argue that because *665 Congress enacted § 1305 without modifying § 1506, Congress intended the airlines to remain free from state economic regulation, while still being governed by common law negligence standards.
- DOES § 1305 OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978 PREEMPT ALL STATE
TORT CAUSES OF ACTION?
When Congress legislates in an area traditionally relegated to the states, such as common law actions for negligence, there is a strong presumption against preemption of state law. [FN34] This presumption can be overcome only by demonstrating a clear and manifest congressional purpose. [FN35] As with every examination of a statutory provision's preemptive effect, we must first look to the intent of Congress. [FN36] What did Congress intend to achieve through its enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978?
Congress may preempt state authority in any one of three ways: first, by so stating in express terms; [FN37] second, by so occupying a field that it would upset the system to allow conflicting state law as an available alternative to litigants; [FN38] and finally, by enacting a narrowly construed federal statute that so conflicts with existing state law as to render compliance with both impossible. [FN39] Section 1305 is unquestionably an express preemption provision. [FN40] *666 Hence, the question becomes not whether Congress intended to preempt state laws relating to an air carrier's services, but rather to what extent that preemption was intended.
- Analysis of Section 1305 Language
- "Relates to" as determining breadth of § 1305
Basic rules of statutory construction dictate that absent contrary congressional intent, statutory language should be given its ordinary meaning. [FN41] In a similar preemption provision, Congress used a phrase very similar to the "relating to" language used in § 1305. Section 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) [FN42] states that ERISA "shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." [FN43] Courts have interpreted the phrase "relates to" as used in ERISA, broadly. [FN44] In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., [FN45] the Supreme Court stated that a law *667 "relates to" a subject "if it has a connection with or reference to" that subject. [FN46] The airlines have urged that § 1305 should be given the same broad interpretation that § 514 has been given.
- Fifth Circuit Approach
Following on the heels of O'Carroll [FN47] was Trans World Airlines v. Mattox. [FN48] Mattox involved a public state cause of action brought by the Texas attorney general under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). The Attorney General alleged that TWA, Continental and British Air had engaged in deceptive fare advertising in violation of that Act. The airlines subsequently sought to enjoin enforcement of the DTPA by arguing that § 1305 foreclosed the availability of such a state law claim. The district court granted the preliminary injunction. [FN49] In reviewing that decision the court of appeals explained:
Although the state laws against deceptive advertising are not aimed specifically at airlines, and clearly do not attempt to set rates, the conclusion is inescapable that such laws do "relate to" rates when applied to airline fare advertising. As the Supreme Court noted in Shaw, a law relates to a particular subject "if it has a connection with or reference to" that subject.... It cannot be gainsaid that enforcement of a state law regulating fare advertising by airlines has a connection with or reference to rates within the meaning of § 1305(a)(1). Therefore, such state action is expressly preempted by section 1305(a)(1). [FN50]
The Mattox case indicates that judicial enforcement of statutory enactments not specifically targeting airlines is nonetheless preempted if such enforcement will have an effect on airline rates, routes, or services.
*668 b. Ninth Circuit Approach
The Ninth Circuit has taken a more narrow approach to the meaning of "relates to." In West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., [FN51] William West was denied a seat on an overbooked flight for which he had purchased a ticket. He subsequently filed suit against the airline for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed its interpretation of the "relates to" language in § 1305:
[W]hile we agree with Northwest that "services" include boarding policies, we disagree with Northwest and the district court that 'law[s] ... relating to airline services' encompass all state laws that affect airline services, however tangentially. This interpretation of § 1305(a)(1) would unduly expand preemption and ignore our presumption against federal preemption in this traditional state law area. Instead, we find that § 1305(a)(1) preempts claims only when the underlying statute or regulation itself relates to airline services, regardless of whether the claim arises from a factual setting involving airline services. Thus, state laws that merely have an effect on airline services are not preempted. [FN52]
The West court went on to hold that federal law did not preempt Mr. West's claim. [FN53] This holding suggests that only state laws which specifically target the airlines are subject to § 1305 preemption. The opinion in West has recently been vacated by the Supreme Court, [FN54] in light of the holding in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, [FN55] discussed below.
- United States Supreme Court
In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, [FN56] the Supreme Court *669 adopted a broad interpretation of the "relates to" language in § 1305. In that case a state sought to enforce its fare advertising guidelines by virtue of a lawsuit pursuant to the state's general consumer protection laws. The guidelines had been promulgated by the National Association of Attorneys General. The issue was whether the Airline Deregulation Act preempted enforcement of the consumer protection law in this context. [FN57] In holding that such action was indeed preempted, the Court apparently adopted the Fifth Circuit's approach:
True to our word, we have held that a state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan, and is preempted by ERISA, "if it has connection with or reference to such a plan." Since the relevant language of the ADA is identical, we think it appropriate to adopt the same standard here: State enforcement actions having a connection with or reference to airline "rates, routes, or services" are preempted under 49 U.S.C.App. § 1305(a)(1). [FN58]
Morales also makes it clear that § 1305 is to be construed as limiting the savings clause in § 1506. Applying the cannon of statutory construction, which dictates that the specific govern the general, the Court stated that "[a] general 'remedies' savings clause cannot be allowed to supersede the specific, substantive preemption provision." [FN59]
Because it involved judicial enforcement of promulgated guidelines and not common law claims, Morales leaves some unanswered questions about the scope of the "relates to" language. Conceivably, its holding could be limited to judicial enforcement of state statutes and regulations which have an effect on airline rates, routes and services. There is no indication in Morales that its holding applies to common law tort actions which merely arise out of factual settings involving air carriers.
*670 2. "Services" as determining scope of § 1305
A personal injury action against an airline will normally have a nominal regulatory effect on airline rates and routes. Therefore, in personal injury cases, airlines typically invoke § 1305, claiming that the passenger's cause of action will have a regulatory effect on airline "services." Regardless of the scope of the "relates to" language, if a passenger's cause of action can be pleaded so as not to fall within the meaning of the term "services," it is not subject to § 1305 preemption. The breadth of the word "services" then becomes a key inquiry. Congress may have intended to limit its use of the term "services" to economic considerations. Alternatively, Congress may have intended for the word to encompass anything that an airline does. Congress may even have intended the scope of the word to fall somewhere between these two extremes. All three possibilities will be examined.
- All-Encompassing Approach
Proponents of complete preemption have adopted a very straightforward, common-sense approach in determining whether all state law claims relating to the services of an air carrier are preempted under § 1305. They cite the primary rules of statutory construction, one of which is to "give effect to the plain meaning of the language used." [FN60] In West v. Northwest Airlines, the Ninth Circuit applied the "plain meaning" analysis and concluded:
[W]e believe that the plain meaning of "services" clearly includes services provided to customers such as the boarding services at issue here. If Congress had intended to limit the word "services" to something other than its common usage, it could easily have used the words "types of services" rather than "services." [FN61]
Proponents of complete preemption argue that the word *671 "service" is defined by Webster's Dictionary as "useful labor that does not produce a tangible commodity." [FN62] As such, virtually everything that an airline does, from handing out head phones to piloting the aircraft, is by definition "service." Since litigation can have a regulatory effect upon an air carrier's conduct, any claim arising out of, or "relating to" the "service" provided by the air carrier is necessarily preempted by § 1305.
Proponents of this all-encompassing approach maintain that the legislative history of § 1305 indicates that the scope of its preemptive effect goes far beyond economic regulations. The broad "routes, rates, or services" language of the House version was adopted over a more narrow Senate version: "routes, schedules, or rates, fares, or charges in tariffs of, or otherwise promulgating economic regulations for." [FN63]
Because of its simplicity, this approach has an initial appeal. However, if carried to its logical extreme, it creates results which are difficult to fathom. Courts adopting this approach have yet to confront these "common sense" arguments in a mass disaster setting. Under the all encompassing approach, there is no material distinction between the facts of In re Air Crash Disaster at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, [FN64] a case involving the tragic deaths of many persons, and the wrongful exclusion case of O'Carroll. [FN65] The facts in both cases fall under the broad definition of "services."
- Incidental Services Approach
At least one court has taken a view that draws a distinction between maintenance or operation of the aircraft and services provided incidental to the flight. In Stewart v. American Airlines, Inc., [FN66] a passenger was injured when the *672 nose wheel of the aircraft deflated during flight. The passenger brought suit in state court, alleging state law claims. The case was then removed to federal court by the airline. The district court determined that the passenger's claim fell outside the scope of § 1305 "services" and remanded the case to state court. [FN67] The court explained:
[I]t is far from clear that, in the instant case, Plaintiff's claims relate to "services" within the meaning of § 1305. First, those cases which have held that a Plaintiff's claims were claims relating to "services" and therefore preempted by § 1305 all involved services provided by individual airline employees directly to passengers, such as ticketing, boarding, in- flight service, and the like.... By contrast, Plaintiff's claims do not arise out of the allegedly negligent performance of such "services." Moreover, assuming, arguendo, that Defendants' argument is correct, it would appear to follow that most, if not all, State law claims arising out of an air crash would be preempted, since most such cases involve claims similar to those at issue in the instant case, namely that a Plaintiff or a Plaintiff's decedent was a passenger on a flight and was injured in the course of the flight due to [a] crash caused by the airline's negligence. Several Courts have held that such claims are not preempted. Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport, 635 F.2d 67, 74 (2nd Cir.1980) (compensatory damages not preempted); In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 734 F.Supp. 1425, 1428 (N.D.Ill.1990) (punitive damages not preempted); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 721 F.Supp. 1185, 1187 (D.Colo.1988) (punitive damages not preempted).
In the instant case, Plaintiff's claims are more like those arising out of an air crash than those considered in O'Carroll.... Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant negligently provided such services as boarding, ticketing, and the like. Rather, he simply alleges that he was injured when the airplane malfunctioned during the course of his flight, and that Defendants' negligent maintenance and operation was the legal and proximate cause of his injuries.
*673 ....
Since Federal preemption was the only ground of jurisdiction alleged in Defendants' removal petition, and since the Defendants have failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate removal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, the Court further holds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and that this action must therefore be remanded to the State Court from whence it came. [FN68]
The problem with the Stewart decision is that it gives no rationale for the distinction that it makes between incidental services and operation or maintenance of the aircraft. Stewart blindly follows the results of air crash cases that did not involve arguments of § 1305 express preemption. The courts cited by Stewart were faced with the question of implied preemption by specific FAA provisions. [FN69] Thus, their results provide no real precedent for a limited view of § 1305.
On the other hand, if Congress did intend to limit the scope of § 1305, no rationale is needed by a court to carry out the intent of Congress, however irrational it may be. In Seidman v. American Airlines, Inc., [FN70] a passenger was injured while evacuating the airplane using the emergency slide after a bomb threat had forced the plane to land prematurely. The passenger commenced a diversity action and obtained a favorable jury verdict. [FN71] While the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court, it did not vacate on the ground that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as it did in O'Carroll. [FN72] Whether this indicates that the Fifth Circuit draws the same distinction as Stewart is yet unknown.
*674 It is clear that the Fifth Circuit considers negligent acts by flight attendants to be "services" within the meaning of § 1305. In Baugh v. Trans World Airlines, [FN73] a passenger alleged that a member of the flight crew stepped on her foot, breaking her ankle. Her claim was based upon a state common law negligence theory. In affirming the dismissal of the passenger's action, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the negligence claim related to the services provided by the air carrier and was preempted by § 1305. [FN74]
Courts are not the only entities to take the incidental services approach. In promulgating regulations to implement § 1305, the Civil Aeronautics Board issued the following policy statement:
Tentatively included within the types of regulation that are preempted are those governing scheduling, inflight amenities, minimum capitalization and other regulations designed to affect the quality of air service.
....
For example, liquidated damages for bumping (denial of boarding), segregation of smoking passengers, minimum liability for loss, damages and delayed baggage, ancillary charges for headsets, alcoholic beverages, entertainment, and excess baggage would clearly be "service" regulation within the meaning of [§ 105].
....
Accordingly, we conclude that preemption extends to all of the economic factors that go into the quid pro quo for passenger's fare, including flight frequency and timing, liability limits, reservation and boarding practices, insurance, smoking rules, meal service, entertainment, bonding and corporate financing; and we hereby occupy these fields completely. [FN75]
Noticeably absent is any reference to piloting, operating, *675 or maintaining the aircraft. This omission may imply that § 1305 preempts state laws affecting something less than everything an airline does, but more than the mere act of providing the traveling public with a particular air transportation option and price.
- Utility-Type Regulation Approach
The Airline Deregulation Act never changed the regulations governing incidental services or maintenance and operation of aircraft. [FN76] Before the Act, these were minimum-requirement, utility-type regulations which could be supplemented by consistent state tort laws. [FN77] There is no reason to believe that the Act was meant to alter this aspect of the regulatory scheme.
The legislative history of the Act indicates that "service" was used by Congress almost always as providing air transportation to the flying public from point to point, not the operation and maintenance of the aircraft. [FN78]
*676 To counter the argument that § 1305's breadth is indicated by the different language employed by the House and Senate versions, one can point to the similarities in the House and Senate approaches. In discussing its "different" *677 version, the Senate report refers to the same utility-type regulation of interstate and intrastate "services." [FN79] Also, the Senate actually considered a version of the provision remarkably similar to the adopted version. [FN80] In a section-by-section discussion of this version, it was stated: "This section is not intended to change the state-federal relationship over matters not regulated by the Board." [FN81] Thus, it may be argued that, because torts have never been regulated by the Board, the preemption section could not have been intended to be so broad as to apply to torts. Even when discussing the House version which was actually adopted, the Senate used "services" in a limited context. [FN82] Thus, it can be argued *678 effectively that the subtle differences in the original Senate version are irrelevant.
The House consideration was similar. Representative Anderson, the chief sponsor of the House Bill and its version of § 1305, presented a section-by- section analysis:
"The existing declaration of policy, conceived and promulgated in 1938, is a reflection of the times in which it was born. Its orientation is toward the development and protection of an infant industry through public utility-type regulation over entry, exit, pricing." [FN83]
*679 Both the House and the Senate's consideration of the final and adopted version arguably indicates that "services" was limited to its term of art meaning and that preemption *680 was limited to utility-type economic regulation. Those who advocate the common ordinary meaning of "services" may be ignoring fundamental cannons of statutory construction which require the examination of the object and policy of a statute. [FN84] The best way to determine congressional intent is to look at the meaning Congress gave the words when it enacted that legislation. [FN85]
Any argument that places reliance on the fact that § 1305 uses the term "services" in the plural instead of the singular is potentially misplaced. Congress used both "service" and "services" almost interchangeably in the legislative history. [FN86] Just as the word "service" has a specific *681 meaning in religion and in the game of tennis, it has a particular meaning in the aviation industry. It is this meaning which Congress used throughout the legislative history. Indeed, the House version was entitled the "Air Service Improvement Act," and it did not require more careful flight attendants. Its goal was to increase the flight options available to the public. [FN87]
In Diefenthal v. CAB [FN88] the Fifth Circuit recognized a common law cause of action for what actually amounts to tortious rendition of services under both the all-encompassing approach and the incidental services approach. [FN89] While dismissing the claim for lacking the requisite amount in controversy, the court recognized the existence of a claim for a flight attendant's alleged malicious behavior in refusing to seat the plaintiffs in a smoking section. [FN90] This holding seemingly supports the narrow view of the word "services." While § 1305 was not at issue in Diefenthal, the court discussed the power of the CAB to regulate air carrier "services" and to "specify a minimum quality of *682 service and a minimum frequency of schedule." [FN91] Also, the legislative history excerpts used by the court in the Diefenthal case are similar to those cited above. While the court rejected the Diefenthals' argument that "adequate services" only referred to frequency of flights, the "quality" the court spoke of is put in terms of the CAB's power to regulate the "type" of air service as well as the frequency. [FN92] Thus, because the court in Diefenthal recognized the plaintiffs' state common law tort claim, the court's definition of services did not encompass tort laws.
An examination of several federal regulations demonstrates that "service" is often used to describe the type and frequency of operations offered to passengers. For instance, anyone seeking a license to operate an airline must submit an application containing a "statement as to the type of aircraft [the] applicant proposes to use in the new service and whether such aircraft is presently owned by the applicant." [FN93] Another federal rule defines an airline's "route authority" as authority "to provide service between and among various points except the service which has been designated as essential air service." [FN94] Yet another regulation defines a "substantial change in operations" as including "changes in operations from charter to scheduled service or a large increase in the number of markets served." [FN95] Another regulation exempts small air taxi operators from certain federal economic regulations. [FN96] This regulation specifies that applicants or registrants as air taxi operators must describe the "type of service the carrier will offer (scheduled passenger, scheduled *683 cargo, mail under a U.S. Postal Service contract, on-demand passenger, on-demand cargo, or other service such as air ambulance operations, fire fighting or seasons operations)." [FN97] Taken together, these regulations demonstrate that the term "service" or "services" often describes only the type and frequency of operations offered to passengers and not the manner in which they are provided.
- General Indicators of Congressional Intent
There is nothing in the legislative history to suggest, even by inference, that Congress considered modifying or federalizing air carrier tort liability. [FN98] Certainly such an undertaking would merit discussion. Rather, the entire history, including the bills, the reports, and the floor debates, focuses on utility-type regulation of fares, routes, schedules and aircraft type. [FN99] In addition, strong evidence indicates that Congress intended to preserve the tort liability of air carriers. As part of the Airline Deregulation Act, Congress added the following provision to the original Federal Aviation Act:
(q) Insurance and Liability
(1) No certificate shall be issued or remain in effect unless the applicant for such certificate or the air carrier, as the case may be, complies with regulations or orders issued by the Board governing the filing and approval of policies of insurance or plans for self insurance in the amount prescribed by the Board which are conditioned to pay, within the amount of such insurance, amounts for which such applicant or such air carrier may become liable for bodily injuries to or the death of any person, or for loss of or damage to property of others, resulting from the operation or maintenance of aircraft under such certificate. [FN100]
It is evident that in 1978 Congress knew that the system *684 that would be in place after deregulation could subject airlines to such extensive tort liability that Congress required approval of insurance plans.
- Section 1305 Preemption Exceptions
Proponents of a broad application of § 1305 preemption are quick to point to the language of § 1305(b)(2) that specifically exempts the proprietary powers of airport operators and the regulation of flights over the State of Hawaii from preemption. [FN101] They argue that no other exceptions to preemption are indicated by Congress, thereby giving § 1305 a broad effect. By so arguing the total preemption proponents create another problem: under the broad interpretation of the word "services," a passenger injured anywhere in the continental United States due to an air carrier's negligence would have his state law based tort claim preempted; but, if fortunate enough to have crashed into the lush foliage and beautiful mountains of Maui, his state law claim would remain intact. This would be a ludicrous result and surely could not have been intended by Congress.
- Procedural Impact of § 1305
- General
Assuming complete preemption of state tort law claims, the practitioner must be prepared to deal with the radical and significant changes that would follow in approaching an airline tort claim. First, all such claims brought under state law are vulnerable to summary judgment and dismissal. Second, dismissal may be avoided only by pleading a federal claim. This assumes a specific federal claim may be implied in the federal aviation statutes and regulations, [FN102] or a federal common law claim can be recognized. [FN103] Third, the pleading of a federal claim may allow for removal of state court actions to federal court. Finally, the rendition of a judgment on either a state law or federal claim may result in an appeal on the very issues presented in this article.
- Removal Considerations
Ordinarily, a defendant wishing to remove a state claim to federal court is confronted with the well-pleaded complaint rule. This rule requires that the plaintiff's pleading must state a federal question on its face. [FN104] Since preemption is normally considered a defense, the federal question does not appear on the face of the pleading and is not subject to removal. [FN105] However, a corollary to this "well-pleaded complaint rule" is the "complete preemption" doctrine, which states that "[t]he preemptive force of certain Federal statutes is so great that they convert otherwise ordinary State law claims into Federal claims for the purposes of the 'well- pleaded complaint rule.' " [FN106] While courts appear to be divided on the issue, some have held that enactment of § 1305 represents an express manifestation of intent to preempt state law entirely with regard to the regulation of rates, routes, and services of an air *686 carrier. [FN107] In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, [FN108] the court clearly stated that: "[a]n examination of the preemption language in § 1305(a)(1) and its legislative history leads to the conclusion that Congress did intend to preempt so completely the particular area of state laws 'relating to rates, routes, or services' as to preclude state court actions." [FN109] As such, airlines faced with state law claims should argue that Congress intended such complete preemption in this area as to render any pleaded state law claim federal in nature and removable to federal court.
III. IS THERE A FEDERAL REMEDY FOR PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH CAUSE BY WRONGFUL
AIRLINE CONDUCT?
If Congress intended to preempt all state law causes of action relating to air carrier services, then one must ponder if any causes of action exist at federal law.
- Is There an Implied Private Cause of Action for Violations of the Federal
Aviation Act?
Several provisions of the Federal Aviation Act, and virtually every regulation promulgated thereunder, impose duties on air carriers that, if violated, may result in the injury of a passenger. [FN110] One of the most notable of these provisions imposes a duty on every air carrier to provide "safe and adequate service, equipment and facilities" to *687 its passengers. [FN111]
In Cort v. Ash, [FN112] the Supreme Court set forth four factors to be used in determining whether an implied cause of action for violation of a federal statute exists:
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted, ... that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of any legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely upon federal law? [FN113]
These factors form the template around which litigants must argue.
- Airlines' Argument
The airlines point to a host of cases holding that no federal implied private cause of action exists under various provisions of the FAA. [FN114] They maintain that proponents of an implied federal right of action have ignored the Fifth *688 Circuit's exemplary decision in Diefenthal v. CAB, [FN115] which specifically analyzes the Cort factors and holds that no implied cause of action exists under the "adequate service" language of § 1374(a). [FN116] The Diefenthal court first noted that § 1374(a) did not provide on its face that it protected any particular class of persons. [FN117] Second, the federal scheme already provided for the CAB to seek the injunctive relief which the Diefenthal's sought. [FN118] Therefore, there was no indication that Congress intended to create the cause of action propounded. [FN119] Third, the injunctive powers of the CAB were more than adequate to promote the concerns of the Diefenthals. [FN120] Thus, private enforcement would not advance the goals of the statute. [FN121] Finally, while the duty of adequate services is derived solely from federal law, this factor was not enough to imply the federal claims sought. [FN122] While Diefenthal did not specifically address § 1305, it was decided after the provision's enactment and, thus, the court could be presumed to have considered its preemptive effects when applying the Cort factors.
- Passengers' Argument
Supporters of an implied right of action contend that the airlines have missed the mark with this argument. They point out that Diefenthal and the other cases refusing to recognize a federal implied claim were all decided prior to O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc. [FN123] Thus, none were operating under the assumption that state common law was preempted by a "clear manifestation of Congressional intent" to federalize airline rates, routes and services. *689 Those cases assumed the existence of state law remedies.
Those courts were not operating under the assumption that all state tort claims relating to air carrier operations were preempted. Surely, if they had been, their analysis under Cort v. Ash would have been different. In Diefenthal, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to allow them to smoke under the "adequate services" provisions of § 1374. Arguably, a personal injury case arising under the "safe services" language will allow for a totally different analysis under Cort. The "safe service" language of § 1374 imposes a duty on air carriers to deliver their passengers to their destination safely and unharmed. [FN124]
If § 1305 indeed preempts passenger claims, then § 1374 provides a cause of action under the Cort v. Ash analysis. First, in the absence of state laws protecting them, passengers can look to no authority other than the Federal Aviation Act for protection. It provides the only other source of due care placed upon the carrier to transport passengers safely to their destinations. Indeed, § 1374's duty to provide safe service is aimed at protecting a distinct class of persons: passengers. As members of the class for whose benefit § 1374 was enacted, passengers have a right to expect safe service. In light of Congress' obvious intention that air carriers be subject to liability for bodily injury and death, as evidenced by the insurance provisions of the Act, the "safe services" provisions of § 1374 seem to be Congress' only remaining tool to protect injured or killed passengers (the obvious recipients of unsafe service). The argument here focuses on protection of passengers. Diefenthal is distinguishable because the court there recognized that the federal scheme was not designed to protect smokers, but to control them. [FN125]
Second, § 1305 provides explicit intent to create a federal*690 remedy. Most case authority previously discussing whether the Federal Aviation Act implies a cause of action held no cause of action implied because of the available state law remedies and the lack of congressional intent to preempt state law. One such case is Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service, Inc. [FN126] In Rogers, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against a fixed-base operator (FBO) for the death of certain occupants in a plane crash. The plane was leased by a third party to the FBO, who in turn orally rented it to the pilot, a relative of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought to hold the FBO vicariously liable for the negligence of the pilot. Because the Oklahoma law of bailments precluded the plaintiffs' claims against the FBO, plaintiffs sought to hold the FBO vicariously liable under Federal Aviation Act provisions and regulations that, if they implied a cause of action, would indeed create the desired vicarious liability. Section 1301(26) of article 49 of the United States Code provided that lessors were deemed to be operating the aircraft they lease, and 14 C.F.R. § 91.9 stated that no person may operate an aircraft unsafely. [FN127]
The court held that Ms. Rogers had no federal claim primarily for one reason: lack of Congressional intent to preempt the state laws involved. [FN128] In a well-reasoned and detailed opinion, the court carefully considered the plaintiffs' argument. The plaintiffs argued that "Congress clearly intended to preempt state law and to protect the public from the negligence and financial irresponsibility of pilots by imposing vicarious liability upon one who allows his aircraft to be flown by another." [FN129] The court stated:
We do not question that under its Commerce Clause powers Congress could preempt state law with regard to the liability for injuries resulting from air crashes. But we are *691 not convinced that in this instance Congress has clearly indicated any such intent to supersede state laws of bailments as related to the operation of aircraft. [FN130]
The court rejected the plaintiffs' analogy to maritime law on the ground that maritime law was made the subject of exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution. [FN131] In aviation, the Commerce Clause powers of Congress had not been exercised to create exclusive federal jurisdiction. [FN132] The court's opinion reads in part as follows:
Appellants' counter-argument quickly reaches the flaw in appellees' analogy to maritime law. The Constitution of the United States extends the judicial power of the federal courts to admiralty and maritime cases, and the federal courts have therefore been obliged to fashion a general maritime law in the absence of federal statute. State legislation which conflicts with general maritime law or federal statute is invalid.
Conversely, the Commerce Clause as interpreted by the courts has left state sovereignty unimpaired except where Congress has clearly indicated an intent to supersede state law.... The difference is clearly expressed by appellants' reply to the supplemental brief:
Under this constitutional grant, the federal courts, except insofar as precluded by Congressional enactment or inhibited by stare decisis, are free to recognize and apply a judge-made cause of action for wrongful death in an admiralty case, as was done in Moragne. The Constitution, however, has not granted the federal courts any comparable power to fashion their own common law remedies in tort cases arising in the airways.
It becomes clear that the development of the power of the federal government under these two constitutional provisions has been strikingly dissimilar. A clear mandate has been recognized in the maritime area for the establishment of uniform federal law, whereas the delicate problem of federal-state relations has resulted in a more stringent rule that federal preemption under the Commerce Clause *692 will not be presumed in the absence of a clear indication of the intent of Congress. [FN133]
The Rogers court stated that had congressional intent been clearly manifested, its "task would be correspondingly simpler." [FN134]
If § 1305 has a broad preemptive effect, encompassing passengers' claims for injuries, then Congress has presumably exercised its Commerce Clause powers to create exclusive federal jurisdiction and allow the application of federal remedies. In O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc. [FN135] in spite of plaintiff's claims that state law remedies were still preserved by § 1506, the court held that "section 1305 is a clear indication of Congressional intent to preempt and is controlling." [FN136] Section 1305 is obviously a clear manifestation of congressional intent to preempt. Whether or not § 1305 indicates a congressional intent to federalize air carrier tort liability is another question. But if state tort claims are preempted, then the second factor of Cort v. Ash may have to be satisfied. [FN137] Otherwise, the liability *693 insurance provisions of the Act would be rendered meaningless.
The third prong of the Cort v. Ash test requires less analysis. An implied remedy would definitely provide airlines with an added incentive to make flights safer, which is the primary purpose of the "safe services" duty of § 1374. The paltry penalties provided by the governmental scheme pale in comparison to the potential multi-million dollar liability that may arise from an air crash disaster. [FN138]
Finally, assuming state tort laws are preempted, air carrier tort liability would no longer be a matter traditionally relegated to state law under the fourth prong of the Cort v. Ash test. [FN139] Thus it would be appropriate to imply a federal remedy in absence of a state law remedy.
- Is There a Federal Common Law Cause of Action Available to Passengers
Injured by Airlines?
Assuming complete preemption and no implied federal statutory remedy, one must determine whether a passenger injured through an airline's negligence may assert a federal common law cause of action.
- Passengers' Argument
Proponents of such a federal common law remedy take *694 a straightforward approach: there should be a remedy for personal injury or death caused by wrongful air carrier conduct, whether such conduct falls within the federal domain (within the term "services") or within the state domain (outside of the term "services"). If the airlines are correct in their assertion that state law remedies have been preempted, and that no federal statutory remedy exists, then Congress must have delegated to the federal courts the responsibility for fashioning the rules of aviation law. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., [FN140] the United States Supreme Court fashioned a common law action for wrongful death under the authority granted to it under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. [FN141] The Court noted certain anomalies that would result if the current law did not recognize a federal common law claim. Among them were: (1) in territorial waters, identical conduct violating federal law produced liability if the victim was injured, but exculpated the defendant if the victim was killed; (2) identical breaches of duty resulting in death produced liability outside the three-mile limit, but not within the territorial waters of a state; and (3) a true seaman was provided with no remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a long-shoreman would have such a remedy when allowed by a state statute. [FN142]
Under the broad view of § 1305 (preempting all state law claims), similar anomalies result. A person wrongfully excluded from a flight would have a federal implied remedy under § 1374 of the Federal Aviation Act. [FN143] Likewise, a handicapped person victimized by discriminatory conduct of an airline could assert a claim under the Air *695 Carrier Access Act. [FN144] However, other persons who are physically injured by equally negligent and careless conduct on the part of the airlines lack a remedy. Moreover, those fortunate few who happen to have state law claims falling outside the scope of § 1305's preemption will be able to seek redress for their injuries, while those whose claims fall within the scope of § 1305 are subject to the piecemeal application of federal remedies. [FN145]
Federal courts today face the same practical considerations that spurred the Moragne decision with regard to the airline regulation scheme that has developed. [FN146] In addition, scholars have been quick to point out the factual *696 likeness between the maritime and aeronautical arenas. [FN147] The very nature of the "ocean of air" would suggest that matters in aviation be governed in a fashion similar to those in admiralty. In his treatise, one scholar discussed the problems created by the fact that aviation came into being after the drafting of the Constitution:
Much of the plaintiff's problem in aviation accident law, or in peculiar jury reactions to aviation cases, lies in a simple fact that many of us frequently forget that aviation is new. The first aviation case tried in England was heard in 1933. Chicago claims to have the busiest airport in the entire world. Yet the first Illinois case involving an airplane accident was also tried in 1933. To this day the appellate decisions of many states fail to list any aviation cases. Many basic questions concerning aviation are still to be decided. A federal district court, in 1954, stated that "The question of whether the air space over the seas is within the jurisdiction of admiralty has received little attention and is an open one." The question was not resolved until 1958 when the Second Circuit held that admiralty governed. As recently as 1935, law review articles appeared expressing the view that the entire ocean of air surrounding the earth was within the admiralty jurisdiction. [FN148]
The perceptive discussion of the similarities and differences that exist between maritime law and the law of aviation found in the Rogers case can be employed to assert the existence of a federal common law cause of action just as easily as it is employed to create an implied remedy. If the analysis in Rogers holds true, then a broad reading of § 1305 to include preemption of state law claims for wrongful air carrier conduct necessarily eliminates the critical distinctions between maritime and aviation law. *697 The court noted in Rogers that if Congress clearly indicated its legislative intent to preempt, then federal courts would be granted the "comparable power to fashion their own common law remedies in tort cases arising in the airways." [FN149] If § 1305 is a clear indication of congressional intent to preempt state tort law, the Rogers analysis permits the fashioning of a federal remedy.
- Airlines' Argument
The argument against a common law action is more difficult to make. There is no particular test that one must meet, as there is with implied remedies under Cort v. Ash. [FN150] The best argument is to attack the analogy to maritime law and argue that § 1305 is not a significant exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause powers to indicate "exclusive" federal jurisdiction. At the time of the enactment of the Constitution, maritime law was based on a significant preexisting body of common law. [FN151] Moreover, Article III of the Constitution is not a mere grant of jurisdiction, but specifically provides judicial "power" to the courts in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. [FN152] No such comparable grant of power is evidenced by § 1305. To make this argument, one must attack the Rogers case head on, and show that the language of O'Carroll does not provide the type of evidence needed to invoke the Moragne analogy.
- ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Some argue that no cause of action exists at all for personal injuries relating to an air carrier's rates, routes, or services. To counter any perceived injustice, they argue that passengers remain free to pursue an administrative remedy. In Anderson v. USAir, [FN153] the court stated:
Nevertheless, the absence of a private remedy does not leave airlines free to deny "safe and adequate service." A party alleging that an airline failed to provide the requisite service can pursue an appropriate administrative remedy. Under the Aviation Act, Department of Transportation (DOT) or the FAA is empowered to bring suit directly against an airline or seek other statutorily defined relief. [FN154]
Other federal district courts, in apparent reliance upon the Anderson decision, have made similar reference to the existence of an administrative remedy for passengers injured through wrongful air carrier conduct. [FN155] However, *699 the several statutes and regulations cited in Anderson do nothing to remedy passenger injuries and are merely penal in nature. [FN156] In fact, a careful review of the entire federal aviation scheme fails to disclose a single statute that provides for monetary damages to compensate for bodily injury or death of a passenger. [FN157]
- CONCLUSION
In Marbury v. Madison, [FN158] the United States Supreme Court recognized one of the most fundamental tenets of our system of jurisprudence:
*700 The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. In Great Britain, the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court. In the 3d vol. of his Commentaries, p. 23, Blackstone states two cases in which a remedy is afforded by mere operation of law.
"In all other cases," he says, "it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded."
And afterwards, p. 109. of the same vol., he says, "I am next to consider such injuries as are cognizable by the courts of the common law. And herein I shall for the present only remark, that all possible injuries whatsoever, that did not fall within the exclusive cognizance of either the ecclesiastical, military, or maritime tribunals, are for that very reason, within the cognizance of the common law courts of justice; for it is a settled and invariable principal in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress." The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. [FN159]
Other scholarly works have noted similar ideals. "Fundamental in our jurisprudence is the principal that for every wrong there is a remedy and that an injured party should be compensated for all damage proximately caused by the wrongdoer." [FN160]
The unjust results that would stem from complete preemption of an injured passenger's state law claims tend to indicate that Congress never meant to preempt such claims. However, it is not completely clear what Congress *701 intended to preempt when it employed the term "services" in § 1305. It is clear that Congress intended to leave a system in which airlines would be liable for personal injury and death arising out of their operations. Therefore, assuming that § 1305 does preempt all such claims, the absence of an administrative remedy compels recognition of a federal remedy.
[FNa1]. Stuart J. Starry practices law in Houston with the firm Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, a Professional Corporation. The author's practice includes representation of plaintiffs in aviation accident cases, including international aviation accident cases. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance and work of Richard Norman, a student at Baylor University School of Law and a law clerk at Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson.
[FN1] Pub.L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended primarily at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1389 (1988)).
[FN2] 49 U.S.C. § 1305 (1988).
[FN3] 52 Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (Supp.1992)).
[FN4] Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334, 1336 (9th Cir.1981).
[FN5] Ch. 601, § 1106, 52 Stat. 973, 1027 (1938) (current version at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988)).
[FN6] Pub.L. No. 85-726, § 201, 72 Stat. 744 (1958) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1988)).
[FN7] Id.
[FN8] Id. § 1506.
[FN9] Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified primarily at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1389 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
[FN10] Id. § 105, 92 Stat. at 1707-08 (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1988)).
[FN11] 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (1988).
[FN12] Representative Anderson, the chief sponsor of the House Bill and its version at § 1305, presented a section-by-section analysis. Anderson cited the CAB at the hearings on regulatory reform:
The existing declaration of policy, conceived and promulgated in 1938, is a reflection of the times in which it was born. Its orientation is toward the development and protection of an infant industry through public utility-type regulations over entry, exit and pricing.... With the passage of legislation such as the Air Service Improvement Act [the House version of the Airline Deregulation Act], loosening Federal regulation of airline service and fares, it is possible that some states will enact their own regulatory legislation, imposing restrictive utility type regulation on interstate airline service and fares. The Air Service Improvement Act includes a specific statutory provision precluding state interference with interstate service and fares.
123 Cong.Rec. 30,595 (1977) (statement of Rep. Anderson).
[FN13] See infra part II.
[FN14] 123 Cong.Rec. 30,595 (1977).
[FN15] 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir.1984).
[FN16] Section 54.1(a) of the California Civil Code provides in relevant part:
Blind persons, visually handicapped persons, deaf persons, and other physically disabled persons shall be entitled to full and equal access, as other members of the general public, to accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of all common carriers, airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad trains, motorbuses, streetcars, boats or any other public conveyances or modes of transportation, ... subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, or state or federal regulation, and applicable alike to all persons.
Cal.Civ.Code § 54.1(a) (West 1982).
[FN17] Hingson, 743 F.2d at 1415 (citations omitted).
[FN18] Id. at 1416.
[FN19] 818 F.2d 49 (D.C.Cir.1987).
[FN20] Id. at 56.
[FN21] Id. at 57.
[FN22] The Anderson opinion gives no explanation for this anomaly. There is little distinction between the tort of outrage claim and the duty of courteous service claim, other than the fact that the latter employed the word "service" as it was stated in Anderson's complaint. The court apparently seized on this use of the term "service" when applying the "rates, routes, and services" language of § 1305. If the actions of the flight crew in Anderson are part of the air carrier services that § 1305 was designed to prevent states from regulating, then the distinction drawn in Anderson seems baseless. See id. at 56-57.
[FN23] 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
[FN24] Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
[FN25] Id.
[FN26] See Calvin Davison & Lorraine B. Halloway, The Two Faces of Section 105 Airline Shield or Airport Sword, 56 J. Air L. & Com. 93 (1990).
[FN27] Smith v. America West Airlines, No. H-91-1550, 1991 WL 55402 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 30, 1991); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. H-90-2276 (S.D.Tex. Sept. 3, 1991); Garza v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. H-91-351 (S.D.Tex. Apr. 3, 1991); Kiefer v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. 9009353 (Dist. Ct. of Harris County, 129th Judicial Dist. of Texas, July 29, 1991).
[FN28] Howard v. Northwest Airlines, 793 F.Supp. 129 (S.D.Tex.1992).
[FN29] See O'Carroll, 863 F.2d at 12.
[FN30] Brief for Appellee at 9, Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., (5th Cir.1991) (No. 91-6037) (citing Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1076 (1988)).
[FN31] See Howard, 793 F.Supp. at 132.
[FN32] See 123 Cong.Rec. 30,595 (1977) (comments of Rep. Anderson).
[FN33] See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988).
[FN34] Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 500 (1988); Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1205 (5th Cir.1985).
[FN35] California v. ARC Am.Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989).
[FN36] Wardair Can., Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 6 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 738 (1984).
[FN37] Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
[FN38] English v. General Elect. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984).
[FN39] English, 469 U.S. at 79.
[FN40] See 49 U.S.C. § 1305. In Salley v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 723 F.Supp. 1164, 1166 (E.D.La.1989), the court analyzed § 1305 as an example of preemption due to interference or conflict with federal law. One scholar discusses the Salley decision:
In Salley v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the court also determined that § 1305 preempts only those state law claims that conflict with federal laws. Specifically, the court found that the state law claims were not in conflict with any Federal Aviation Act provisions and, therefore, no preemption resulted. Apparently ignoring the requisites of express preemption, the court found that § 1305 was "not preemption based on pervasive federal regulation, but preemption due to interference or conflict with federal law."
Given the fact that § 1305 constitutes an express preemption of any law, rule, or regulation that relates to rates, routes, or services, an analysis of the inconsistencies between state and federal rules is unnecessary. Thus, if any state law, rule, or regulation relates to rates, routes, or services, § 1305 should preempt it whether or not it is consistent with any similar federal laws.
Daniel Petroski, Airlines' Response to the DTPA Section 1305 Preemption, 56 J. Air L. & Com. 125, 144 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
[FN41] Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
[FN42] 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
[FN43] Id.
[FN44] FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S.Ct. 403, 407 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1987).
[FN45] 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
[FN46] Id. at 96-97.
[FN47] O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
[FN48] 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 925 (1990) (affirming preliminary injunction).
[FN49] Id. at 788.
[FN50] Id. at 783.
[FN51] 923 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.1990), vacated and remanded, 112 S.Ct. 2932 (1992).
[FN52] Id. at 660 (alteration in original).
[FN53] Id. at 661. The court did, however, hold Mr. West's claim for punitive damages preempted. Id.
[FN54] See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. West, 112 S.Ct. 2932 (1992).
[FN55] 112 S.Ct. 2031 (1992).
[FN56] Id.
[FN57] Id.
[FN58] Id. at 2037.
[FN59] Id.
[FN60] West, 923 F.2d at 659 (citing Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir.1981) and Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981)).
[FN61] Id. at 659-60.
[FN62] Brief for Appellee at 9, Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., (5th Cir.1991) (No. 91-6037) (citing Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1076 (1988)).
[FN63] H.R.Rep. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 94-95 (1978).
[FN64] 919 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir.1991).
[FN65] 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
[FN66] 776 F.Supp. 1194 (S.D.Tex.1991).
[FN67] Id. at 1199.
[FN68] Id. at 1197-1200 (footnotes omitted).
[FN69] Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport, 635 F.2d 67, 74 (2d Cir.1980); In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 734 F.Supp. 1425, 1428 (N.D.Ill.1990); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 721 F.Supp. 1185, 1187 (D.Colo.1988).
[FN70] 923 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir.1991).
[FN71] Id. at 1136.
[FN72] Id. at 1137-42.
[FN73] No. 90-2074 (5th Cir.1990) (per curiam, unpublished).
[FN74] Id. The Baugh opinion is unpublished and is arguably of no precedential value.
[FN75] Implementation of Preemption Provisions of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 44 Fed.Reg. 9948, 9948-51 (1979) (statements of General Policy).
[FN76] See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705, reprinted in House Comm. on Pub. Works and Trans., 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, at 1-53 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereafter Legislative History].
[FN77] 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1988).
[FN78] The introduction to the Legislative History sheds light on the scope of the intended regulation of fares, routes and services:
INTRODUCTION
This committee print is a legislative history of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, an act which frees the airlines from the restrictive system of economic regulation which has governed their operations since 1938.
...
The regulatory system established in 1938 subjected airlines to extensive economic regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board. If an airline wished to change the cities it served or the prices it charged, it was required to seek permission from the Civil Aeronautics Board. The Board could refuse to allow the airline to take actions which would benefit consumers and which the airline believed to be in its best interest. Even if the Board ultimately granted an airline's request, there could be years of delay before the airline could implement its proposal.
....
To remedy these deficiencies in the 1938 act, the Airline Deregulation Act frees the airlines from economic regulation on a phased and orderly basis. Following the basic approach of the House bill, the act includes a sunset provision which ends most economic regulation of domestic air service in 1985. As intermediate steps, the act ends the Civil Aeronautics Board's authority over domestic routes on December 31, 1981, and the Board's authority over domestic fares on January 1, 1983. [Note the similarity of the language with "rates, routes and services."]
In the years before sunset, the act requires CAB to increase competition. This is accomplished by a new policy statement requiring the Board to emphasize competition in its decisions; by liberalizing the test for authorization of new air service; and by placing procedural deadlines on the Board and giving the agency authority to adopt simplified procedures which will enable it to meet these deadlines.
Other provisions of the act establish specific programs to encourage new entry and added competition. The automatic entry program allows carriers to enter one new market a year and to protect one market a year against entry. The dormant authority program provides for prompt authorization of carriers in markets in which other carriers have authority to provide nonstop service, but are not using this authority. The fare flexibility provisions of the act permit carriers to raise fares by up to 5 percent a year or reduce them by up to 50 percent, without Board approval.
The act includes provisions which will insure that the transition to a more competitive system will not be damaging to small communities or to airline employees.
The act provides that all communities now listed on air carrier certificates are guaranteed continued air service for 10 years. Before the Board may allow a certificated carrier to suspend or reduce its service to a small community, the Board must find a replacement carrier. If necessary, the replacement carrier must be subsidized through a new community-based subsidy program, requiring use of aircraft appropriate for the community's needs.
....
In sum, the Deregulation Act represents a comprehensive and carefully thought-out plan for freeing the airline industry from excessive economic regulation. It should result in a more efficiently operated industry, able to respond promptly to the needs of consumers. The Public Works and Transportation Committee is proud of the major role it played in developing this historic legislation, led by Congressman Anderson, and Congressman Snyder, and ranking minority member of the full committee, Congressman Bill Harsha, and all other members who devoted their time and talents to this legislation.
Harold T. (Bizz) Johnson
Chairman, Committee on Public Works and Transportation
Legislative History, supra note 76, at v and vi.
[FN79] See id., at 264, 266.
[FN80] The proposed provision read as follows:
Federal Preemption
Sec. 105. No State including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the District of Columbia, the territories or possessions of the United States, political subdivision of a state, or political agency of two or more states, shall enact any law, regulation, or standard relating to rates, routes, services, or other matters regulated by the Board in interstate, overseas or foreign air transportation or the transportation of mail by aircraft. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of any state or political subdivision over intrastate air transportation of intrastate air carriers.
123 Cong.Rec. 4214 (1977).
[FN81] Id. at 4219.
[FN82] After the Conference Committee adopted the House version (the final version), the Senate consideration of the conference report on § 1305 reads as follows:
Mr. Bentsen. The bill establishes a new section of the Federal Aviation Act under which Federal law would preempt State regulation as soon as an intrastate airline received any interstate authority, no matter how limited those interstate activities may be.
....
My question is whether, under the bill now before us, the CAB will be able to continue to use its exemption authority to exempt intrastate carriers which are conducting some interstate services from Federal regulation where the CAB deems it is appropriate.
....
Mr. Cannon. That is correct. Under this bill, the CAB may exempt intrastate carriers from Federal regulation where they are conducting some services, such as the use of alternate airports that take the carrier out of State and services provided within a State where the passengers are interstate or whenever else the Board finds an exemption to be in the public interest.
Mr. Bentsen. My understanding is correct though, is it not, that this bill does not alter the regulatory authority that States now possess over the intrastate routes?
Mr. Cannon. That is correct. This bill does nothing to change the States' jurisdiction over the operations of those intrastate carriers which continue to provide solely intrastate services.
Mr. Kennedy. Section 105 of the conference bill states in part: No state or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier granted the authority under this title to provide interstate air transportation.
I am concerned that long recognized powers of the airport operators to deal with noise and other environmental problems at the local level may be inadvertently curtailed by this section. Am I correct in stating that actions of the airport operators, presently accepted as valid exercises of proprietary powers, are not intended to be interpreted as "relating to ... routes or services" of air carriers and are not intended to be preempted by the powers created by this section?
124 Cong.Rec. 37,419 (1978) (emphasis added).
[FN83] 123 Cong.Rec. 30,595 (1977). In specifically discussing the new preemption provision, the analysis provided in total:
Section 3. Federal Preemption
- Existing law
The existing law contains no explicit recognition of Federal preemption of interstate air transportation which prevents the States from regulating interstate air service and fares. However, preemption is implicit in the present Act, and has been recognized by the courts.
Under existing law as interpreted by the courts, it is reasonably clear that the states have no authority to regulate interstate service and fares. However, some states have asserted jurisdiction to regulate intrastate fares charged by interstate carriers. This has led to difficulties. The interstate carriers frequently provide service between two points in a state (e.g., Philadelphia-Pittsburgh, San Francisco-Los Angeles) as part of longer interstate routes. This means that an interstate carrier may be carrying two types of passengers between points in a single state; intrastate passengers whose entire journey is between these points, and interstate passengers who are traveling between two points in the same state and then stopping over or connecting and continuing their journey. In some cases the CAB and the state have reached different results in regulating the fares charged between a pair of points, and as a result, passengers on the same flight traveling between the same points have been charged different fares. The CAB has asserted jurisdiction to remedy this discriminatory practice, but the Board's decision has been appealed to the courts and the outcome is uncertain.
- Changes made by Air Service Improvement Act
With the passage of legislation such as the Air Service Improvement Act, loosening Federal regulation of airline service and fares, it is possible that some states will enact their own regulatory legislation, imposing restrictive utility-type regulation on interstate airline service and fares. The Air Service Improvement Act includes a specific statutory provision precluding state interference with interstate service and fares. This is not intended to preempt the exercise of normal proprietary functions by airport operators, such as the establishing of curfews and landing fees which are consistent with other requirements in Federal law and do not unduly burden interstate commerce.
It is also desirable to remove the discrimination which arises from conflicting Federal and state regulations governing interstate and intrastate passengers on the same flight. The Air Service Improvement Act accomplishes this by providing that the states may not regulate the intrastate service or fares of interstate carriers. There is one situation in which state authority over intrastate service and fares is preserved. There are now several large intrastate air carriers in Texas, California, and Florida which have pioneered in providing low fare service. Under the Air Service Improvement Act these carriers will be eligible to enter at least one interstate market per year. For a period of time after the carriers begin entering interstate markets they may remain primarily intrastate carriers and it seems appropriate to preserve the states' authority to regulate their intrastate service and fares. The Act provides that so long as carriers which were exclusively intrastate in August 1977 continue to derive more than 50% of their revenues from intrastate operations, the states will continue to regulate their intrastate service and fares.
Id. at 30,595-96 (emphasis added).
Additionally, Congress was operating under the assumption that under "existing law," courts had already determined that the states could not regulate service and fares. Yet Congress was aware of the co-existence of air carrier tort liability. Thus, arguably, Congress' interpretation of services could not have included tort liability.
[FN84] The Supreme Court has required the review of overall legislative purpose in addition to the simple analysis of statutory language:
Of course, the "starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (Powell, J., concurring). But the text is only the starting point. As Justice O'Connor explained last term: "In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy."
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222 (1986); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2403 (1991) (recognizing "the maxim of statutory construction noscitur sociis that a word is known by the company it keeps.").
[FN85] St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 546 (1978) (statutory language is to be read in light of customary understanding of words at time of enactment).
[FN86] See Legislative History, supra note 76, at 2 (providing transport from one point to another); id. at 14 ("nonstop service between any pair of points"); id. at 15 ("impact of the new services on the national air route structure"); id. at 16 (between points); id. at 21 (local service); id. at 27 (reduced levels of service due to strike); id. at 28 (passenger service, cargo service); id. at 31 (serving eligible points); id. at 104 (pooling of service); id. at 110 (frequency, type of equipment to assure service); id. at 120 ("air routes and services"); id. at 140 (through service and joint rates); id. at 153 (air services); id. at 171 ("prices, route structures, and the nature and variety of air services to be set by the independent forces of the free market"); id. at 219 (route service); id. at 223 (transcontinental service); id. at 225 (serve a route); id. at 233 (variety of air service patterns non- stop, multi-stop, etc.); id. at 254 ("the Board made a comprehensive survey of all commuter replacement services and found that on the average, traffic increased 71 percent after the commuter initiated service, and flight frequencies increased by over 100 percent with the commuter service"); id. at 258 ("minimum service requirement" of "not less than two round trips a day 5 days a week"); id. at 260 ("serving the U.S. mainland ... experimental service patterns ... termination of service,"); id. at 261 (charter services); id. at 262 ("services" of "scheduled" and "charter" operators); id. at 264 ("services" between points, specifically discussing Senate preemption provision); id. at 265 ("interstate services" discussing preemption of state regulation via state Public Utilities Commission); id. at 274 (classes of service, such as deluxe, coach, night coach); id. at 294 (scheduled air transport equals regular route service); id. at 319 (ratemaking elements include class of service); id. at 380 (remarks of Mr. Schmitt about the "lessening of such services as airlines remove aircraft to more lucrative routes"); id. at 391 (Mr. Goldwater's remarks regarding airlines abandoning services to smaller communities in order to compete in more lucrative, dense, long-haul markets); id. at 404 (increased frequency of flights equals better service); id. at 412 (large aircraft services, small aircraft services, "services which the Board cannot specify as to timing and aircraft type"); id. at 417 (Mr. McGovern's remarks regarding "loss of total service between cities A and B"); id. at 418 (Mr. McGovern's remarks regarding "downgrading of service with smaller aircraft"); id. at 434 (expanded services); id. at 447 ("interconnecting network of air services"); id. at 510 ("cities it serves or price it charges," "route moratorium" affecting amount of "service" airlines could provide); id. at 516 (certificate restrictions requiring a carrier to make a stop at one city when operating between two other cities which limit the "service" the carrier can provide); id. at 769, ("route service"); id. at 774 (better service equated with increased carriers on routes and increase in number of flights); id. at 975 ("fare and service competition," "opened up routes to additional service").
[FN87] See Legislative History, supra note 76, at 509-12.
[FN88] 681 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1107 (1983).
[FN89] Id. at 1052-53.
[FN90] Id.
[FN91] Id. at 1046 (emphasis added). The court specifically mentions a case upholding the CAB's authority to specify the "type of vehicle" to be used. Id. at 1045 (citing Crescent Express Lines v. United States, 320 U.S. 401, 408 (1943)). The example of "quality" regulation at hand was the CAB regulation of smoking areas, even after the Deregulation Act. Id. at 1047. This type of regulation does not encompass every act of the airline; nor does it encompass tort law.
[FN92] Id. at 1044 ("both quantity and the kind").
[FN93] 14 C.F.R. § 201.4(5)(c) (emphasis added).
[FN94] Id. § 204.2(l) (emphasis added).
[FN95] Id. § 204.2(m) (emphasis added).
[FN96] Id. § 298.21(c)(i)(2).
[FN97] Id. (emphasis added).
[FN98] See Legislative History, supra note 76, at 1-53.
[FN99] Id.
[FN100] 49 U.S.C. app. § 1371(q) (1988).
[FN101] See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(b)(2) (1988).
[FN102] The federal aviation program as set forth in the United States Code provides only a hodgepodge of remedies for very specific types of wrongful conduct. For example, it has been held that passengers who are the victims of airline discrimination have a cause of action pursuant to the anti- discrimination sections of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(b) (1988). See, e.g., Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 567 F.2d 290 (5th Cir.1978); Mahaney v. Air France, 474 F.Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y.1979); Roman v. Delta Airlines, Inc, 441 F.Supp. 1160 (N.D.Ill.1977); Valentine v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 365 A.2d 475 (N.J.Super.1976). Conversely, courts have almost uniformly denied the existence of a cause of action for breach of an airline's duty to provide "safe and adequate service," a duty imposed by 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(a) (1988). See, e.g., Anderson v. USAir, 818 F.2d 49, 54 (D.C.Cir.1987); Deifenthal v. CAB, 681 F.2d 1039, 1048-50 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1107 (1983). It should be noted that the results in Anderson and Deifenthal may have been different had the courts in those cases assumed a broad reading of § 1305 preemption. See discussion infra parts III and IV.
[FN103] See infra part III.
[FN104] Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936).
[FN105] Stewart v. American Airlines, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 1193, 1196 (S.D.Tex.1991).
[FN106] Id. at 1196 (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)).
[FN107] Petroski, supra note 40, at 145 (citing State v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., No. 3-89-0713-H (N.D.Tex. Apr. 19, 1989)); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773, 787 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 926 (1990)).
[FN108] 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 926 (1990).
[FN109] Id. at 787.
[FN110] For example, Subchapter VI of the Federal Aviation Act deals with Safety Regulation of Civil Aeronautics. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1421(f) (1988) (collision avoidance systems); id. § 1425 (maintenance of equipment in air transportation). In addition, there are 20 provisions in the Code of Federal Regulations that regulate deicing requirements. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 135.149 (1992) (general equipment requirements). There are also many provisions that regulate aircraft engine safety inspections. See, e.g., id. § 21.21 (inspection and tests); id. § 125.247 (inspection programs and maintenance). It is easy to see how failure to comply with such regulations could foreseeably result in injury to airline passengers.
[FN111] 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1988).
[FN112] 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
[FN113] Id. at 78 (citations omitted). It should be noted that the four factors set forth in Cort v. Ash do not constitute a test, but are merely factors relevant to the more significant inquiry of general congressional intent. Id.
[FN114] See Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408, 1414 (9th Cir.1984) (implied private right of action under § 1374(b) for discrimination, but no federal implied right of action under § 1374(a) for inadequate service); Kodish v. United Airlines, 628 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir.1980) (no federal implied right of action under §§ 1374(b) or 1302(a)(3) for age discrimination among pilots); Caceres Agency v. Trans World Airways, 594 F.2d 932, (2nd Cir.1979) (no federal implied private cause of action under § 1374(b) for airline's discrimination among travel agents); Rauch v. United Instruments, 548 F.2d 452 (3rd Cir.1976) (no federal implied private right of action under § 1421 for defective equipment); Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 544 F.2d 134 (3rd Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977) (no federal implied private cause of action under § 1374(b) or § 1381 for deceptive trade practices); Danna v. Air France, 463 F.2d 407 (2d Cir.1972) (no federal implied private cause of action under § 1374(b) for fare discriminations).
[FN115] 681 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir.1982).
[FN116] Id. at 1048-50.
[FN117] Id. at 1049.
[FN118] Id.
[FN119] Id.
[FN120] Id. at 1050.
[FN121] Id.
[FN122] Id.
[FN123] 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
[FN124] This is much like the duty imposed by Louisiana law discussed in Seidman v. American Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir.1991).
[FN125] Diefenthal, 681 F.2d at 1049.
[FN126] 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
[FN127] Id. at 1391-92.
[FN128] Id. at 1393-95.
[FN129] Id. at 1392.
[FN130] Id. at 1393.
[FN131] Id. at 1395.
[FN132] Id.
[FN133] Id. (citations ommitted).
[FN134] Id. at 1394.
[FN135] 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
[FN136] Id. at 13.
[FN137] The Cort discussion of the second factor indicates that it is based on a general analysis of congressional intent, which includes consideration of the relationship between state and federal law in providing additional remedies. Indeed, the Supreme Court analyzed the statute there in question (which prohibited corporate expenditures in campaigns for federal office) and stated:
True, in situations in which it is clear that federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be controlling. But where, as here, it is at least dubious whether Congress intended to vest in the plaintiff class rights broader than those provided by state regulation of corporations, the fact that there is no suggestion at all that § 610 may give rise to a suit for damages or, indeed, to any civil cause of action, reinforces the conclusion that the expectation, if any, was that the relationship between corporations and their stockholders would continue to be entrusted entirely to state law.
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82-84 (1975).
Assuming preemption, there can be no expectation that the relationship between the airlines and the passengers would be entrusted entirely to state law. The opposite is true, and in light of the insurance provisions in § 1371(q), it is clear that federal law has granted passengers the right to damages for personal injury or death.
[FN138] See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1471 (1988) (a punitive section merely designed to fine airlines from $1,000 to $10,000 per violation); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472 (1988) (establishing criminal penalties); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1487 (1988) (providing the district court with the power to enforce the above-cited provisions); 14 C.F.R. § 13.5 (1992) (allowing the DOT to process private complaints, tracking the statutory remedies of a $1,000 penalty per violation).
[FN139] In analyzing the fourth Cort factor, the Supreme Court placed emphasis on the current state law scheme governing corporations: "Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation." Cort, 422 U.S. at 84. If one accepts a federal scheme where no state can interfere with the regulation of commercial air travel, then under Cort the scheme requires the existence of a federal cause of action.
[FN140] 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
[FN141] Id. at 395-96.
[FN142] Id.
[FN143] This cause of action has typically been asserted as an "abuse of discretion" case, asserting that the pilot in command abused the discretion given to him by 49 U.S.C. app. § 1511 in removing passengers in the interests of safety. Section 1374(b) prohibits giving unreasonable preference to one passenger over another and has been interpreted to limit the pilot's § 1511 discretion. See, e.g., O'Carroll, 863 F.2d at 12-13.
[FN144] 49 U.S.C. app. § 1347 (1988).
[FN145] The district court in Stewart v. American, 776 F.Supp. 1194, 1197-98 (S.D.Tex.1991), attempting to reconcile recent Fifth Circuit holdings, drew an equally arbitrary distinction. The Stewart court held that § 1305 does not preempt claims of passengers injured in incidents related to an airline crash disaster, but does preempt claims of persons merely injured by negligent rendition of flight crew service. Id. at 1198.
[FN146] The Court in Moragne noted that general public policy favoring the creation of federal common law claims can be derived from the overall purpose of federal statutory schemes. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 390-93. The Court stated: "This appreciation of the broader role played by legislation in the development of the law reflects the practices of common-law courts from the most ancient times.... '[M]uch of what is ordinarily regarded as 'common law' finds its source in legislative enactment.' " Id. at 392 (citations omitted). The Court in Moragne went on to use the general purposes of the many existing federal maritime statutes as its source of the general principals of its newly-fashioned remedy.
Arguably Congress has provided Article III courts with the authority to do so by extending its Commerce Clause powers through the preemptive intent evidenced by § 1305. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1988). The general purpose of the federal aviation statutory scheme is to provide safe, efficient service to its passengers. Id. § 1302. Many remedies have already been created by Congress, albeit in a piece-meal fashion. A federal common law cause of action for negligence in operating an air carrier, or providing air carrier services, is consistent with the goals of the federal statutory scheme. Lower courts could be guided by federal court precedents in the areas of maritime law and previously implied aviation causes of action. As the court in Moragne recognized, the lower courts were well-equipped to deal with the details of the newly-created cause of action:
We do not determine this issue now, for we think its final resolution should await further sifting through the lower courts in future litigation.... The experience thus built up counsels that a suit for wrongful death raises no problems unlike those that have long been grist for the judicial mill.
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 408.
[FN147] See, e.g., David K. Linnan, Iran Air Flight 655 and Beyond: Free Passage, Mistaken Self-Defense, and State Responsibility, 16 Yale J. Int'l L. 245 (1991).
[FN148] Lee S. Kriendler, 1 Aviation Accident L. § 1.01, at 1-4 (1991) (citing Arnold W. Knauth, Aviation & Admiralty, 6 Air L.Rev. 226, 227 n. 7 (1935); Van Vechter Veeder, The Legal Relation Between Aviation and Admiralty, 2 Air L.Rev. 29 (1931); Report of the Special Committee On the Law of Aviation of the American Bar Association, 46 ABA Rep. 77-97, 498-530 (1921); George G. Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law, 6 Cornell L.Q. 271, 303-05 (1921)).
[FN149] Rogers, 435 F.2d at 1395.
[FN150] 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
[FN151] While our American system of maritime law draws heavily from our English ancestors, we can trace some general concepts of admiralty law back even further. In writings from Babylonian times until the collapse of the Roman empire, there remains evidence of maritime doctrines that persist to this day:
[t]he power of a shipmaster to throw cargo overboard to save a ship and other cargo (jettison), and the duty of the ship and saved cargo to reimburse the jettisoned cargo's owners so that all share in proportion to the property values (general average); and the concept of a loan secured by a ship (bottomry) in which the borrower's personal liability is cancelled if the ship is lost. The body of ancient law is referred to loosely as the 'Rhodian sea law.' No primary sources persist, so far as is known, but secondary references are fairly common in Greek and Latin writers, and Rhodes was a sufficiently important port in its heyday (around 500 B.C.) to have given rise to a large body of litigation and maritime disputes and to compilation and codification of the commonest doctrines.
Nicholas J. Healy & David J. Sharpe, Cases and Materials on Admiralty 3 (1974).
[FN152] The relevant portion of Art. III, § 2 of the United States Constitution reads as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States,--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, amended by U.S. Const. amend. XI.
[FN153] 818 F.2d 49 (D.C.Cir.1987).
[FN154] Id. at 49, 55.
[FN155] Howard v. Northwest Airlines, 793 F.Supp. 129 (S.D.Tex.1992); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, No. H-90-2276 (S.D.Tex. Sept. 3, 1991).
[FN156] First, 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(6) (1988) merely empowers the Secretary of Transportation to establish reasonable rules, regulations and "minimum" standards governing practices and procedures for safety in air commerce. Not only does this do nothing to compensate injured passengers, but it also shows that Congress really contemplated that the Aviation Act only provide "minimum" standards for safety, allowing states to provide consistent but stricter tort liability. Next, § 1511 merely gives an air carrier authority to refuse transportation to a passenger if allowing the passenger to travel would be detrimental to the safety of the flight. This does not provide most passengers any remedy whatsoever. Section 1471 is a punitive section designed to fine airlines from $1,000 to $10,000 per violation. This does nothing to compensate injured passengers as contemplated by Congress. Section 1472 establishes criminal penalties and does nothing to further the civil liability contemplated by Congress. Under this criminal penalty section the list of violations is painfully narrow and is aimed at punishing wayward pilots and passengers. Section 1482 only establishes a complaint procedure and does not constitute any remedy for injured passengers. Section 1482(d)(3) cited by the Anderson court merely deals with correcting discriminatory rates and practices and will do nothing for compensating personal injury claims. Finally, the Anderson court cites § 1487, which merely provides the district court with the power to enforce the above-cited provisions. If the district court enforced an order that an airline pay the FAA $1,000, or even $10,000, that would do very little to assist an injured passenger in getting the compensation that Congress clearly contemplated in § 1371(q). Such a result may be tolerable in a discrimination case like Anderson where the plaintiff was a handicapped passenger with a political, rather than personal agenda, but not in most other cases. Query: What type of remedy would a $10,000 penalty be for 200 passengers killed in an air crash disaster?
The lower court in Anderson cites 14 C.F.R. § 13.5, as well as 14 C.F.R. §§ 302.201-.206. These procedures merely allow the DOT to process private complaints and track the statutory remedies of a $1,000 penalty per violation.
[FN157] See 14 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-49.55, 61.1-139.343, 141.11- 199.31, 201.1-415.31, 1201.100-1271.600 (1992); 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-08, 1324-25, 1341-59, 1371-89, 1401-06, 1421-32, 1441- 43, 1461-63, 1471-75, 1481-90, 1501-19, 1521-23, 1531-42, 1551-57 (1988).
[FN158] 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
[FN159] Id. at 163.
[FN160] Robert S. Thompson & John A. Sebert, Jr., Remedies: Damages, Equity and Restitution, § 1.02, at 1-15 (1983) (citations omitted).
END OF DOCUMENT
Torts at Twenty Thousand Feet
The American Bar Association (ABA) publishes a magazine for trial lawyers called “The Brief.” Mr. Starry was asked by the ABA to educate its members about a trend that was occurring at the time. Airlines had been getting personal injury cases dismissed on the basis of the preemption doctrine, through which some Personal Injury claims may be barred by federal law. In his article, “Torts at Twenty Thousand Feet” Mr. Starry explains the preemption doctrine and how it had been abused by airlines to dismiss tort claims brought by injured passengers. To read the article, click the button below.
ABA Brief

Copr. © West 1999 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
23-FALL BRIEF 8
(Cite as: 23-FALL Brief 8)
Brief
Fall, 1993
*8 TORTS AT TWENTY THOUSAND FEET
Federal Preemption in Commercial Aviation
Stuart J. Starry [FNa1]
Copyright © 1993 by the American Bar Association; Stuart J. Starry
Flight 017 was an hour and ten minutes out of Baltimore when it ran into foul weather. Captain Bill Conrad flipped on the sign instructing passengers to buckle up and then commenced a gradual 5,000-foot climb out of the storm. The flight crew was just starting dinner service. Passenger Rick Keeton, seated on the aisle, was craning his neck to identify the culinary treat of the day. Plates began to rattle. Suddenly the starboard wing was thrust down by a renegade air current. The L-1011 simultaneously dropped 100 feet, effectively ruining Rick's appetite.
Captain Conrad announced to the passengers that they could expect some turbulence for the next hour of the flight. The flight crew continued serving dinner. The turbulence worsened as Rick watched the beverage cart approach his row. Suddenly the aircraft lurched powerfully upward, then dipped. Flight attendants clawed frantically for support. Rick never saw the stainless steel coffee pot that flew over his seat, spattering him with its boiling contents and causing third-degree burns to his scalp, face, neck, and shoulders. Over a year later, even with the benefit of four skin-graft operations, Rick is still disfigured.
You first learn of the incident when Rick contacts you for representation in his suit against the airline. You file a negligence action in state court, knowing that Rick Keeton and the airline are both residents of the same state. Instead of answering your lawsuit and deposing your client, the airline removes your case to federal court, alleging federal question jurisdiction. Two days later, you receive a motion to dismiss your case for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
Although it may seem farfetched to some, this scenario has been playing itself out in many courts across the country. It is perhaps taken for granted that when an airline passenger suffers personal injury or death as a result of tortious conduct on the part of an airline, he or she may maintain a state common law or statutory cause of action against the airline. However, in the wake of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and certain recent federal cases interpreting that act, an issue has emerged that has sent shockwaves through the airline industry and, at the same time, created a rift among the federal circuit courts. That issue is whether § 105 of the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1305, preempts all state common law tort causes of action for wrongful air carrier conduct.
What are the arguments and strategies on both sides of the preemption issue? Should an implied federal statutory remedy be recognized? In the absence of a statutory remedy, should *9 the victims of airline negligence be granted a federal common law cause of action?
Regulating the airlines
Airline regulation began fifty-five years ago when Congress promulgated the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. [FN1] This act created the Civil Aeronautics Authority, which in 1940 was renamed the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and charged with regulating commercial aviation. [FN2]
The act also contained a "savings clause," 49 U.S.C. § 1506, which provided that nothing in the act would "abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of [the] Act [would be] in addition to such remedies." [FN3] Thus, the state law duties of common carriers, which had been applied to railroads and other means of public transportation of the time, would be the applicable standard for the fledgling airline industry.
The revised Federal Aviation Act of 1958 retained the CAB and created the Federal Aviation Administration. [FN4] It also left untouched the savings clause (§ 1506), thus providing viable state common law and statutory remedies for airline negligence.
In 1978, Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act [FN5] to remove the utility-type federal regulatory structure and encourage and develop an air transportation system that "relies on competitive market forces to determine the quality, variety and price of air services." Although the savings clause was again left unchanged, Congress enacted a federal preemption provision at § 105 of the act (now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1305), which reads in pertinent part as follows:
[N]o state or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political agency of two or more states shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to provide air transportation. [FN6]
Through promulgation of § 1305, Congress intended to prevent the states from filling the regulatory void created by the Airline Deregulation Act. However, because a lawsuit can have a regulatory effect on airline conduct, some courts have interpreted this provision to mean that all state common law claims that relate to the rates, routes, or services of an air carrier are preempted. This seems to be inconsistent with the Airline Deregulation Act's focus on removing utility-type regulation. It is this preemption provision and its varying interpretations that have given rise to controversy.
The "shield": § 1305 after deregulation
In the fifteen years since the adoption of § 1305, a line of federal decisions has slowly broadened its scope. Under these decisions, § 1305 may possibly apply to anything that an airline does.
This line of cases began in 1984 with Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, [FN7] in which a blind passenger who was forced to sit in a bulkhead seat filed suit in federal court alleging that the airline's actions constituted unlawful discrimination. His complaint contained fourteen causes of action under both federal and state statutes as well as state common law. Among these were a claim for intentional infliction of mental distress and a claim under California Civil Code § 54.1, which required that handicapped persons be given "full and equal access" to air carrier accommodations.
In preempting the claim based on the California statute, the Ninth Circuit rejected the passenger's argument that the California law did not conflict with federal law and stated:
Section 1305(a)(1) preemption is not limited to those state laws or regulations that conflict with federal law. It preempts state laws and regulations "relating to rates, routes, or services." Regulation of air carrier seating policies for handicapped passengers involves the regulation of services within the meaning of § 1305(a)(1). [FN8]
However, the Ninth Circuit also held that Hingson's common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress were not preempted. Thus, Hingson can be read as holding that enforcement of state legislative enactments that impose utility-type regulation are preempted by § 1305, leaving common law tort claims intact.
Three years later, in Anderson v. USAir, Inc., [FN9] the District of Columbia Circuit was faced with an almost identical set of facts. In Anderson, a blind passenger was prohibited by the flight crew from sitting in a row next to an overwing emergency exit. The passenger brought suit against the airline, alleging, among other claims, violation of a common law "obligation ... to provide equal and courteous service to all." [FN10] The court held that, even if applicable in the case at hand, a state common law obligation to give courteous service is expressly preempted by § 1305. Interestingly, the court did not hold that Anderson's claim of the tort of outrage (which is comparable to a claim of breach of duty of courteous service) was similarly preempted, but rather dismissed the claim on its merits. [FN11] Thus, Anderson expanded the scope of Hingson by interpreting § 1305 to preempt at least some state common law claims.
Finally, in O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc. [FN12] in 1989, a passenger was removed from an aircraft and later jailed because of his unruly behavior and apparent intoxication. He subsequently brought suit against the airline for false imprisonment, assault and battery, and negligence, arising out of his allegedly wrongful exclusion from the flight. On appeal of a $260,000 verdict, the defendant airline argued that § 1305 preempted any state law claim for wrongful exclusion. The Fifth Circuit agreed. All of O'Carroll's claims *10 were held preempted, and the entire lower court proceeding was vacated.
As one might expect, news of this freshly discovered "shield" spread quickly throughout the airline industry. [FN13] Since O'Carroll, many courts have held a variety of state law claims preempted, [FN14] including at least one case involving the death of a passenger. [FN15] Because of the seemingly unjust results, courts have not been unanimous in their interpretations of the breadth of § 1305. To fully understand the divergence of judicial interpretations, it is helpful to examine the arguments that have been advanced by both airlines and passengers.
The airlines, in effect, have taken the position that all state law causes of action for tortious conduct by an airline are expressly preempted by the plain language of § 1305. Any state cause of action for negligence of an airline necessarily "relates" to that airline's "services," because it is hard to imagine a single thing done by an airline that does not fall within the plain meaning of the word "services."
Opponents of the total preemption argument have attacked the "plain meaning" approach with a different commonsense approach: Congress could not possibly have intended to preempt all state tort causes of action in enacting § 1305, because this would effectively leave no remedy for a passenger who is injured through the negligent conduct of an airline. Passengers argue that the primary objective of the Airline Deregulation Act was to increase competition in the airline industry by purposefully creating a void of economic regulation while still ensuring passenger safety. To accomplish this goal, the act eliminated federal control of the rates airlines charge, the routes airlines fly, and the cities to which the airlines provide service. Passengers also argue that because Congress enacted § 1305 without modifying the savings clause, Congress intended the airlines to remain free from state economic regulation while still being governed by common law negligence standards.
The presumption against preemption
When Congress legislates in an area traditionally relegated to the states, such as common law actions for negligence, there is a strong presumption against preemption of state law. [FN16] This presumption can be overcome only by demonstrating a clear and manifest congressional purpose. [FN17] Thus, as with every examination of a statutory provision's preemptive effect, we must first look to the intent of Congress. [FN18] What did Congress intend to achieve through its enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978?
Congress may preempt state authority in any one of three ways: 1) by so stating in express terms; 2) by so occupying a field that it would upset the system to allow conflicting state law as an available alternative to litigants; and 3) by enacting a narrowly construed federal statute that so conflicts with existing state law as to render compliance with both impossible. [FN19] Section 1305 is unquestionably an express preemption provision. Hence, the question becomes not whether Congress intended to preempt state laws relating to an air carrier's services but rather to what extent that preemption was intended.
"Relating to"
Basic rules of statutory construction dictate that absent contrary congressional intent, statutory language should be given its ordinary meaning. [FN20] Congress used a phrase very close to the "relating to" language of § 1305 in § 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which is a preemption provision similar to § 1305. Congress said that ERISA "shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ...." [FN21] Courts have interpreted the phrase "relates to," as used in ERISA, broadly. [FN22]
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., an ERISA case, the Supreme Court stated that a law "relates to" a subject "if it has a connection with or reference to" that subject. [FN23] The airlines have urged that § 1305 be given the same broad interpretation that ERISA's § 514 has been given.
Following on the heels of O'Carroll [FN24] in 1989, which held that all of the plaintiffs' claims were preempted, another Fifth Circuit case, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, [FN25] was decided in the following year. Mattox involved a public state cause of action brought by the Texas attorney general under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). [FN26] TWA, Continental, and British Air were alleged to have engaged in deceptive fare advertising in violation of that act. The airlines subsequently sought to enjoin enforcement of the DTPA by arguing that § 1305 foreclosed the availability of such a state law claim. The district court granted the preliminary injunction. In reviewing that decision, the court of appeals explained:
Although the state laws against deceptive advertising are not aimed specifically at airlines, and clearly do not attempt to set rates, the conclusion is inescapable that such laws do "relate to" rates when applied to airline fare advertising. [FN27]
The Mattox case indicates that judicial enforcement of statutory enactments not specifically targeting airlines is *11 nonetheless preempted if such enforcement will have an effect on airline rates, routes, or services.
In 1991, the Ninth Circuit took a narrower approach to the meaning of "relating to." In West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., [FN28] William West was denied a seat on an overbooked flight for which he had purchased a ticket. He subsequently filed suit against the airline for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the "relating to" language in § 1305 as follows:
[W]hile we agree with Northwest that "services" include boarding policies, we disagree with Northwest and the district court that "law[s] ... relating to airline services" encompass all state laws that affect airline services, however tangentially.... Instead, we find that § 1305(a)(1) preempts claims only when the underlying statute or regulation itself relates to airline services, regardless of whether the claim arises from a factual setting involving airline services. Thus, state laws that merely have an effect on airline services are not preempted. [FN29]
The West court's holding that the claims therein were not preempted suggests that only state laws that specifically target the airlines are subject to § 1305 preemption.
The opinion in West was vacated the next year by the Supreme Court in light of the holding in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. [FN30] In Morales, the Court had adopted a broad interpretation of the "relating to" language in § 1305, arguing that this was in keeping with how they had previously interpreted the language of ERISA. The case was one in which a state sought to enforce its fare advertising guidelines, promulgated by the National Association of Attorneys General, by virtue of a lawsuit pursuant to the state's general consumer protection laws.
The issue in Morales was whether the enforcement of the consumer protection law in this context was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, and the Court held that it was indeed preempted. Morales also makes it clear that § 1305 is to be construed as limiting the savings clause in § 1506. Applying the canon of statutory construction that dictates that the specific governs the general, the court stated that "a general 'remedies' savings clause cannot be allowed to supersede the specific substantive preemption provision." [FN31]
Because it involved judicial enforcement of promulgated guidelines and not common law claims, Morales leaves some unanswered questions about the scope of the "relating to" language. Conceivably, its holding could be limited to judicial enforcement of state statutes and regulations that affect airline rates, routes, and services. There is no indication in Morales that its holding applies to common law tort actions that happen to arise out of factual settings involving air carriers.
"Services"
A personal injury action against an airline will typically have a minimal regulatory effect on airline rates and routes, so airlines usually claim that the passenger's cause of action will have a regulatory effect on airline services. Regardless of the scope of the "relating to" language in § 1305, if a passenger's cause of action can be pleaded so as not to fall within the meaning of "services," it cannot be subjected to § 1305 preemption. The breadth of the word "services" then becomes a key inquiry.
Congress may have intended to limit its use of "services" to economic considerations. It may have intended the word to encompass virtually everything that an airline does. Or Congress may have intended the scope of the word to fall somewhere between these two extremes.
All-encompassing approach. Proponents of complete preemption have adopted a straightforward, commonsense approach, viewing all state law claims relating to the services of an air carrier as preempted under § 1305. They point to the definition of "service" in Webster's Dictionary as "useful labor that does not produce a tangible commodity." [FN32] In West the Ninth Circuit concluded, "If Congress had intended to limit the word 'services' to something other than its common usage, it could easily have used the words 'types of services' rather than 'services."' [FN33] As such, virtually everything that an airline does, from handing out headphones to piloting the aircraft, is by definition "service." Because litigation can have a regulatory effect on an air carrier's conduct, any claim arising out of or "relating to" the "service" provided by the air carrier is necessarily preempted by § 1305.
The proponents further maintain that the legislative history of § 1305 indicates that the scope of its preemptive effect goes far beyond economic regulations. The broad "rates, routes, or services" language of the House version was adopted over a narrower Senate version: "routes, schedules, or rates, fares, or charges in tariffs of, or otherwise promulgating economic regulations for ...." [FN34]
Because of its simplicity, the all-encompassing approach has an initial appeal. However, if carried to its logical extreme, it creates results that are difficult to fathom. Courts adopting this approach have yet to confront these "commonsense" arguments in a mass-disaster setting. In this view, there is no material distinction made between the facts of In re Air Crash Disaster at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, [FN35] a case involving the tragic deaths of many persons, and the wrongful-exclusion case of O'Carroll. Rather, the facts in both cases fall under the broad definition of "services."
Incidental-services approach. At least one court has taken a view that draws a distinction between maintenance or operation of the aircraft and services provided incidental to the flight. In Stewart v. American Airlines, *12 Inc., [FN36] a passenger was injured when the nose wheel of the aircraft deflated during flight. The passenger brought suit in state court, alleging state law claims. The case was then removed to federal court by the airline. The district court determined that the passenger's claim fell outside the scope of § 1305 "services" and remanded the case to state court. The district court explained:
In the instant case, Plaintiff's claims are more like those arising out of an air crash than those considered in O'Carroll.... Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant negligently provided such services as boarding, ticketing, and the like. Rather, he simply alleges that he was injured when the airplane malfunctioned during the course of his flight, and that Defendants' negligent maintenance and operation was the legal and proximate cause of his injuries. [FN37]
The problem with the Stewart case is that it gives no rationale for the distinction it makes between incidental services and operation or maintenance of the aircraft. Stewart blindly follows the results in air crash cases that did not involve arguments of § 1305 express preemption, as the courts cited by Stewart were faced with the question of implied preemption by specific FAA provisions. [FN38] Thus, their results provide no real precedent for a limited view of § 1305.
On the other hand, if Congress did intend to so limit the scope of § 1305, no rationale is needed by a court to carry out the intent of Congress, however irrational that intent may be. In Seidman v. American Airlines, Inc., [FN39] a passenger was injured while evacuating an airplane using the emergency slide after a bomb threat had forced the plane to land. The passenger commenced a diversity action and obtained a favorable jury verdict. Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court, it did not vacate on the ground that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction as it did in O'Carroll. Whether this indicates that the Fifth Circuit draws the same distinction as Stewart is yet unknown.
It is clear that the Fifth Circuit considers negligent acts by flight attendants to be "services" within the meaning of § 1305. In Baugh v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., [FN40] a passenger alleged that a member of the flight crew stepped on her foot, breaking her ankle. Her claim was based on a state common law negligence theory. In affirming the dismissal of the passenger's action, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the negligence claim related to the services provided by the air carrier and was preempted by § 1305.
Courts are not the only entities to take the incidental-services approach. In promulgating regulations to implement § 1305, the CAB issued the following policy statement:
Tentatively included within the types of regulation that are preempted are those governing scheduling, inflight amenities, minimum capitalization and other regulations designed to affect the quality of air service.
***
Accordingly, we conclude that preemption extends to all of the economic factors that go into the quid pro quo for passenger's fare, including flight frequency and timing, liability limits, reservation and boarding practices, insurance, smoking rules, meal service, entertainment, bonding and corporate financing; and we hereby occupy these fields completely. [FN41]
Noticeably absent is any reference to piloting, operating, or maintaining the aircraft. This omission may imply that § 1305 preempts state laws affecting something less than everything an airline does but more than the mere act of providing the traveling public with a particular air transportation option and price.
Utility-type regulation approach. Those who support this approach maintain that the Airline Deregulation Act never changed the regulations governing incidental services or maintenance and operation of aircraft. [FN42] Before the act, these were minimum-requirement, utility-type regulations that could be supplemented by consistent state tort laws. [FN43] There is no reason to believe that the act was meant to alter this aspect of the regulatory scheme. The legislative history of the act also indicates that "service" was used by Congress almost always to mean providing air transportation to the flying public from point to point, not the operation and maintenance of the aircraft.
To counter the argument that § 1305's breadth is indicated by the different language employed by the House and Senate versions, one can point to the similarities in the House and Senate approaches. The Senate actually considered a version of the provision remarkably similar to the one that was adopted. In discussion of this version, the Senate noted, "This section is not intended to change the state-federal relationship over matters not regulated by the Board ...." [FN44] Thus it may be argued that because torts have never been regulated by the CAB, the preemption section could not have been intended to be so broad as to apply to torts. Even when discussing the House version that was actually adopted, the Senate used "services" in a limited context. [FN45] Therefore, the subtle differences in the original Senate version may be effectively irrelevant.
The House consideration was similar. Representative Glenn Anderson (CA), the chief sponsor of the House bill and its version of § 1305, presented a section-by-section analysis, which reads in part:
The existing declaration of policy, conceived and promulgated in *41 1938, is a reflection of the times in which it was born. Its orientation is toward the development and protection of an infant industry through public utility-type regulation over entry, exit, and pricing. [FN46]
Both the House and the Senate's consideration of the final and adopted version arguably indicates that "services" was limited to its term-of-art meaning and that preemption was limited to utility-type economic regulation. Those who advocate reference only to the ordinary meaning of "services" may be ignoring fundamental canons of statutory construction that also require the examination of the object and policy of a statute. [FN47] The best way to determine congressional intent is to look at the meaning Congress gave the words when it enacted that legislation. [FN48] Any argument that places reliance on the fact that § 1305 uses the term "services" in the plural instead of the singular is potentially misplaced. It can easily be shown that Congress used both "service" and "services" almost interchangeably. [FN49]
Just as the word "service" has a specific meaning in religion and another in the game of tennis, it has a particular meaning in the aviation industry. It is this term-of-art meaning that Congress used continually throughout the legislative history of the Airline Deregulation Act. Indeed, the House version was called the "Air Service Improvement Act"-and it did not require more attentive flight attendants! Rather, its goal was to increase the flight options available to the public. [FN50]
Put them all together ... In Diefenthal v. CAB, [FN51] the Fifth Circuit recognized a common law cause of action for what actually amounts to tortious rendition of services under both the all-encompassing approach and the incidental-services approach. While dismissing the claim as lacking the requisite amount in controversy, the court recognized the existence of a claim for a flight attendant's alleged malicious behavior in refusing to seat the plaintiffs in a smoking section. This holding seems to support the narrow view of the word "services."
Although § 1305 was not at issue in Diefenthal, the court discussed the power of the CAB to regulate air carrier "services" and spoke of the power to "specify a minimum quality of service and a minimum frequency of schedule." [FN52] Also, excerpts of legislative history used by the court in the Diefenthal case are similar to those cited above. Whereas the court rejected the Diefenthals' argument that "adequate services" referred only to frequency of flights, the "quality" of which the court spoke is put in terms of the CAB's power to regulate the "type" of air service as well as the frequency. [FN53] Thus, because the court in Diefenthal recognized the plaintiffs' state common law tort claim, it can be said that its definition of services does not encompass tort laws.
An examination of several federal regulations demonstrates that "service" *42 or "services" is often used to describe only the type and frequency of operations offered to passengers and not the manner in which they are provided. For instance, one regulation states that a "substantial change in operations" is defined as including "changes in operations from charter to scheduled service or a large increase in the number of markets served." [FN54] Another federal rule, which exempts small air-taxi operators from certain federal economic regulations, specifies that applicants or registrants as air-taxi operators must describe the "type of service the carrier will offer (scheduled passenger, scheduled cargo, mail under a U.S. postal service contract, ... or other service such as air ambulance operations, ...)." [FN55]
Congressional intent regarding tort liability
There is nothing in the legislative history to suggest, even by inference, that Congress considered modifying or federalizing air carrier tort liability. Not only does the entire history-including the bills, reports, and floor debates-focus on utility-type regulation of fares, routes, schedules, and aircraft type but there is also strong evidence that Congress intended to preserve the tort liability of air carriers. As part of the Airline Deregulation Act, Congress added the following provision to the original Federal Aviation Act:
(q) Insurance and Liability: (1) No certificate shall be issued or remain in effect unless the applicant for such certificate or the air carrier ... complies with regulations or orders issued by the Board governing the filing and approval of policies of insurance or plans for self insurance in the amount prescribed by the Board which are conditioned to pay, within the amount of such insurance, amounts for which such applicant or such air carrier may become liable for bodily injuries to or the death of any person, or for loss of or damage to property of others, resulting from the operation or maintenance of aircraft under such certificate. [FN56]
It is evident that Congress knew in 1978 that the system after deregulation could subject airlines to such extensive tort liability that approved insurance plans had to be in place.
Preemption exceptions
Proponents of a broad application of § 1305 preemption are quick to point to the language of § 1305(b)(2) that specifically exempts from preemption the proprietary powers of airport operators and the regulation of flights over the state of Hawaii. They argue that no other exceptions to preemption are indicated by Congress, thereby giving § 1305 a broad effect. Under this broad interpretation of the word "services," a passenger injured anywhere in the continental United States because of an air carrier's negligence would have his or her state law-based tort claim preempted. However, if the passenger were fortunate enough to have crashed into the beautiful mountains of Maui, the state law claim would remain intact. This ludicrous result surely could not have been intended by Congress.
Procedural impact of § 1305
Assuming complete preemption of state tort law claims, the practitioner must be prepared to deal with the radical and significant changes that would follow in approaching an airline tort claim. First, all such claims brought under state law are vulnerable to summary judgment and dismissal. Second, dismissal may be avoided only by pleading a federal claim. This assumes that a specific federal claim may be implied in the federal aviation statutes and regulations [FN57] or that a federal common law claim can be recognized. Third, the pleading of a federal claim may allow for removal of state court actions to federal court. Finally, the rendition of a judgment on either a state law or a federal claim may result in an appeal on the very issues presented in this article.
Ordinarily, a defendant wishing to remove a state claim to federal court is confronted with the well-pleaded complaint rule, which states that the plaintiff's pleading on its face must state a federal question. [FN58] Because preemption is normally considered a defense, the federal question does not appear on the face of the pleading and the claim is not subject to removal. However, a corollary to this rule is the "complete preemption" doctrine, which basically states that "the preemptive force of certain federal statutes is so great that they convert otherwise ordinary State law claims into Federal claims for the purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." [FN59]
Although courts appear to be divided on the issue, some have held that enactment of § 1305 represents an express manifestation of intent to preempt completely state law with regard to the regulation of rates, routes, and services of an air carrier. [FN60]
In Mattox, the court clearly stated, "An examination of the preemption language in § 1305(a)(1) and its legislative history leads to the conclusion that Congress did intend to preempt so completely the particular area of state laws 'relating to rates, routes, or services' as to preclude state court actions." [FN61] As such, airlines faced with state law claims should argue that Congress intended such complete preemption in this area as to render any pleaded state law claim federal in nature and removable to federal court.
Implied private causes of action
Again assuming that Congress intended to preempt all state law causes of action relating to air carrier services, the question arises whether any causes of action exist under federal law. Several provisions of the Federal Aviation Act and virtually every regulation promulgated thereunder impose duties on air carriers which, if violated, may result in the injury of a passenger. [FN62] One of the most notable of these provisions is 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a), which imposes a duty on every air carrier to provide "safe and adequate service, equipment and facilities" to its passengers.
In Cort v. Ash, [FN63] the Supreme Court set forth four factors to be used to determine whether an implied cause of action for violation of a federal statute exists:
- Is the person a member of a class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted? That is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?
- Is there any indication of any legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
- Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
- Is the cause of action traditionally relegated to state law in an area basically the concern of the state, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? [FN64]
These factors form the template for a litigant's arguments.
The airlines have pointed to a host of cases holding that no federal implied private cause of action exists under various provisions of the FAA. [FN65] They maintain that proponents of an implied federal right of action have ignored the Fifth Circuit's exemplary decision in Diefenthal, which specifically applies the Cort factors in analyzing the "adequate service" language of § 1374(a) and holds that no implied cause of action exists. [FN66]
The Diefenthal court noted that § 1374(a) did not on its face protect any particular class of persons and that the federal scheme already provided for the CAB to seek the injunctive relief that the Diefenthals sought. Therefore, there was no indication that Congress intended to create the cause of action propounded. Because the injunctive powers of the CAB were more than adequate to promote the concerns of the Diefenthals, private enforcement would not advance the goals of the statute. Finally, although the duty to provide adequate services is derived solely from federal law, this factor was not enough to imply the federal claims sought. Diefenthal did not specifically address § 1305, but because the case was decided after the provision's enactment, the court could be presumed to have considered its preemptive effects when applying the Cort factors.
Supporters of an implied right of action contend that the airlines have missed the mark with this argument. They point out that Diefenthal and other cases that refuse to recognize a federal implied claim all were decided prior to O'Carroll. Thus, none were decided by a court operating under the assumption that state common law was preempted by a "clear manifestation of Congressional intent" to federalize airline rates, routes, and services. Those cases assumed the existence of state law remedies.
Moreover, supporters claim that those courts could not have been operating under the assumption that all state tort claims relating to air carrier operations were preempted, or surely the courts' analysis under Cort would have been different. In Diefenthal, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to allow them to smoke under the "adequate service" provisions of § 1374. Arguably, a personal injury case arising under the "safe service" language will allow for a totally different analysis under Cort, as that language imposes a duty on air carriers to deliver their passengers to their destinations safely and unharmed.
Applying Cort factors to § 1374
If § 1305 indeed preempts passenger claims, then § 1374 provides a cause of action under the Cort analysis.
Benefited class. In the absence of state laws protecting them, passengers can look to no authority other than the Federal Aviation Act for protection. It provides the only other source of due care placed on the carrier to transport passengers safely to their destinations. Indeed, the § 1374 duty to provide safe service, equipment, and facilities is aimed at protecting a distinct class of persons: passengers. As members of the class for whose benefit § 1374 was enacted, passengers have a right to expect safe service.
In light of Congress's clear intention that air carriers be subject to liability for bodily injury and death, as evidenced by the insurance provisions of the act, the "safe service" provisions of § 1374 seem to be Congress's only remaining tool to protect injured or killed passengers (the obvious recipients of unsafe service). The argument here focuses on protection of passengers. Diefenthal is distinguishable because the court there recognized that the federal scheme was designed not to protect smokers but to control them. [FN67]
Legislative intent to create remedy. Section 1305 manifests the explicit intent to create a federal remedy. Most case authority prior to the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act which discusses whether the Federal Aviation Act implies a cause of action held that it did not, because of the available state law remedies and the lack at that time of congressional intent to preempt state law. [FN68]
If § 1305 of the Airline Deregulation Act has a broad preemptive effect encompassing passengers' claims for injuries, then Congress has presumably exercised its commerce clause powers to create exclusive federal jurisdiction and allow the application of federal remedies. In O'Carroll, despite plaintiff's claims that state law remedies were still preserved by the § 1506 savings clause, the court held that "§ 1305 is a clear indication of Congressional intent to preempt and is controlling." [FN69]
Section 1305 is obviously a clear manifestation of congressional intent to preempt; whether it also indicates a congressional intent to federalize air carrier tort liability is another question. *44 But if state tort claims are preempted, then the second factor of Cort may have to be deemed satisfied. Otherwise, the liability insurance provisions of the act would be rendered meaningless.
Consistency with legislative purpose. An implied remedy would definitely provide airlines with an added incentive to make flights safer, which is the primary purpose of the "safe service" duty of § 1374. The paltry penalties provided by the governmental scheme pale in comparison to the potential multimillion-dollar liability that may arise from an airline crash disaster. [FN70]
Traditional relegation to state law. Assuming state tort laws are preempted, air carrier tort liability would no longer be a matter traditionally relegated to state law under the fourth prong of the Cort test. Thus it would be appropriate to imply a federal remedy in the absence of a state law remedy.
Federal common law remedy for injured passengers?
Assuming complete preemption and no implied federal statutory remedy, it must be determined whether a passenger injured through an airline's negligence may assert a federal common law cause of action.
Proponents of such a federal common law remedy take a straightforward approach: There should be a remedy for personal injury or death caused by wrongful air carrier conduct, whether such conduct falls within the federal domain (within the term "services") or within the state domain. If the airlines are correct in their assertion that state law remedies have been preempted and that no federal statutory remedy exists, then Congress must have delegated to the federal courts responsibility for fashioning the rules of aviation law.
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., [FN71] a maritime case decided in 1975 (before the federal aviation preemption provision was enacted), the Supreme Court established a common law action for wrongful death under the maritime authority granted to it under Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. The Court noted certain anomalies that would result if the current law did not recognize such a federal common law claim. Among them were that 1) in territorial waters, identical conduct violating federal law produced liability if the victim was injured but exculpated the defendant if the victim was killed; 2) identical breaches of duty resulting in death produced liability outside the three-mile limit but not within the territorial waters of a state; and 3) a true seaman was provided with no remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters, whereas a longshoreman would have such a remedy when allowed by a state statute. [FN72]
Under the broad view of § 1305 (preempting all state aviation law claims), similar anomalies result. A person wrongfully excluded from a flight has a federal implied remedy under § 1374 of the Federal Aviation Act. [FN73] Likewise, a handicapped person victimized by discriminatory conduct of an airline has a claim under the Air Carrier Access Act. [FN74] However, other persons who are physically injured by equally or more negligent and careless conduct on the part of the airlines have no remedy. Moreover, those fortunate few whose state law claims fall outside the scope of the § 1305 preemption will be able to seek redress for their injuries, whereas those whose claims happen to fall within the scope of § 1305 are subject to the piecemeal application of federal remedies. [FN75]
Given the airline regulation scheme that has developed, federal courts today face the same practical considerations that spurred the Moragne maritime decision. Scholars have been quick to point out the factual likeness between the maritime and aeronautical arenas. The very nature of the "ocean of air" would suggest that matters in aviation be governed in a fashion similar to those in admiralty. One scholar, in discussing the problems created by the fact that aviation came into being after the drafting of the Constitution, observed:
Much of the plaintiff's problem in aviation accident law, or in peculiar jury reactions to aviation cases, lies in a simple fact that many of us frequently forget that aviation is new. The first aviation case tried in England was heard in 1933. Chicago claims to have the busiest airport in the entire world. Yet the first Illinois case involving an airplane accident was also tried in 1933. To this day the appellate decisions of many states fail to list any aviation cases. Many basic questions concerning aviation are still to be decided. A federal district court, in 1954, stated that "The question of whether the air space over the seas is within the jurisdiction of admiralty has received little attention and is an open one." The question was not resolved until 1958 when the Second Circuit held that admiralty governed. As recently as 1935, law review articles appeared expressing the view that the entire ocean of air surrounding the earth was within the admiralty jurisdiction. [FN76]
A perceptive discussion of the similarities and differences between maritime law and the law of aviation can be found in Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service, Inc., [FN77] decided before the Aviation Deregulation Act. The court noted in Rogers that if Congress were to clearly indicate its legislative intent to preempt state law claims for wrongful air carrier conduct, then federal courts would be granted the "comparable power [of maritime law] to fashion their own common law remedies in tort cases arising in the airways." If § 1305, enacted after Rogers, is a clear indication of congressional intent to preempt state tort law, the Rogers analysis permits the fashioning of a federal remedy.
The argument against a common law *45 action is more difficult to make. There is no particular test that one must meet, as there is with implied remedies under Cort. The best argument is to attack the analogy to maritime law and argue that § 1305 is not so significant an exercise of Congress's commerce clause powers as to indicate "exclusive" federal jurisdiction.
At the time of the Constitution's enactment, maritime law was based on a significant preexisting body of common law. [FN78] Moreover, Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution is not a mere grant of jurisdiction but specifically provides judicial "power" to the courts in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. No such comparable grant of power is evidenced by § 1305. To make this argument, one must attack the Rogers case head on and show that the language of O'Carroll does not provide the type of evidence needed to invoke the Moragne analogy.
Lack of administrative remedies
Those who argue that no cause of action exists at all for personal injuries relating to an air carrier's rates, routes, or services counter any perceived injustice by noting that passengers remain free to pursue an administrative remedy. In Anderson, the court stated:
[T]he absence of a private remedy does not leave airlines free to deny "safe and adequate service." A party alleging that an airline failed to provide the requisite service can pursue an appropriate administrative remedy. Under the Aviation Act, the DOT [Department of Transportation] or the FAA is empowered to bring suit directly against an airline or seek other statutorily defined relief. [FN79]
Other federal district courts, in apparent reliance on the Anderson decision, have made similar reference to the existence of an administrative remedy for passengers injured through wrongful air carrier conduct. [FN80] However, the several statutes and regulations cited in Anderson do nothing to remedy passenger injuries and are merely penal in nature. [FN81] In fact, a careful review of the entire federal aviation scheme fails to disclose a single statute that provides for monetary damages to compensate for bodily injury or death of a passenger. [FN82]
"For every wrong, there is a remedy"
In 1803 in Marbury v. Madison, [FN83] the Supreme Court recognized one of the most fundamental tenets of our system of jurisprudence:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. [FN84]
Many scholarly works have since noted similar ideals. "Fundamental in our jurisprudence is the principal that for every wrong there is a remedy and that an injured party should be compensated for all damage proximately caused by the wrongdoer." [FN85]
The unjust results that would stem from complete preemption of an injured passenger's state law claims tend to indicate that Congress never meant to preempt such claims. However, it is not completely clear what Congress intended to preempt when it employed the term "services" in § 1305. It is clear that Congress intended that airlines would be liable for personal injury and death arising out of their operations. Therefore, assuming that § 1305 does preempt all such claims, the absence of an administrative remedy compels recognition of a federal remedy.
FN[FNa1]. Stuart J. Starry is a partner with the Houston firm of Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C. His practice includes representation of plaintiffs in domestic and international aviation accident cases. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Richard Norman, a student at Baylor University School of Law and a law clerk at Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson.
Editor's note: A copy of the original version of the paper, which includes a full set of citations, is available on request from the author.
FN[FN1]. Civil Aeronautics Act, ch 601, 52 Stat 973 (1938).
FN[FN2]. Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 644 F2d 1334, 1336 (9th Cir 1981).
FN[FN3]. Civil Aeronautics Act, ch 601, 52 Stat at 1027.
FN[FN4]. Federal Aviation Act, Pub L No 85-726, 72 Stat 744 (1958).
FN[FN5]. Airline Deregulation Act, Pub L No 95-504, 92 Stat 1705 (1978).
FN[FN6]. 49 USCA § 1305(a)(1) (West Supp 1991).
FN[FN7]. Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F2d 1408 (9th Cir 1984).
FN[FN8]. Id. at 1415 (emphasis added).
FN[FN9]. Anderson v. USAir, Inc., 818 F2d 49 (DC Cir 1987).
FN[FN10]. Id. at 56.
FN[FN11]. The Anderson opinion gives no explanation for this anomaly, other than the fact that the duty-of-courteous-service claim employed the word "service" as it was stated in Anderson's complaint. The court apparently seized on this use of "service" when applying the "rates, routes, or services" language of § 1305. If the actions of the flight crew in Anderson are part of the air carrier services that § 1305 was designed to prevent states from regulating, then the distinction drawn in Anderson seems baseless.
FN[FN12]. O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., 863 F2d 11 (5th Cir 1989).
FN[FN13]. Calvin Davison and Lorraine B. Halloway, The Two Faces of Section 105-Airline Shield or Airport Sword? 56(1) J Air L & Comm 93 (Fall 1990).
FN[FN14]. Smith v. America West Airlines, No H-91-1550, slip op (SD Tex Sept 3, 1991); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No H-90-2276, slip op (SD Tex Sept 3, 1991); Garza v. Southwest Airlines Co., No H-91-351, slip op (SD Tex April 3, 1991); Kiefer v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No 9009353 (Dist Ct of Harris Cty, 129th Jud Dist of Tex July 29, 1991).
FN[FN15]. Howard v. Northwest Airlines, No 4-91-2731, slip op (SD Tex Jan 3, 1992).
FN[FN16]. Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 500 (1988); Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 755 F2d 1192, 1205 (5th Cir 1985), reh'g denied, 761 F2d 695 (5th Cir 1985).
FN[FN17]. California v. ABC Am. Corp., 109 S Ct 1661, 1665 (1989).
FN[FN18]. Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dept of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 6 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 738 (1984).
FN[FN19]. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); English v. General Electric Co., 110 S Ct 2220, 2275 (1990); Michigan Canners and Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural Mktg. and Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984).
FN[FN20]. Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
FN[FN21]. ERISA, 29 USC § 1144(a) (1988).
FN[FN22]. FMC Corp. v. Holiday, 111 S Ct 403, 407 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987).
FN[FN23]. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
FN[FN24]. O'Carroll, cited in note 12.
FN[FN25]. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897 F2d 773 (5th Cir 1990) (aff'g preliminary injunction), cert denied, 111 S Ct 307 (1990).
FN[FN26]. Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 1987).
FN[FN27]. Mattox, 897 F2d at 783.
FN[FN28]. West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 923 F2d 657 (9th Cir 1991), vacated and remanded, 504 U.S. 968, 1992 WL 120611, 60 USLW 3376 (No 91-734, June 8, 1992).
FN[FN29]. Id. at 660.
FN[FN30]. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 112 S Ct 2031 (1992).
FN[FN31]. Id., 112 S Ct at 2037.
FN[FN32]. Appellee's Brief at 9, Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc. (No 91- 6037), citing Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1076 (1984).
FN[FN33]. See West, 923 F2d at 659-60 (citing Public Util. Comm'n, 644 F2d at 1337; Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981)).
FN[FN34]. HR Rep No 95-1779, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 94-95 (1978).
FN[FN35]. In re Air Crash Disaster at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 919 F2d 1079 (5th Cir 1991).
FN[FN36]. Stewart v. American Airlines, Inc., 776 F Supp 1194 (SD Tex 1991).
FN[FN37]. Id. at 1196-99.
FN[FN38]. Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport, 635 F2d 67, 74 (2d Cir 1980); In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 734 F Supp 1425, 1428 (ND Ill 1990); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 721 F Supp 1185, 1187 (D Colo 1988).
FN[FN39]. Seidman v. American Airlines, Inc., 923 F2d 1134 (5th Cir 1991).
FN[FN40]. Baugh v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No 90-2074 (5th Cir 1990) (per curiam, unpublished). The opinion is arguably without precedential value.
FN[FN41]. Statement of General Policy, Implementation of Preemption Provisions of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 44 Fed Reg 9948, 9951 (1979).
FN[FN42]. See House Comm on Pub Works and Transp, 96th Cong, 1st Sess, Legislative History of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 1-53 (Comm Print 1979) [Legislative History].
FN[FN43]. 49 USC § 1421(a) (1976).
FN[FN44]. See 123 Cong Rec 4214, 4219 (1977).
FN[FN45]. See 124 Cong Rec 37,419 (1978).
- FN[FN46]. 123 Cong Rec 30,595 (1977) (emphasis added). In specifically discussing the new preemption provision, the analysis stated that "preemption is implicit in the present Act, and has been recognized by the courts." Congress assumed that under "existing law" (prior to the new provision), courts had already determined that the states could not regulate service and fares. Yet Congress was aware of the coexistence of air carrier tort liability. Thus, arguably, Congress's interpretation of services could not have included tort liability.
FN[FN47]. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986) ("Of course, the 'starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.' But the text is only the starting point.... 'In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy."' [Citations omitted.]) See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S Ct 2395, 2403 (1991) (recognizing "the maxim of statutory construction noscitur sociis-that a word is known by the company it keeps").
FN[FN48]. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 546 (1978).
- FN[FN49]. See Legislative History at 14 ("nonstop service between any pair of points"); 15 ("impact of new services on the national air route structure"); 21 (local service); 27 (reduced levels of service due to strike); 28 (passenger service, cargo service); 104 (pooling of service); 110 (frequency, type of equipment to assure service); 120 ("air routes and services"); 140 (through service and joint rates); 153 (air services); and continuing through thirty- three more examples.
FN[FN50]. See Legislative History at 509-12.
FN[FN51]. Diefenthal v. CAB, 681 F2d 1039 (5th Cir 1982).
FN[FN52]. Id. at 1046 (emphasis added). The court specifically mentions a case upholding the CAB's authority to specify the "type of vehicle" to be used. (Id. at 1045.) The example of "quality" regulation at hand was CAB regulation of smoking areas, even after the Deregulation Act. (Id. at 1047.) This type of regulation does not encompass every act of the airline nor does it encompass tort law.
FN[FN53]. Id. at 1044 ("both quantity and the kind").
FN[FN54]. 14 CFR § 204.4(m) (1986) (emphasis added).
FN[FN55]. 14 CFR § 298.21(c)(iv) (1990). See also 14 CFR §§ 201.4(5) and 204.4(1) (1986).
FN[FN56]. 49 USC § 1371(q) (Supp 1991) (emphasis added).
FN[FN57]. The federal aviation program as set forth in the United States Code provides only a hodgepodge of remedies for very specific types of wrongful conduct. For example, it has been held that passengers who are the victims of airline discrimination have a cause of action pursuant to the antidiscrimination sections of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 USCA § 1374(b). See, e.g., Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 567 F2d 290 (5th Cir 1978); Mahaney v. Air France, 474 F Supp 532 (D NY 1979); Roman v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 441 F Supp 1160 (D Ill 1977); Valentine v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 365 A2d 475, 144 NJ Super 305 (1976).
Conversely, courts have almost uniformly denied the existence of a cause of action for breach of an airline's duty to provide "safe and adequate service," a duty imposed by 49 USCA § 1374(a). See, e.g., Anderson, 818 F2d at 54; Diefenthal, 681 F2d at 1048-50. It should be noted that the results in Anderson and Diefenthal might have been different had the courts in those cases assumed a broad reading of § 1305 preemption.
FN[FN58]. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936).
FN[FN59]. Stewart, cited in note 36, citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).
FN[FN60]. Daniel Petroski, Airlines' Response to the DTPA-Section 1305 Preemption, 56 J Air L & Comm 125 (1990), citing State v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., No 3-89-0713-H (ND Tex April 19, 1989); Mattox, cited in note 25.
FN[FN61]. Mattox, 897 F2d at 787.
FN[FN62]. For example, Subchapter VI of the Federal Aviation Act deals with Safety Regulation of Civil Aeronautics (e.g., § 1421(f) (collision avoidance systems); § 1425 (maintenance of equipment in air transportation)). In addition, there are twenty provisions in the Code of Federal Regulations that mention deicing requirements with which airlines must comply (e.g., 14 CFR § 135.149 (equipment requirements-general)). Many provisions touch on aircraft- engine safety inspections (e.g., 14 CFR § 21.21 (inspection and tests); 14 CFR § 125.247 (inspection programs and maintenance)). It is easy to see how failure to comply with such regulations could foreseeably result in injury to airline passengers.
FN[FN63]. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
FN[FN64]. Id. at 78. It should be noted that the four factors set forth in Cort do not constitute a test but merely are factors relevant to the more significant inquiry of general congressional intent.
FN[FN65]. Caceres Agency v. Trans World Airways, 594 F2d 932 (2d Cir 1979) (no federal implied private cause of action under § 1374(b) for airline's discrimination among travel agents); Rauch v. United Instruments, 548 F2d 452 (3d Cir 1976) (no federal implied private right of action under § 1421 for defective equipment); Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 544 F2d 134 (3d Cir 1976) (no federal implied private cause of action under § 1374(b) or § 1381 for deceptive trade practices), cert denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977); Hingson, 743 F2d at 1414 (implied private right of action under § 1374(b) for discrimination, but no federal implied right of action under § 1374(a) for inadequate service); Kodish v. United Airlines, 628 F2d 1301 (10th Cir 1980) (no federal implied right of action under § 1374(b) or § 1302 (a)(3) for age discrimination among pilots); Danna v. Air France, 463 F2d 407 (2d Cir 1972) (no federal implied private cause of action under § 1374(b) for fare discriminations).
FN[FN66]. Diefenthal, 681 F2d at 1048-50.
FN[FN67]. Id. at 1049.
FN[FN68]. See, e.g., Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service, Inc., 435 F2d 1389 (5th Cir 1970).
FN[FN69]. O'Carroll, 863 F2d at 13 (emphasis added).
FN[FN70]. See 49 USC App § 1471 (a punitive section merely designed to fine airlines from $1,000 to $10,000 per violation); 49 USC App § 1472 (establishing criminal penalties); 49 USC App § 1487 (providing the district court with the power to enforce the above-cited provisions); 14 CFR § 13.5 et seq. (allowing the DOT to process private complaints, tracking the statutory remedies of a $1,000 penalty per violation).
FN[FN71]. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1975).
FN[FN72]. Id. at 395-96.
- FN[FN73]. This cause of action has typically been asserted as an "abuse of discretion" case, asserting that the pilot in command abused the discretion given to him by 49 USC § 1511 to remove passengers in the interests of safety. Under 49 USC § 1374(b), giving unreasonable preference to one passenger over another is prohibited, and the rule has been interpreted to limit the pilot's § 1511 discretion. See, e.g., Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F2d 942 (2d Cir 1975).
FN[FN74]. 49 USCA § 1374(c) (West Supp 1991).
FN[FN75]. The district court opinion in Stewart, in an attempt to reconcile recent Fifth Circuit holdings, drew an equally arbitrary distinction. The Stewart court held that claims of passengers injured in incidents akin to an airline crash disaster have claims, whereas those who are merely injured by negligent rendition of flight-crew service have no claim. (776 F Supp at 1198.)
FN[FN76]. L.S. Kriendler, 1 Aviation Accident L § 1.01, 1-4 (1991) (citing at n 7, Arnold W. Knauth, Aviation and Admiralty, 6 Air L Rev 226 (1935); Van Vechter Veeder, The Legal Relation between Aviation and Admiralty, 2 Air L Rev 29 (1931); Report of the Special Committee on the Law of Aviation of the American Bar Association, 46 ABA Rep 77-97, 498-530 (1921); George G. Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law, 6 Cornell L Q 271, 303-5 (1921)).
FN[FN77]. Rogers, 435 F2d at 1395.
FN[FN78]. Although our American system of maritime law draws heavily from our English ancestors, we can trace some general concepts of admiralty law back even further. In writings from Babylonian times until the collapse of the Roman empire, there is evidence of maritime doctrines that persist to this day. See Nicholas J. Healy and David J. Sharpe, Cases and Materials on Admiralty at 3 (West, 1974).
FN[FN79]. Anderson, 818 F2d at 49, 55.
FN[FN80]. Howard, cited in note 15; Hodges, cited in note 32.
FN[FN81]. Statutes cited in Anderson include 49 USC §§ 1421(a)(6), 1471-72, 1482, 1487, and 1511. The lower court in the case cites 14 CFR §§ 13.5 and 302.201-302.206.
FN[FN82]. See 14 CFR § 1 (1986) et seq.; 49 USC § 1301 (1976) et seq.
FN[FN83]. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
FN[FN84]. Id. at 163.
FN[FN85]. Robert S. Thompson and John A. Sebert, Jr., Remedies: Damages, Equity and Restitution, § 1.02, at 1-15 (Matthew Bender 1983) (citations omitted).
END OF DOCUMENT
Winning Techniques of Successful Trial Attorneys
In 2000, Mr. Starry was honored to author a chapter for a book published by the Lawyers and Judges Publishing Company to usher the trial practice into the new millennium. In his chapter entitled “Asserting and Avoiding the Preemption Defense,” Mr. Starry explores the use of Federal Preemption to defeat tort claims involving a range of matters — from products liability cases to employment claims. The article also contains advice on how attorneys representing the injured victims can avoid preemption and keep their cases alive. To read the article, click the button below.
52 Asserting and Avoiding the Preemption Defense
By Stuart Starry*
52.1 Preemption: Generally
When I was a defense lawyer, the most powerful weapon in my arsenal was the preemption defense. On several occasions I totally annihilated my opponents by obtaining outright dismissals of their cases. On many more occasions I laid to waste the best theories of liability. It was always useful to have a preemption motion on file during negotiations.
Now that I am a plaintiff's lawyer, I have been forced to deal with the defense and find my way around it. Many plaintiff's attorneys do not understand the various ways preemption can build a fortress against the plaintiff's claims. It is my belief that plaintiff's attorneys who have a strategy against preemption can avoid the dismissal trap and resolve their cases for more money. To understand preemption one must begin with its roots. It all began with a clause in the most important American document:
The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.1
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution is the generally accepted origin of the preemption doctrine. The doctrine itself was first expressed by Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden:
The nullity of any act, inconsistent with the constitution, is produced by the declaration that the Constitution is the supreme law. The appropriate application of [the Supremacy Clause], is to such acts of the State Legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but . . . interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress . . . . In every such case, the act of Congress is supreme . . . and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.2
The power of this clause invades many aspects of a trial lawyer's practice. The practical significance is often best demonstrated by anecdote.
Some time ago I had the privilege of representing a major air carrier. The major air carrier only flew between larger cities, but it desired to generate additional business by offering the passengers "through transportation" to ski resorts near smaller towns. Smaller regional air carriers who flew smaller planes serviced the smaller towns. Ticket code sharing provided the vehicle for the major carrier to provide such "through transportation" to the smaller towns. Under this arrangement, a passenger's ticket would show the same, two-letter airline designation code regardless of whether the passenger flew on the major or a regional carrier. Not only did the airlines share ticket codes; they also shared trademarks and logos. The smaller carriers even painted their planes with markings and colors identical to the major airlines. When a passenger of the major carrier landed in Denver and then boarded a smaller plane to the ski resort, it was an invisible transition. Most passengers never realized they were on a different airline when they boarded the smaller plane.
Unfortunately, one of the small planes crashed, killing the pilot, copilot, and several passengers. Tragedy turned to horror during the investigation when it was learned that a blood test of the pilot's body revealed he had used cocaine shortly before the crash. This was a dream case for the plaintiffs. It was an impossible case to defend.
For the plaintiffs, the case got even better. It was filed in state court and was assigned to a judge who was a personal friend to one of the crash victims. The case was filed against both the regional carrier and the major carrier.
After months of discovery it was learned that the regional carrier, who employed the pilot, had not conducted a background check. A background check would have revealed that the pilot had a history of drug problems. Moreover, the regional carrier did not even have a drug testing policy for its flight crews-something that major carriers had implemented for decades.
Needless to say, I was glad I did not represent the regional carrier. My goal was to distance the major carrier from the wrongful conduct. After all, the major carrier had a strict drug policy and conducted thorough background checks.
The plaintiffs' problem was that they had to get past the financial limitations of the regional carrier to recover a substantial sum. The regional carrier had only a few leased planes and minimal insurance coverage. My defense team estimated that the case was worth over $10 million on a good day and at least $3 million on a bad day. The plaintiffs needed a theory of liability against the major carrier, who they knew had deep pockets. They found one. They claimed that the major airline and the regional airline conspired to defraud the public through the ticket coding and trademark sharing arrangement. The survivors testified that they thought they were flying on the major airline at the time of the crash. They also assumed that the pilots on the small airplanes had the same qualifications and training, as did the pilots on the big planes. Otherwise, they would not have boarded the smaller plane.
The plaintiffs' pleading was amended to add fraud and a claim under the state's deceptive trade practices act (which, at the time, allowed automatic trebling of damages). By now my trial team was really worried. We took the plaintiffs' new theory to a group of mock juries. The lowest verdict was for $18 million. Many were over $100 million in punitive damages. We were terrified at the prospect of a trial. Because the case was lodged in a plaintiff-friendly court, we expected the worst. The trial judge denied a recusal motion, and it looked as though the plaintiffs wanted to try the case to a jury and roll the dice on punitive damages.
Fortunately, within a short time after the pleading was amended, we discussed a removal strategy based on federal preemption. My partners thought it was a hair-brained strategy and predicted that the case would be remanded. I was desperate and undeterred. One of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses testified that the ticket coding and trademark sharing was not only fraudulent but was also sanctioned by the federal government as part of airline deregulation. The government's policy was aimed at reducing fares and opening up smaller routes to the public. The plaintiff's expert had been pressing for a change in the Airline Deregulation Act.
When Congress deregulated the airlines, they enacted a preemption provision designed to prevent state re-regulation:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political agency of two or more states shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to provide air transportation.3
It was this statute that was our savior. We removed the case to federal court on federal question grounds, claiming that federal law applied exclusively to the plaintiffs' fraud claim because it related to air carrier's "rates and routes." After all, the plaintiffs' own expert had testified that code sharing allowed the larger carriers to economically service smaller routes.
At the hearing on the inevitable motion to remand, the court inquired whether I was the one who signed the removal papers. I replied: "Yes." The trial judge then reminded me that I was the one who would be sanctioned if he found the removal grounds to be frivolous. After several hours of creative argument (without the benefit of supporting case law), the court took the matter under advisement. A week later the trial judge issued an opinion retaining jurisdiction.
We then filed a motion to dismiss the claim because federal law had no similar remedies for such fraud. There was no federal deceptive trade practices act. There was no federal common law of fraud. The case was then settled for a mere fraction of its value in state court. It was a victory for the defense. Had my opponent known that his creative pleading would land him in federal court, he certainly would not have added the fraud claim.
My experience with the strategic removal of the case taught me a very important lesson. Before a pleading is filed, a good practitioner must always ask: "Does federal or state law control the case?" The answer should be an easy one. It generally is not. Federal preemption analysis is a jigsaw puzzle, and it often it seems Congress left out some vital pieces. At the initial stages of any case, it is important to establish whether a preemption question exists.
Under normal circumstances, a plaintiff is the master of his complaint. Simply because federal relief is available does not mean that a plaintiff is required to use federal relief. Often a plaintiff is in a better position in state court asserting only state law claims. If a state law claim exists concurrently with a federal claim, a plaintiff may choose to use the state law claim in lieu of or in addition to, the federal claim. A defendant may be in a better position under federal law. To properly assert and defend preemption claims, practitioners must understand several doctrines.
- The Well Pleaded Complaint Rule
A plaintiff can generally keep his claim in state court as long as he is careful not to base his claim on any federal cause of action. Mere anticipation of a federal defense is not enough to force the claim into federal court. The Supreme Court first addressed a plaintiff's duty to clearly state his claim in Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Mottley.4 In that case Justice Moody declared on behalf of the court that
[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution. It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that the defense is invalidated by some Provision of the Constitution of the United States.5
Mottley is the basis for the well pleaded complaint rule. Most simply stated, if a plaintiff wants to be in federal court, he must allege a federal cause of action. If he prefers to be in state court, he needs to avoid alleging a federal cause of action. His motive for wanting to be in either forum is irrelevant. However, like all rules of law, this has an exception: the artful pleading doctrine.
- The Artful Pleading Doctrine
The artful pleading doctrine holds that an attorney cannot overrule legislative intent simply because he is crafty. In circumstances where it is clear that Congress intended to preempt state law, no amount of artful pleading will keep the case out of a federal forum. The Ninth Circuit may have stated this principle most succinctly when it delivered the following: "Although a plaintiff is generally considered the master of his complaint and is free to choose the forum for his action, this principle is not without limitation. A plaintiff will not be allowed to conceal the true nature of a complaint through 'artful pleading.'"6 As a law professor once explained to me and a class of eager first-year law students: "If you paint the word 'cow' on the side of a horse, that doesn't make it a cow." The troublesome task for most practitioners is seeing the horse in the first place. That was the problem for the plaintiff's attorney in the ticket code-sharing case discussed earlier. What he thought was a state law claim was actually covered by federal laws so powerful that they governed his complaint. This principle was stated another way by the court in Stewart v. American Airlines.7 "The preemptive force of certain federal statutes is so great that they convert otherwise ordinary state law claims into federal claims for the purposes of the 'well-pleaded complaint rule.'"8Although one can argue either that the claim was converted to federal law or that it was always federal law, the result is the same: a complete difference in the governing law and a possible change of forums.
- The Complete Preemption doctrine
Those who wish to invoke the artful pleading doctrine offensively against an opponent's "crafty" pleading should be careful as well. The doctrine itself has limits. Just because a plaintiff's claim touches a federally regulated area does not mean it is preempted. A loose connection with federal law is not enough to send a case to a federal court when Congress clearly did not intend for federal law to control such a case. The Court in Merrill Dow Pharmaceutical Inc. v. Thompson,9 concluded that
. . . a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be no private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim "arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."10
Federal principles must control the disposition of the claim, not merely be associated with the claim.11 This is the complete preemption doctrine and is a corollary to the artful pleading doctrine. However, if the claim is completely preempted, then, an artfully crafted state law claim is converted to a federal claim for removal purposes.12
In sum, these three principles mean the following: A plaintiff can avoid preemption by pleading a state law claim that does not touch upon federal law. Even if the defendant asserts that the claim is preempted, the defense of preemption does not render the case removable. It is only when the preemption is so "complete" that the plaintiff must rely on federal legal principles to recover, that the case is converted to a federal one and becomes removable.
- Three Types of Preemption
Preemption is generally divided into three categories: (1) conflict preemption, (2) field preemption, and (3) express preemption. Every American trial lawyer should be aware of all three.
- Conflict Preemption
Conflict preemption was the first type of preemption to be recognized by the courts.13 It most closely follows the ideology set forth by the Supremacy Clause. It occurs when state law conflicts with federal law. When it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, the federal law governs. Consider the situation that might arise if, for example, the Ohio state legislature outlawed the use of airbags in automobiles because it was reported that some deaths were actually being caused by airbags. A car manufacturer in Ohio may be faced with the prospect of violating the federal law mandating the installation of airbags in order to comply with the state legislature's wishes. In a claim to enforce the ban, courts would be obliged to enforce the federal law, and ignore the state law.
Sometimes, seemingly contradictory laws do not create preemption by conflict. Early in the history of preemption analysis, the Supreme Court in Savage v. Jones established that the conflict needs to be "so direct and positive that the two acts cannot be reconciled or stand together."14 If, for example, the Ohio legislature merely required that all cars equipped with airbags have switches allowing drivers to disable the airbags, then the law may not conflict with a federal law requiring the installation of airbags. The laws may seem at cross-purposes, but in fact, compliance with both is possible, and there is no conflict for federal preemption to resolve.
- Field Preemption
The birth of field preemption was spawned by the cases of Hines v. Davidowitz15 and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.16 When a state tries to regulate an area that Congress intended the federal government to fully occupy, the state regulation is preempted. For such preemption to occur, the federal regulation must be "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplant it."17 In Hines, the Supreme Court determined that the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940, along with the federal immigration and naturalization laws provided a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of aliens. Thus, an act passed by the Pennsylvania legislature requiring alien registration was void.18
When the area is one that the states have traditionally occupied, the requirements for both conflict preemption and field preemption are more stringent. When the tradition is one of state occupation, then the field will only be preempted if there is evidence of "clear and manifest intent" by Congress to do so. Courts are reluctant to find preemption in areas of traditional state power because doing so seems to undermine the federalist system.19 If Congress had not expressly stated an intent to preempt, then it becomes difficult to find the evidence of "clear and manifest intent" to preempt. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Rice found that it is possible to find clear and manifest intent through an assessment of congressional purpose.20 The Rice Court held enforcement of several state laws preempted by the comprehensive nature of the Federal Warehousing Act. The Court looked to the language in the act conferring "exclusive" authority with the Secretary of Agriculture, along with statements of sponsors found in committee reports that federal licensees would be "solely responsible to the Federal act."21An assessment of congressional purpose, though, is not a simple undertaking. In order to assure that the bounds of state sovereignty will not be infringed, courts often read field preemption as narrowly as possible.22 This author has failed to ever convince any trial or appellate court that any area of law has been "occupied" to the extent necessary for preemption of state law.
Field preemption, however, is not completely unheard of. When it occurs, its force is broad and displaces even consistent state law. The First Circuit recognized it in French v. Pan Am Express, Inc.23 Very recently in Abdullah v. American Airlines, the Third Circuit followed the reasoning of French that
. . . the lack of a conflict between federal standards and state law is irrelevant. The court in French remarked that the absence of a conflict was "beside the point." "So long as occupation of an envisioned field was intended, 'any state law falling within the field is pre-empted.' . . . The federal interest necessarily predominates, rendering states impotent to act."24
Before attempting to assert field preemption arguments, you should be thoroughly familiar with the statues, regulations and legislative history of the federal laws asserted.
- Express Preemption
Congress often uses statutory language to express its intent to preempt state regulation of a particular area of law. This "express preemption" should be the easiest to recognize. However, in recent years practitioners have been forced to navigate an extremely complex group of United States Supreme Court decisions on the matter. The sheer number of plurality decisions handed down from the Supreme Court has made express preemption analysis difficult to understand.25
As with any statutory construction analysis, opposing sides can read the same words and interpret them differently. The microanalysis of individual words has lead to conflicting decisions regarding nearly identical statutes. In the example involving the ticket code-sharing airlines, the operative words from the preemption statute at hand were "relating to rates or routes." In nearly all express preemption analyses one will encounter a key phrase. Winning a case, many times, involves a lawyer convincing the court that his definition of that phrase is the correct one.
How the court determines the "correct" definition often requires examination of congressional intent. This examination, articulated by the Supreme Court in Medtronic v. Lohr, should be done "through the reviewing court's reasoned understanding of the way in which congress intended the statute, and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business consumers and the law."26 This examination clearly can include examination of not only the language of a statute but can also include analysis of the surrounding text and context. This author's experience with appeals based on express preemption is instructive. In the field of commercial aviation, Congress enacted a preemption provision that has been given very different interpretations by both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. See discussion of aviation law infra at p.__
Often courts revert to the "congressional purpose" analysis used in field preemption merely to define the term of an express preemption clause.27
52.2 Procedural Tools of Preemption
If an attorney suspects that his case is preempted by federal law, the next step is deciding which procedural device to use (or avoid) to advance his client's interests. There are several.
- Removal
The federal removal statute reads:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. . . .
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction conferred by § 1331 of this title is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates.28
Before a plaintiff files his case in state court he should determine whether there is any chance that the defendant could remove the case to federal court. Often plaintiffs mistakenly cite federal statutes that the defendant violated in their initial pleadings. Even if a plaintiff is only pleading negligence under state law and merely using the federal statute as a basis for a state law negligence per se claim, federal courts will often construe it as a federal claim. If a plaintiff wants to avoid federal court, I recommend that no federal statutes be cited.
If one is compelled to cite a federal law as evidence of negligence per se, then the pleading must contain the following language in the jurisdiction section: "Plaintiff does not herein assert any federal claim, and any reference to federal law is merely exemplary. Because of this disclaimer any attempt to remove this case by the defendant is necessarily frivolous." This disclaimer should give a defendant pause before any removal papers are filed. Unfortunately, it is not a guarantee that the defendant will not successfully remove the case. If the area of law in which the claim is asserted is "completely" preempted, then the case is removable notwithstanding the disclaimer. In other words, if the case is a federal "horse," then painting a state law "cow" on the side of it will not fool a federal judge.
A defendant who desires to put his opponents in federal court needs to be knowledgeable about the substantive law in the arena under which the case arises. If he is in unfamiliar territory he should conduct substantive research before the applicable removal deadline. After the research, the analysis is simple. Every claim made by the plaintiff presupposes that the defendant could have avoided the lawsuit by conducting himself differently. The existence of the claim, then, has the power to regulate conduct. Whatever the defendant should have done differently to avoid the lawsuit is the conduct expected by the claim's regulation. If the conduct regulation imposed by the plaintiff's state law claims: (1) conflicts with federal law, (2) falls in an area pervasively occupied by federal regulation, or (3) is expressly preempted by federal statute, then the case is removable. The real inquiry is: "What conduct is the plaintiff's claim regulating?"
Often the wording of a plaintiff's complaint can make a case vulnerable to this analysis. For example, assume an injured passenger sues an airbag manufacturer claiming in his pleadings that "the defendant was negligent in installing a dangerous airbag in the plaintiff's car." This pleading may be interpreted by the court as holding a manufacturer liable for installing a device required to be installed by federal law. In such a case, conflict preemption would make the case vulnerable to removal. On the other hand, the plaintiff may eliminate the removal threat by being more specific in the complaint. For example, pleading that "the defendant was negligent in failing to install a safe airbag in plaintiff's car" would render the case immune from misinterpretation and removal. In the latter pleading language, it is clear that the conduct imposed by the claim (installing a safe airbag) is not in conflict with the federal law requiring airbags. It merely asks that the airbags installed pursuant to federal law be safe ones.
In sum, care must be taken by the plaintiff to craft a pleading to avoid removal anytime the claim nears federally regulated territory.
- Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim
The best way to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to stay out of federal court. But, when a case has been removed from state court or filed originally in federal court it remains vulnerable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the state law claims have been preempted.29 This is because federal law is almost all statutory in nature (with few exceptions such as admiralty). As a result, federal law has few remedies for most common types of wrongful conduct (i.e., negligence). Often times even if an area is exclusively in the federal domain, there is no remedy for the wrongful conduct alleged. In the airbag case example, the court would dismiss a claim of negligently installing an airbag, because there is no federal negligence law and the federal statutes do not create a cause of action to redress such conduct. One can assert that failure to provide a remedy is unconstitutional, but often a court would prefer to dismiss the case, rather than assume the burden of crafting a federal remedy.
This author exploited that very situation representing the airline in Baugh v. TWA.30 In Baugh, a flight attendant with high heels stepped on the plaintiff, breaking her ankle. I removed the case on diversity grounds and then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
When I took the plaintiff's deposition, I was mindful to use magic words from the preemption statute during cross-examination. I got her to agree that her injuries occurred during the flight attendant's attempt to provide meal "service." This was important because all state regulation of an air carrier's "rate, routes, and services" had been expressly preempted by statute. I took the position that the claim would require the defendant airline to prohibit flight attendants from wearing high heels and serving in-flight meals during turbulence. A good idea perhaps, but state regulation of conduct nonetheless. The court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. The biggest mistake made by the plaintiff's attorney was his failure to assert a federal claim after removal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and did not have to reach the issue of whether federal remedy existed.31 Even though it was not clear whether federal law provided a remedy, pleading one would have forced the court to entertain the issue of whether a federal claim existed or whether to deny the plaintiff any remedy whatsoever. Anytime there is a preemption defense, the plaintiff should counter that federal remedies are implied or arise under federal common law. At least then the court will have to ponder depriving the victim of a remedy.
- Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Ironically, a circuitous logical matrix emerges when analyzing removal jurisdiction and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In a non-diversity case, if only state law claims are pled and they are not preempted, then they cannot be asserted in federal court. Any attempt to file such claims in federal court would face dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, if the same claims were preempted, the case could be removed if it were originally filed in state court. Then, the federal court could dismiss the whole case under Rule 12(b)(1) if federal law provided no remedy. Query: If the lawsuit were dismissed for failure to state a claim, just what was the federal court asserting removal jurisdiction over in the first place? The "claims or rights" are either "arising under the Constitution treaties or laws of the United States" (in which case they are cognizable) or they do not so arise (in which case they are not removable). That is a conflict that has bothered this author for many years and has no answer.
In any event, most federal courts will assume jurisdiction over the subject matter if the preemption issue is brought forth. A removing defendant would be better suited to bring all dismissal motions as Rule 12(b)(6) motions, rather than Rule 12(b)(1) motions. This avoids the circuitous logic problem. However, in certain instances a defendant can only rely on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion in the preemption game. An important example of this is in order.
This author had the pleasure of losing his first trial in a dramatic way. The case was O'Carrol v. American Airlines.32 In O'Carrol, the plaintiff had been removed from the airplane by the flight crew on charges of intoxication and unruly behavior. He was arrested by the airport police and spent an unpleasant night in jail. He sued the airline, asserting state law claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment and false arrest. The plaintiff brought the claims originally in a Beaumont, Texas, federal court on diversity grounds. At that time, federal court in Beaumont was considered a plaintiff's nirvana. Despite the forum, a naive sense of bravado and encouragement from my mentors convinced me to take the case to trial. Unfortunately, I was dismantled at the trial by a board-certified attorney with 20 years experience. I had approximately nine months of law practice under my belt, none of which was in a courtroom. The jury returned a verdict of $272,000 in the plaintiff's favor. Many long nights in the library were spent trying to salvage my big firm career. Then it hit me - Preemption. During the trial I had argued that federal law required the captain to remove anyone who appeared to be intoxicated from the plane. Thus, the reasoning went, he couldn't have been negligent. I was right. The problem was that I argued it to the jury and it was a matter for the judge. How could I get my preemption argument heard after trial? As a general proposition jurisdiction is never waived. Under the federal rules of civil procedure, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion can be argued even after trial.33 I promptly filed the motion and argued that the entire trial was for naught. The court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims that were tried, because they were state law claims that had been preempted. Although the trial court denied the motion, it preserved the argument for appeal. Ultimately the Fifth Circuit agreed with me and vacated the judgment.34 It was a total victory for the defense, which could have only been accomplished through Rule 12(b)(1).
- Summary Judgment
Because many state judicial systems differ procedurally from the federal system, Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(b)(1) procedural devices are often unavailable when asserting preemption arguments in state courts. This author has generally observed preemption arguments to be brought in the form of summary judgment motions in such instances.35 Substantively, there is no difference. The federal motions are generally considered as dispositive as a summary judgment.
52.3 Pleading Strategies to Avoid Dismissal
- Pleading Around the Federal Law
The simplest way to avoid preemption is to avoid pleading claims that regulate conduct governed by federal law. A boilerplate pleading of state law negligence is not enough. One must know the substance of any federal laws that may apply. Pleading negligence without knowing the federal law is like walking through a minefield wearing a blindfold. Remember the defective airbag example. The only way a plaintiff's attorney could know the wisdom in pleading negligent "failure to install a safe airbag" (not preempted) and negligent "installation of a dangerous airbag" (preempted) was to know that federal law required their installation.
Know the applicable federal laws and only describe wrongful conduct that could have been engaged in despite the federal law. Despite the state law legal theory (negligence, strict liability, warranty, or contract), if the wrongful conduct described by the pleadings is either required by federal law encouraged by federal law or even covered by federal law, it is preempted.
- Finding a Federal Claim
If the conduct regulated by ones claims appears to be preempted, the one must search the fact of the case for other wrongful conduct. If non-preempted conduct can support liability and causation, it should be used to plead around the federal law. However, if the only wrongful conduct legitimately causing plaintiff's damages is governed exclusively by federal law, then one must find a federal remedy or send the client home to lick his wounds.
- Implied Causes of Action
The most common method of creating a federal claim is to imply one under the relevant federal statutes according to the doctrine of Cort v. Ash.36 In determining whether a private cause of action exists, Cort v. Ash, sets forth factors which are relevant. They are as follows:
- Is the person one of a class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted; that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?
- Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
- Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for Plaintiff?
- Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law in an area basically the concern of the state so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?37
Applying these factors in the shadow of a preemption claim is not difficult. With respect to the first factor, most statutes are designed to protect the public, and usually, the plaintiff is a member of the class Congress was trying to protect. For example, if the plaintiff was poisoned by federally regulated chemicals, then in all likelihood, the regulations were designed to prevent the poisoning.
With respect to the second factor, most statutes do bear some assumption of a private remedy. Most regulatory statutes contain "savings clauses" designed to preserve remedies which pre-dated the legislation. Some statutes have liability insurance requirements which, obviously, assume lawsuits may be filed. Most of the time, if one scours the text of a statute and its legislative history, one can find a language to somewhat satisfy this factor.
With respect to the third factor, it is almost always consistent with the purpose of a statute to penalize violations of the statute with lawsuits. The fourth factor is the easiest. It is always satisfied in the shadow of a preemption claim. If the area is preempted, then it cannot possibly be "relegated to state law." Therefore, it would always be appropriate to imply a cause of action.
In pleading an implied cause of action, this author recommends setting forth the statutory language relied upon and citing Cort. Then a court could hardly find that pleading failed to state a claim. Rather, the court would be required to determine if the claim is one "upon which relief can be granted."
- Common Law Claims
The law presumes a remedy for a wrong done. The United States Supreme Court has declared:
Rights, Constitutional and otherwise, do not exist in a vacuum. Their purpose is to protect persons from injuries to particular interests, and their contours are shaped by the interests they protect.
Our legal system's concept of damages reflects this view of legal rights. "The cardinal principal of damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant's breach of duty." 2 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts § 25.1, p. 1299 (1956) (emphasis in original).38
This principle of American law is the philosophical bedrock upon which all common law rests. It is also a last resort for one who's claims seem to be preempted and who cannot find a federal statute granting or even implying relief. Courts rarely recognize federal common law claims. But if failure to do so would be obviously unjust, federal courts may be willing to recognize federal common law under their constitutional authority.39
Any time a plaintiff's claims are removed on federal question grounds and there is clear preemption without a chance of remand, the plaintiff's counsel should amend to allege that the plaintiff has a federal common law claim identical in nature to the state law claims pled. Then and only then will the court be required to contemplate the existence of a duty and a breach of that duty, prior to dismissal.
- Federal Standard of Care with State Law Remedies
A final way for a plaintiff to admit the existence of federal preemption and preserve his client's claims is to convince the court to adopt the reasoning of the Court in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.40
In Silkwood a laboratory analyst at a federally licensed nuclear power plant was contaminated by plutonium. After she was killed in an unrelated car accident, the administrator of her estate brought a diversity action in federal court based on the Oklahoma common law of torts. After a favorable jury verdict, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the punitive damages awarded were preempted by the existence of the federal nuclear regulatory scheme. The Supreme Court reversed this holding on a unique basis. While admitting that the federal government had "occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns," the Court pointed to the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act for evidence that Congress left room for state law remedies.
This limited preemption was based mostly on the fact that Congress failed to provide for a federal remedy:
If there were nothing more, this concern over the states' inability to formulate effective standards and the foreclosure of the states from conditioning the operation of nuclear plants on compliance with state-imposed safety standards arguably would disallow resort to state-law remedies by those suffering injuries from radiation in a nuclear plant. There is, however, ample evidence that Congress had no intention of forbidding the states from providing such remedies.
Indeed, there is no indication that Congress even seriously considered precluding the use of such remedies either when it enacted the Atomic Energy Act, in 1954 and or when it amended it in 1959. This silence takes on added significance in light of Congress' failure to provide any federal remedy for persons injured by such conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.41
While the trial court in Silkwood actually submitted the case on a negligence and a gross negligence charge from Oklahoma law, there was plenty of evidence that Kerr-McGee had violated federal regulations.42 In most respects, the negligence standard applied was no different than the federal regulations that required "reasonable" efforts to minimize exposure.43
Silkwood has been cited by subsequent decisions imposing a federal standard of care, while allowing state law remedies.44 Thus, one could argue that a finding of preemption does eliminate the application of inconsistent state tort standards of conduct. But if federal standards of conduct (or consistent state standards) are applied, then Congress' intent to preempt is preserved, exclusive federal regulation is preserved. At the same time, a remedy for conduct violative of the federal standard is administered through state law damages. After all, the Court in Silkwood explained:
We do not suggest that there could never be an instance in which the federal law would preempt the recovery of damages based on state law. But insofar as damages for radiation injuries are concerned, preemption should not be judged on the basis that the federal government has so completely occupied the field of
safety that state remedies are foreclosed but on whether there is an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state standards or whether the imposition of a state standard in a damages action would frustrate the objectives of the federal law. We perceive no such conflict or frustration in the circumstances of this case. . . . .
The United States, as amicus curiae, contends that the award of punitive damages in this case is preempted because it conflicts with the federal remedial scheme, noting that the NRC is authorized to impose civil penalties on licensees when federal standards have been violated. 42 U.S.C. § 2282 (1976 ed. and Supp. V) However, the award of punitive damages in the present case does not conflict with that scheme. Paying both federal fines and state-imposed punitive damages for the same incident would not appear to be physically impossible. Nor does exposure to punitive damages frustrate any purpose of the federal remedial scheme.45
Pleading the "federal standard with state remedy" argument is simple. One should allege the violation of federal law in specific statutory or regulatory terms and state that "because of defendant's violation of the federally imposed standard of care, plaintiff is entitled to a damage remedy at common law which is not precluded by the federal regulatory scheme." Practitioners should not confuse such a claim with negligence per se (which ought to be pled in a separate count to avoid confusion). The former leaves no room for state law negligence while the latter is using federal law as a per se example of negligence, which could presumably in other instances vary from the federal standard.
- Negligence Per Se.
While not a federal remedy, the state law doctrine of negligence per se can be asserted using violations of federal statutes and regulations as evidence of per se negligence under state law. The distinction between the "state law remedies with a federal standard of care" claim and a negligence per se claim based on the federal law is blurry to say the least. But practitioners should always plead them in separate counts to avoid confusing the courts. Most courts can easily grasp the concepts of negligence per se, but they may not grasp (or politically accept) the Silkwood rationale.
- When to Plead the Federal Claims
Because most plaintiffs prefer to stay in state court, they should not initially plead federal claims unless they wish to be removed or wish to file in federal court from the beginning. Otherwise, these claims should only be added after a removal succeeds and an attempted remand fails.
This concept is true for negligence per se claims as well. Even though technically they are not claims based on federal law, few courts have the discipline to ferret out the difference. This author's experience is that many courts can not grasp the idea that a pleading can cite violation of a federal law and not be asserting a federal claim. The risk of removal warrants avoiding it, unless absolutely necessary. See discussion of pleading disclaimer, supra p. ___.
52.4 Appeal: The Last Resort
Most preemption motions are dispositive of either some or all of the issues in a case. Thus, they are likely to end up the subject matter of an appeal. There is a great deal of appellate authority on various aspects of preemption. As discussed earlier, there is no real clear-cut test for any of the three types of preemption. Thus, the appellate decisions usually hinge on policy objectives of the current politic and the composition of the appellate court. It is advisable to retain a preemption expert if your case is headed for an appeal on either side of a preemption battle.
52.5 Preemption: Specific Topics
While it may seem that the remainder of this chapter need not be read from beginning to end, it should be. It is a survey of some of the most prominent cases in which the federal preemption defense has made law. The most significant preemption cases have been described in the areas of employee retirement, commercial aviation, medical devices, pesticides, and tobacco. However, there are many other areas in which one may find a preemption defense asserted, such as railroads, hazardous substances, general aviation, securities, copyright, to name a few.
This survey will reveal that most preemption law is based on express provisions in federal statutes. Such provisions commonly use two basic types of language. One type involves prohibiting states from imposing "requirements" that are "different from or in addition to" federal law. The other type involves prohibiting enforcement of state laws "relating to" a particular subject matter. Each of these two types of express preemption language has its own line of cases. One should always be careful not to use the wrong line of cases to support his argument.
- Employee Retirement
- History
In 1974, long before the current trend in managed health care began, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").46 ERISA touches nearly all employee benefits, from retirement to medical benefits, from COBRA47 plans to HMOs.48 The purpose was twofold: 1) employers would be encouraged to provide employees with appropriate fringe benefits unencumbered by many different state law requirements,49 and 2) employees would be protected from unscrupulous employers who were underfunding programs that wound up insolvent before the employee received any benefits.50
Section 514 of ERISA (now recodified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144)51 reads in part:
- 1144. Other laws
(a) Supercedure; effective date. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this title and title IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) and not exempt under section 4(b). This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
This is an express preemption provision. It appears to make every provision of ERISA displace state law so long as the state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan. One of the most troublesome provisions of ERISA, which displaces state law, is § 502.
Section 502 of ERISA (now recodified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132)52 reads in part:
- 1132. Civil Enforcement
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary- . . . .
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan. . . .
A close look at section 502 reveals that only equitable relief is available.53 Because it is the exclusive remedy, it causes many of the problems with claims involving managed care organizations.
When Congress considered ERISA, it looked at health benefits systems as they were being administered in 1974. If a person got sick, he went to the doctor, got the treatment he needed, and waited for reimbursement from his health benefit plan. If the health benefit plan did not approve the treatment, the plan member had to pay for the treatment out of pocket. Under this scheme, equitable relief was an appropriate remedy. If the plan wrongly withheld payment, the plan member, under ERISA, could recover his out-of-pocket expenses.
What Congress did not anticipate was that the country would move to the HMO/PPO health care systems. Now, when a person gets sick, he goes to a primary health care provider, who makes a recommendation on further treatment. A Utilization Reviewer then determines the cost appropriateness and necessity of medical care. If Utilization Reviewer denies necessary treatment, plan members may suffer injuries, further illness, or die. Then, when a wrongful death or medical malpractice claim is filed under state law, it is preempted as "relating to" employee benefit plans.
Remember under ERISA, only equitable relief is available. What would that amount to? The premiums the employee has paid for his health care plan? An award of paid premiums? Some compensation that would be for the loss of a leg, or a death in the family. Typical medical malpractice compensatory and punitive damages are simply not available under ERISA. Ironically, if an injured patient has no medical fringe benefits he does not face the ERISA obstacle. If he pays for his own medical care, then the denial of treatment would not "relate to" employee benefits, and a state law claim for medical malpractice would be valid.
Beginning with Alessi v. Resbestos-Manhattan, Inc.,54 and Shaw v. Delta Air Lines Inc.,55 ERISA was read so broadly that nearly all plaintiffs' claims were held to be preempted by the federal statute.56 This reading was simply missing the purpose of the ERISA statute.57 Nevertheless, this misreading was affirmed and followed.58 Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.,59 marked an all time high for ERISA preemption. The Mackey court held that the "mere mention of ERISA in a complaint will require preemption."60
- The New Paradigm and Successful ERISA Strategies
Because of the legal perversions that ERISA was creating, courts have begun to resurrect long forgotten principles.61 In New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,62 the Supreme Court struck a blow in the name of federalism and mandated a presumption against preemption.63 Only in situations where it is absolutely necessary to provide federal legislation-because state legislation will simply not provide the consistency that the subject requires-should the federal government be able to reign over a state issue. According to the Court in Travelers, an incidental economic federal impact is not enough to justify federal jurisdiction. Only significant economic impact on benefits packages should trigger preemption.64 Travelers also abandoned "relates to" literalism and set a standard for looking to the structure and purpose of ERISA.65 This decision opened the door around ERISA. Now the test is when a state law binds ERISA administrators to specific choices, or in some way limits administrative discretion, it is preempted.66
The problem now is finding a way to structure a complaint to avoid preemption and recover damages for injured clients. The first step is to understand the "relates to" trap in the language of section 514. "Relates to" is virtually limitless; it has no definitive end. It's like the house that Jack built. The cheese is related to the mouse that is related to the cat that is related to the house; therefore, the cheese and the house are related. Success in avoiding preemption requires cutting off the "relates to" logic. In 1997, in California Division of Labor Standards v. Dillingham, Justice Scalia addressed this concern, in dicta.67 He noted that the "relates to" language is particularly unhelpful and should cease to be the test courts use to determine whether a claim should be preempted. Instead, he suggested the test should be ordinary field preemption or conflict preemption analysis.68
In Bannister v. Sorenson,69 the Eighth Circuit reviewed past precedent and distilled six factors which can be used in preemption analysis. The use of these factors avoids the "relates to" problem. Consider: (1) Would the state law claim negate a provision of ERISA? (2) Would it have an undue effect on ERISA entities? (3) Would it have an overbearing effect on ERISA administrators? (4) Would it have a sizable economic impact? (5) Would it be inconsistent with provisions of ERISA? (6) Is the claim focused on an area of traditional state power? Considering these factors the claim is not preempted if litigation of the state claim would only minimally affect ERISA. However, any claims that impose duties on ERISA administrators that conflict from state to state are generally preempted.
Therefore, the key to avoiding the preemption trap is to critically ask yourself: "What would my claim have the defendants change about their conduct?" Then you must ask: "Would the claim require the defendant to institute a change which would sizably impact the economics or administration of an ERISA plan?" If the answer is yes, then you must change the nature of your claim. You must change it until the answer is "no."
The Third Circuit case of Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare70 is an example of how pleadings can affect the outcome of a preemption battle. In Dukes, the plaintiff's husband allegedly died because the defendants refused to perform prescribed blood tests that would have timely identified a dangerously high blood sugar level. The plaintiff claimed the HMO was vicariously liable under the agency theory for the acts of doctors who refused the test and directly liable for failure to properly select and screen the doctors.71
The defendant's HMO removed the case to federal court claiming that not only was the claim expressly preempted by § 514 as "related to" an ERISA plan, but that it was also preempted by § 502 because the medical care allegedly denied was a "benefit" and solely enforceable by way of § 50272
The Dukes court distinguished between § 514 and § 502 preemption. Citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,73 the court held that only § 502 so completely preempts state laws as to make them removable. "ERISA preemption under § 514(a) without more, does not convert [a] state claim into an action arising under federal law.'"74
Because of this, the Dukes court did not concern itself initially with defensive preemption dismissal, but only with removal jurisdiction and remand. If the claims were arguably preempted by ERISA, but not "completely" preempted, the court had no jurisdiction to hear the defensive preemption battle because the case had been improvidently removed.
The difference between preemption and complete preemption is important. When the doctrine of complete preemption does not apply, but the plaintiff's' state claim is arguably preempted under § 514(a), the district court, being without removal jurisdiction, cannot resolve the dispute regarding preemption. It lacks power to do anything other than remand to the state court where the preemption issue can be addressed and resolved.75
Thus the sole issue for the Dukes court was whether the plaintiff's claims were preempted by the removal-worthy § 502. A reading of § 502 shows that it covers recovery of benefits due and enforcement and clarification of benefit rights. The court held that there was not § 502 preemption:
We are compelled to this conclusion because the plaintiff's claims, even when construed as U.S. Healthcare suggests, merely attack the quality of the benefits they received: The plaintiffs here simply do not claim that the plans erroneously withheld benefits due. Nor do they ask the state courts to enforce their rights under the terms of their respective plans or to clarify their rights to future benefits. As a result, the plaintiff's claims fall outside of the scope of § 502(a)(1)(B) and these cases must be remanded to the state courts from which they were removed.76
In Dukes the nature of the wrongful conduct (refusing to provide the blood test) could easily have been pled as a "denial of benefits due him." Of course, this plaintiff's attorneys in Dukes were smart enough to avoid such claims and only attack the behavior of the defendants as medical doctors, not as administrators. This is how one avoids the preemption trap - knowledge of the law and well-pled complaints.
Even when the facts of the case require pleading that benefits were withheld, there is still a possible way to avoid ERISA preemption. Normally these Utilization Review cases are lumped into § 502 of ERISA as "enforcement" of benefit rights. The way around § 502 is simply to show that a Utilization Review claim, where treatment was denied and injury resulted, is not seeking "enforcement" of benefit rights. It is simply seeking damages. One must persuade the court to look to the intent of ERISA rather than play the statutory construction rhetoric with "relates to." The intent of Congress was to provide financial guidance and not medical guidance to ERISA plans. When this is clear to the court, the framework for a winning Utilization Review case is set. When a reviewer makes a bad medical decision, the harm should be remedied through the same avenues by which vicarious liability claims are remedied. These avenues provide compensatory and even punitive damages.77 The administration of the plan is not in question. Section 514 does not apply.
Although this argument makes good sense, its legal foundation is weak. A Utilization Reviewer bases his decisions on both the medical need for treatment and the associated costs. To divide that decision into two parts may be splitting hairs. While other torts accept the medical/monetary distinction, there is precedent that leans toward the notion that ERISA does not.78 To make that distinction require examination of the terms of a specific plan, and the Supreme Court has held that any law requiring examination of a plan's terms are preempted.79
ERISA cases are now easier to keep in state court. But many claims are still preempted and there is a general sense that the law is unfair. Congress has recognized the problem and may do something about it. Several bills have been introduced onto the floor to establish minimum federal standards for HMOs and managed care insurers. The hope for these new pro-patient bills is to deter health insurers from compromising care in the pursuit of profits.80 If the courts cannot clean up the mess, the new millenium will surely bring with it health care legislation.
- Products Liability
- Tobacco
"WARNING: THE SURGEON GENERAL HAS DETERMINED THAT CIGARETTE SMOKING IS DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH." The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 requires this warning (among others) to appear on every pack of cigarettes sold in the United States. That act, along with the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 was enacted to standardize regulations based on smoking and health. The acts imposed requirements relating to cigarette packaging and advertising. At the same time the acts preempted state law requirements with respect to the advertising and promotion of any appropriately labeled cigarettes. The acts prevented states from promulgating regulations regarding cigarette labeling.81 Each act has a section 5a, and each act has a section 5b. They have been recodified for legislative purposes,82 and are set forth in the following chart:
1965 Labeling Act
1969 Cigarette Smoking Act
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.
Historically, the acts were used as an all-encompassing shield, protecting cigarette manufacturers from any and all liability arising from state law causes of action. Only recently has the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of preemption in the landmark case of Cipollone v. Liggett Group.83
Rose Cipollone began smoking in 1942 and died of lung cancer in 1984. Before death she filed a complaint alleging that Liggett Group, Inc., and other cigarette makers
. . . breached express warranties contained in their advertising, because they failed to warn consumers about the hazards of smoking, because they fraudulently misrepresented those hazards to consumers, and because they conspired to deprive the public of medical and scientific information about smoking.84
In analyzing the claims, the court splintered into a confusing plurality. However, seven justices agreed that the 1965 act had no effect on common law claims and only preempted state "rule making bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements. . . ."85
Six justices agreed that § 5(b) of the 1969 act did preempt certain of Cipollone's failure-to-warn claims and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, but did not preempt the warranty and conspiracy claims.86 "[T]he language of the [1969] act plainly reaches beyond [positive] enactments."87
Cipollone had the effect of splitting tobacco cases into two categories: those that are preempted and those that are not. Most common law state tort claims survive preemption. However, any failure to warn or advertising claims still face federal preemption.88 The Court decided that what was actually preempted by section 5 of the 1969 Act was state regulation of cautionary statements. That is, states cannot make any rules regarding cigarette warnings. State police power, an area of traditional state occupation, was not preempted.89 Cipollone clearly bars failure-to-warn claims based on advertising. However, the door may be open for state law failure-to-warn claims based on packaging.90
In both the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act, section 5a deals with cigarette packaging and section 5b deals with advertising and promotion of cigarettes. The Court found that section 5b of the 1969 Act did have a preemptive effect, but the Court remained silent on section 5a of the 1969 Act. However, in dicta, seven members of the Cipollone Court agreed that section 5a of the original 1965 Act had no preemptive effect on common law tort claims.91 Section 5a of the 1965 Act reads: "No statement related to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 4 of this Act shall be required on any cigarette package." The wording of section 5a of the 1969 Act is exactly the same. Therefore, if the 1965 Act has no preemptive effect, neither should the 1969 act with respect to cigarette packaging.92
One should keep in mind that this argument remains untested in court. Allowing a state claim based on a package's failure-to-warn may simply defeat the legislative purpose of the statute. Such a claim might encourage each state to set its own labeling standards, contrary to the legislative intent of federal uniformity.
The exact holding of Cipollone will be revealed and clarified in future litigation, but for now it is still under debate. Undebatable, however, is its impact on federal preemption in products liability claims.93 Cipollone will be most cited for is its resurrection of the presumption against preemption.94 Cipollone, in effect, held that when preemption is expressly addressed, congressional intent can be inferred. When a statute drafted by Congress contains express preemption provisions with a limited scope, no express preemption will be grafted onto other provisions of the statute. The other provisions may only preempt via conflict with state law. The Court will not infer any broader scope of preemption than what is actually written.95 When Congress expressly discusses preemption with regard to one aspect of a statute, it has effectively expressed its intent not to preempt other areas of the statute-Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (to express one is to exclude the other).96 This presumption against preemption has reached into other areas of products' liability, from airbags to pacemakers.
- Airbags and Motor Vehicle Safety
In 1966, Congress approved the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in order to provide national uniformity in automobile manufacturing requirements.97 The Motor Vehicle Safety Act standards serve as minimum standards for motor vehicle safety.98 Over the years automobiles have incorporated numerous safety devices and modifications including airbags. Litigation relating to airbags typically involved the inadequacy of restraint systems and alleged that airbags or similar devices should have been installed in automobiles in addition to seat belts. More recently, litigants have alleged that certain designs of airbags are inadequate. Other cases claimed that the airbags caused the plaintiffs' injuries.
These liability claims stem from the crashworthiness doctrine which first arose in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.99 The court in Larsen held that vehicles must be designed in a manner that provides adequate protection to its occupants. Manufacturers typically contend that restraint system claims are preempted. Until recently, the courts agreed.100 Few courts recognized state law claims in the presence of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act.101 While plaintiffs argued that their automobiles did not meet the stringent standards required to make them crashworthy, a manufacturer's compliance with federal minimum standards generally snuffed out the claims. The result was that consumers would be hurt in auto crashes and could not be heard in court on their claim that their car should have had an airbag instead of a mere seat belt.
This preemption trend is hard to fathom in light of the statutory language at hand. Section 30103 of the act contains a provision preempting only less stringent state regulation and permitting more stringent state regulation:
(b) Preemption
(1) When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. However, the United States Government, a State, or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe a standard for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment obtained for its own use that imposes a higher performance requirement than that required by the otherwise applicable standard under this chapter.
(2) A State may enforce a standard that is identical to a standard prescribed under this chapter.102
The Motor Vehicle Safety Act also contains a savings clause which provides: "Compliance with any federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law."103
A more rational reading of these provisions has developed in the wake of Cipollone. Now, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act is considered in light of the presumption against preemption. If Congress had intended to preempt design defect litigation it would have expressly stated so. Instead, it expressly preserved state common law in the savings clause. Congress certainly knew of design defect litigation in 1966, and yet, design defect litigation was not addressed in the act. Because it was not addressed and Congress in 1966 would have considered it part of state common law, it is not preempted. Courts are finding that the Motor Vehicle Safety Act was intended not to be exclusive of the common law, but rather, supplementary to it.104 In Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co.,105 the plaintiff's decedent was killed in an automobile accident. The plaintiff alleged design defect due to the lack of a driver's side airbag. In reversing a trial court summary judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined that
. . . . Congress intended the Safety Act to be "supplementary of and in addition to the common law of negligence and product liability." Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 3891 F.2d 495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968). Having determined that the preemption clause when read in tandem with the saving clause "provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority, there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of the legislation." Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (citation and quotation omitted).
Because we must construe the preemption clause narrowly in light of the presumption against the preemption of state police power regulations, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 123 L. Ed. 2d 387, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993), and given the express utilization of the term "common law" in the saving clause, we agree with the analysis of those courts that have held that actions such as this are not preempted. See, e.g., Gingold, 567 A.2d at 330. 106
Thus, if one plans on filing a case implicating design and manufacture of a motor vehicle, one should generally become conversant with the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Even if the current trend of courts is away from preemption, courts in any given jurisdiction may still cling to the notion of implied preemption. Even in jurisdictions following the new trend, one must be wary of a plethora of specific regulations, which may simply conflict with a cause of action and preempt it.
- Pesticides
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) is a broad, total regulation of every aspect of the pesticide industry.107 If one is handling a claim involving pesticides, one should become familiar with the provisions of FIFRA.108 The act contains a provision, which has been held to have preemptive effect:
- 136v. Authority of States
In general. A state may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this Act.
Uniformity. Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this Act.109
With respect to pesticide labeling, not only does this section preempt state requirements "different" from federal law, but also it preempts state laws "in addition" to federal requirements. Unlike the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, FIFRA does not allow for more stringent, albeit consistent state labeling requirements. It is no wonder. FIFRA is incredibly comprehensive with respect to product labeling. Nine pages of the Code of Federal Regulations are devoted to specific warning language, placement of warnings, size and color of warning type, and many other minute details.110 One could try to apply the airbag argument to pesticides, but would soon run into insurmountable obstacles, because under FIFRA, a pesticide manufacturer is actually prohibited from using more stringent language than provided for by the Act. "Use of any signal word(s) associated with a higher toxicity category is not permitted except when the agency determines that such labeling is necessary to prevent unreasonable or adverse effects on man or the environment."111
A significant number of federal cases have recently arisen after Cipollone to preempt injured persons' claims against the manufacturers of pesticides. In Papas v. Upjohn Co.,112 workers were injured due to exposure from pesticides manufactured by the defendants. The workers' claims were based on negligence, strict liability, and a breach of warranty. All of the claims impugned the inadequate labeling of the pesticides. Comparing section 136v to the Cigarette Labeling Act provisions analyzed in Cipollone, the court held the workers' claims to be preempted.
The Papases concede that each of their negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty counts alleges in part that Zoecon failed to warn users that its product contained certain harmful chemicals and failed to inform users to take appropriate precautionary measures. Those allegations, like the failure to warn claims in Cipollone, require the finder of fact to determine whether, under state law, Zoecon adequately labelled [sic] and packaged its product. This inquiry is precisely what section 136v forbids.113
The problem for most practitioners in pesticide cases is to find a defect in the product other than a marketing (labeling) defect. Design and manufacturing defects are difficult to come by when dealing with liquid or powdered chemicals. Most harm to persons is brought upon by improper handling, which is normally either consistent with or in violation of a label. Either way, it is not typically a manufacturers' problem, but a problem for those who handle the chemicals.
One who seeks to avoid preemption can find guidance in certain cases on how to formulate a theory of liability and draft his pleadings. Jenkins v. Amchem Products, Inc., involved a farmer whose use of the chemical 2,4-D over a long period of time led to the development of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.114 He brought suit against the manufacturer alleging (1) negligence, (2) failure to adequately test the product to ensure it was free from harmful contaminants, (3) failure to warn plaintiff of the long-term exposure risks, and (4) strict liability. The trial court granted partial summary judgment based on FIFRA preemption. The court described its order as follows: "[R]eferring to plaintiff's four legal theories as stated in the pretrial order, this ruling restricts theory 1 [negligence], leaves theory 2 [failure to adequately test] untouched, eliminates theory 3 [failure to warn], and restricts theory 4 [strict liability] to the extent it is based upon a failure to adequately warn or instruct."115 The trial court next ruled on the defendants' motion that all of the plaintiff's remaining claims were inextricably related to the adequacy of the labeling. The court agreed and dismissed the entire case.116
In a detailed opinion, which included a survey of the post- Cipollone FIFRA cases, the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the dismissal and adopted a test set forth in the case of Worm v. American Cyanamid Co.117 To determine whether or not a plaintiff's claim relates to labeling (and is preempted) versus some other defect in the product (and is not preempted), the following inquiry should be made: ". . . .whether one could reasonably foresee that the manufacturer, in seeking to avoid liability for the error, would choose to alter the product or the label."118 While this test is subjective as to the reasonable foreseeability of a manufacturer's actions, it still provides a plaintiff with guidance in avoiding FIFRA preemption in claims against pesticide manufacturers.
For a plaintiff's attorney, the key is to claim a defect that is easier to fix by changing the product than changing the label. This will not be easy in most cases. For example, assume a can of roach spray contained extremely harmful carcinogens, which if breathed in, caused lung cancer. Normally, a lazy manufacturer would simply warn against inhaling the spray. However, a plaintiff may claim the product is defective because its liquid is too volatile and prone to becoming airborne when sprayed through a standard spray can nozzle. Certainly the defect claimed has nothing to do with the label. Nor can a manufacturer guard against this defect by changing the label. To fix the defect, the manufacturer must change the product. Another strategy to avoid preemption in such a case would be to sue the manufacturer of the spray can, claiming that the nozzle delivered the product in a volatile form and/or failed to incorporate a safety device, such as a respirator, with the product. In the latter case a clever defendant may claim that the respirator or the spray can is part of the packaging and thus covered by FIFRA. In general, plaintiffs who wish not to be removed to federal court and/or dismissed must avoid a pleading that impugns the labeling or packaging of pesticides. In short, plead around the label.
Only one case has found a state failure-to-warn claim based on failure to warn viable. In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,119 the court allowed a state tort claim for damages caused by a herbicide. Even though § 136v(b) of FIFRA seems to expressly preempt state actions, the D.C. Circuit found that it did not. The court decided "Even if Chevron could not alter the label, Maryland could decide that, as between a manufacturer and an injured party, the manufacturer ought to bear the cost of compensating for those injuries that could have been prevented with a more detailed label than that approved by the EPA."120 The court's reasoning then followed that absent a "clear and manifest purpose" to preempt, state tort damages were not incompatible with federal law.121 One wonders what could be more clear and manifest than: "Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this Act."122 Most subsequent cases have rejected the rationale in Ferebee.123
In pesticide cases, plaintiffs should seek out defendants other than manufacturers. They should sue distributors and, more importantly, applicators if possible. There are a number of cases which hold that FIFRA preemption does not apply to these other defendants.124 This author has successfully represented the victims of pesticides and avoided claims of FIFRA preemption by carefully selecting defendants and avoiding claims which relate to failure to warn.
- Medical Devices
Federal Regulation of Food, Drugs and Medical Devices began at the turn of the century. In 1906 Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act.125 This act basically banned misleading marketing but was not proactive. In 1938 more than 100 people died from ingesting an untested elixir. The resulting public outrage lead to the comprehensive Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).126 This act was proactive in requiring companies to test drugs prior to marketing them. Over the years this Act has been amended more than twenty times.127 The original FDCA regulated Medical Devices, but lacked any proactive features. It merely outlawed mislabeling and adulteration of devices. Not until 1976 did Congress address the weaknesses in the FDCA with respect to medical devices, when it passed the Medical Device Amendments (MDA).128
The MDA classifies devices into three categories depending on the level of risk and experimentation of the device and imposes varying levels of scrutiny and testing on each category. Category III devices are the most risky and are subject to the most stringent regulation, including pre-market approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). There are exceptions to the pre-approval requirement for older designs which are "grandfathered" into the act and designs substantially equivalent to the "grandfathered" designs.129
The Medical Device Amendments also contained a provision held to preempt some state law claims relating to medical devices:
- 360K. State and local requirements respecting devices
(a) General rule. Except as provided in subsection (b), no State or political subdivision of a state may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this Act to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this Act.130
It would seem that this "different from, or in addition to" language would be interpreted with the same preemptive effect as similar language contained in the Cigarette Labeling Act, the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, and FIFRA. However this is not the case. The Supreme Court has given the MDA preemption provision the most restrictive interpretation.
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,131 a married couple brought suit for injuries sustained by the wife when her pacemaker failed, stopping her heart and requiring emergency surgery. The couple's claims were based on negligent design, manufacture and marketing. The pacemaker had been excepted from the pre-market approval requirements of the MDA because it was the substantial equivalent of a grandfathered design. This fact, the defendant argued, preempted the Lohr's design claims. The defendant also argued that the manufacturing and labeling requirements of the act also preempted the Lohr's manufacturing and marketing claims.
Giving the MDA preemption provision an extremely narrow reading, the Medtronic majority held that all of the couple's claims survived the preemption challenge. The plurality opinion of the Court is difficult to decipher. In analyzing the design claims, the Court engages in a typical Cipollone type analysis of the legislative history and congressional intent. However, two main developments flow from the opinion, which are highly likely to affect the strategy of those in the preemption game.
First, the Court was unanimous on the proposition that state law damages remedies can be used to enforce the federal standards of care created by the MDA.132 The Court initially noted that there has been a tension growing in recent decades between traditional state police powers and the federal government's increasing role in matters of public health and safety.133 Without expressly stating so, the Court reached a compromise between these competing forces. Noting that the MDA has no explicit cause of action and that there is no suggestion that the MDA implies a federal remedy, the Court cited Silkwood, stating that it's "difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."134 The Court concluded:
Nothing in §360k denies Florida the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel federal requirements. Even if it may be necessary as a matter of Florida Law to prove that those violations were the result of negligent conduct, or that they created an unreasonable hazard for users of the product, such additional elements of the state-law cause of action would make the state requirements narrower, not broader than the federal requirement. . . . The presence of a damages remedy does not amount to the additional or different "requirement" that is necessary under the statute; rather, it merely provides another reason for manufacturers to comply with identical existing "requirements" under federal law.135
In this author's opinion, this is the most important preemption holding of the decade. The Court was unanimous on this point. It is a rock solid resurrection of the liberal, result-oriented Silkwood, which is now dressed up in judicially conservative clothing. Federal preoccupation with a matter was once the source of defeat for a plaintiff's claims. Now it can form the basis of the claims.
It is still true that if a plaintiff's claims conflict with the federal law, they will be preempted. However now the federal laws, which once provided no remedy, can almost always be argued to form the basis of a remedy. Regardless of a whether a tort action is characterized as one based on federal law with state law remedies or state law negligence with federal laws as a per se example, the paradigm has changed.
One must now question the need for ever implying a private right of action under Cort v. Ash or creating a federal common law remedy as in Moragne. If preemption is limited so that the state can always apply its damages remedies to the federal standard of care, why would a court go through the trouble of the Cort or Moragne analysis. It probably will not. Nonetheless, prudent plaintiffs should plead all three theories. If the court strikes the pleadings on the federal common law and implied claim, at least the defendant will have something to write home about.
Medtronic leaves a lingering procedural question. Does removal jurisdiction exist for the type of claims it recognized? If they are pled only as negligence per se, there should be no removal jurisdiction. Negligence per se is a state law cause of action that uses violations of federal law as mere examples of negligence under state law. However, a sharp defense attorney should argue that Medtronic does not allow the characterization of such actions as negligence per se. Arguably, in adopting the Silkwood rationale, the Court indicated that the only standard of care is a federal one. In other words, preemption exists, but it only extends to the standard of care, leaving state law to supply the remedy of damages. Since the standard of care is necessarily federal, regardless of the damages remedy applied, the question of liability is based on federal law. This of course would allow removal to federal court. This technical distinction should form a battleground in the future. The Court's language cited above seems to indicate that the Supreme Court views the cause of action as a state law one which is merely parallel to the federal standard. But without the federal standard the cause of action would not exist. Is it not a "founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States?"
The second important development occasioned by Medtronic is the majority's use of the rationale in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel.136 The Chevron doctrine instructs a federal court to defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute when the enabling statute is ambiguous. In essence, this allows an agency, such as the FDA, to decide which claims Congress meant to preempt. This doctrine is based on dubious legal reasoning. In order for preemption to apply in the first place, a court must find a clear congressional intent to preempt. Under the "presumption against preemption" established in Cipollone, vagueness of a statute's preemption language should be a deathnell to preemption. It does not seem reasonable that such vagueness could form a requirement of a preemption test. The dissent in Medtronic was highly critical of the majority's use of the doctrine.137
Tactically, if one wanted to use regulations to interpret the preemptive effect of a statute, he would have to show that congressional intent was not clear. But, what defines "clear"? Justice Scalia has called this the "future battle over which agency interpretations of law will be fought."138
- Commercial Aviation
In 1978 Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act139 ("ADA") to increase competition in the airline industry. It amended the Federal Aviation Act140 ("FAA") purposefully creating a void of regulation. Thus, airlines were free to set their own prices, routes, and type of service. To prevent state governments from filling the intentionally created void, Congress added § 105(a)(1) to the Federal Aviation Act. It provided as follows:
[N]o State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to the rates, routes, or service of any air carrier....141
In the late 1980s this provision was becoming the choice of defendants for defeating plaintiff's claims, even those claims of common negligence. In 1994, §105(a)(1) was amended and incorporated into the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 ("FAAAA"), as § 41713.142 The "relating to the rates, routes, or service" language was replaced with "related to price, route, or service." The amendment was technical in nature and not intended to substantively change the law.143
- Supreme Court
The interpretation of § 41713 has never reached the U.S. Supreme Court in a personal injury context. However the Court has spoken on the scope of § 41713 in the context of false advertising and breach of contract claims.
In Morales v. Trans World Airlines,144 the Court held that enforcement of certain statutes aimed at deceptive advertising was preempted. The Court followed the then existing ERISA precedent and focused on the "relates to" language of § 41713. The Court concluded that enforcement of the statutes would have a significant effect on airline prices and thus, "related to" airline prices.145 Morales is of limited use in analyzing the preemption defense in personal injury cases. First, it is a "price" case. Most personal injury preemption arguments focus on the word "services" in the preemption provision. Secondly, it adopted the "relates to" analysis of older ERISA cases, from which the current Court has significantly retreated. (See discussion in subsection 52.5A., supra.)
In American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,146 the Supreme Court considered claims of a passenger who sued because his frequent flyer miles had been retroactively devalued by the airline. The Court held that § 41713 preempted his claims under a state consumer fraud act because the state consumer fraud act was proscriptive legislation which had the effect of re-regulating the already deregulated airline pricing and marketing policies.147 The Wolens Court refused to preempt the breach of contract claims, because it was not in conflict with the purposes of airline deregulation. Enforcement of self-imposed contractual obligations did rise to the level of state regulation of airline conduct required for preemption.148 For personal injury practitioners, the most important text from Wolens is in the footnotes.
By analyzing the dicta and footnotes of the majority, concurrence, and dissent it is arguable that the entire Court is unanimous that personal injury claims are not preempted by §41713. In footnote 7 the majority discussed the FAA's insurance requirements and implies that they did not believe personal injury claims to be preempted.
The preceding subsection, FAA § 401(q)(1), 49 U.S.C. 1371(q)(1), requires an air carrier to have insurance, in an amount prescribed by the DOT, to cover claims for personal injuries and property losses "resulting from the operation or maintenance of aircraft." See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19-20, and n. 12. American does not urge that the ADA preempts personal injury claims relating to airline operations. See Tr. Of Oral Arg. 4. (acknowledgement by counsel for petitioner that "safety claims," for example, a negligence claim arising out of a plane crash, "would generally not be preempted"); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20, n. 12 ("It is. . . unlikely that Section [41713] 1305 (a) (1) preempts safety-related personal-injury claims relating to airline operations.").149
In footnote 9 the majority chastised Justice O'Connor for wanting to preempt everything, and indicated that she had to concoct some reasoning to allow the prosecution of personal injury claims - a result they at least seemed to agree with.150
Justice O'Connor's dissent mentions the majority's apparent agreement with her position that ". . .Morales does not mean that personal injury claims against airlines are always pre-empted."151 She continued:
Many cases decided since Morales have allowed personal injury claims to proceed, even though none has said that a State is not "enforcing" its "law" when it imposes tort liability on an airline. In those cases, courts have found the particular tort claims at issue not to "relate" to airline "services," much as we suggested in Morales that state laws against gambling and prostitution would be too tenuously related to airline services to be pre-empted, see Morales, supra, at 390. E.g., Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4 F.3d 350, 353-356 (CA5 1993) (arguing that "'services' is not coextensive with airline 'safety'" so safety -related tort claim should not be pre-empted . . .).152
Justice Stevens seemed to disagree with preempting anything. He used what he believed to be the obviously not preempted arena of negligence law to make a point about contract law:
Like contract principles, that standard of ordinary care is a general background rule against which all individuals order their affairs. Surely Congress did not intend to give airlines free rein to commit negligent acts subject only to the supervision of the Department of Transportation, any more than it meant to allow airlines to breach contracts with impunity.153
In sum, Wolens seems to indicate that if the Supreme Court were to decide the issue, personal injury claims against commercial airlines would not be preempted. However, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have varied greatly in their interpretation of Wolens, and the Third Circuit has completely dismissed Wolens, applying the doctrine of field preemption instead. Preemption doctrine differs dramatically from circuit to circuit. Therefore the practitioner needs to be familiar with the trend in his or her circuit before drafting a pleading. Failure to do so could have dispositive consequences. This subsection will discuss the three leading circuits.
- Fifth Circuit.
This author had the pleasure of successfully representing the appellant in the en banc decision of Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.154
PICTURE (A) TO BE INSERTED AROUND HERE WITH CAPTION AS FOLLOWS: The author gained significant publicity when he successfully argued both sides of the same issue. He won for the plaintiff in Hodges v. Delta Airlines, a case overruling precedent set when he won for the defendant in Baugh v. TWA.
In Hodges, the Fifth Circuit struggled with the issues presented in the footnotes of Wolens. Ms. Hodges was injured when a case of rum, which had been improperly stowed in the overhead compartment, fell out, cutting her arm and wrist. The District Court dismissed the claim as "relating to" air carrier "services' and thus preempted. Ms. Hodges appealed. The issue was whether § 41713 preempted Hodges' claims. Ultimately the Fifth Circuit adopted the Morales approach that seeks to interpret § 41713 "relates to" and "services" language. The Fifth Circuit concluded that "services" "extends to all of the economic factors that go into the provisions of quid pro quo for passenger's fare."155 This included, for example "liquidated damages for bumping, minimum liability for loss, damages and delayed baggage and ancillary charges for headsets, alcoholic beverages, entertainment, and excess baggage."156 But, rather than accepting the legislative purpose of Congress in preempting utility-type regulation of such accouterments, the court included tort law claims arising out of the provision of such accouterments in its preemption analysis. The court acknowledged that "Taken to its logical extreme, this argument would suggest that a lawsuit following a fatal airplane crash would "relate to" "services."157
The patent injustice of the logical extreme convinced the court to find some limit to preemption. Instead of using congressional intent to stop this apparent logical leak, the court used a tire-patch, applying the insurance provisions of the ADA to define the preemption provision. The court went so far as to state: "The importance of [the insurance provision] cannot be understated, for it can only be understood to qualify the scope of "services" removed from state regulation.158 The ADA's insurance provision required insurance for "bodily injuries or death" resulting from the "operation and maintenance of the aircraft."159 Under the Fifth Circuit's analysis "operation and maintenance" then becomes the key. The court reasoned that if under the ADA, an airline was required to keep insurance policies for liabilities arising from bodily injuries of passengers, claims covered by those insurance policies could not be preempted.
Because Ms. Hodges bodily injury arose from the use of the overhead bins on the aircraft, it was not difficult for the court to construe them as falling within the insurance provision and thus, outside the scope of preemption.160 In doing so, the court expressly overruled its prior opinion in Baugh v TWA.161 See discussion of Baugh, supra p.___. This author had successfully represented the air carrier in Baugh years earlier. The Hodges court declined to overrule O'Carrol v. American Airlines, another case in which this author successfully represented the air carrier. See discussion of O'Carrol, supra p. ____. The court drew the line somewhere between Baugh (a negligent flight attendant stepping on a passenger's foot) and O'Carrol (a negligent flight crew removing a passenger from a plane). The court apparently rationalized Baugh as "operation and maintenance" of the aircraft and O'Carrol as "boarding practices" relating to air carrier "service." These fine distinctions are as confusing to this author as they were to Justice Jolly, in his special concurrence.162
There is absolutely no evidence anywhere to support the idea that the ADA's insurance provision was intended to clarify "services" as used in the preemption provision-not in the legislative history of the act, not anywhere. Even in the footnotes of Wolens, the insurance provision is cited only as an indication that preemption would not extend so far. It certainly was not cited as defining all boundaries of preemption as suggested by the Hodges majority. Justice Jolly's special concurrence in Hodges indicates that using "operation and maintenance" as the test will prove to be unworkable in the end.163 The notion that the only claims to escape preemption are claims that would be covered under the required insurance policies is specious. Nevertheless, it is the law in the Fifth Circuit.
Thus, the practitioner in the Fifth Circuit must plead his tort claims against an airline specifically. The pleading needs to allege that the defendant was "negligent in the operation and maintenance of the aircraft in one or more of the following particulars. . . ." The pleading then should list the particular actions of the defendant. This approach may not always work. Take, for example, an instance in which the plaintiff was injured in the gate area tripping over a flight attendant's belongings, which were left on the floor in front of the jetway door. The claim would clearly relate to airline "services" under the Fifth Circuit definition, but it would not fall into the insurance provisions "operation or maintenance" of the aircraft. It would be preempted, unless the trial court could rationalize some consistency with the Hodges opinion. Arguably, the jetway and the gate area are part and parcel to the "operation and maintenance of the aircraft." That is the gate and jetway are extensions of the aircraft when it is parked. Clearly, a passenger cannot board the aircraft without the jetway, and one cannot get in the jetway through any other portal than the gate area, both which are necessary to the operational phase of boarding. I would plead it specifically as follows: "The plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the flight crew during the operational phases of preparing to board and/or boarding the aircraft. The gate crew for the aircraft failed to maintain the aircraft's gate area in a safe condition." Perhaps a pleading like this will convince a court that the claims are not preempted. Perhaps it will be viewed as painting the word "cow" on a horse.
Because the insurance provision seems to be the key in the Fifth Circuit, mental anguish claims are sure to be in jeopardy. Remember, the insurance provision (so heavily relied upon as the no preemption test) only applies to claims for "bodily injury or death." What happens then to the passenger on board the crashed plane who survived without physical injury, but who witnessed other passengers burn to death? What happens when the passenger develops Post Traumatic Stress Disorder? In the Fifth Circuit-too bad, life is tough, get over it! Plaintiffs should plead every possible remedy in this instance, including the strategies of adopting a federal standard of care and federal implied and common law remedies. Perhaps a rise in the client's blood pressure would qualify in the court's view as bodily injury. Measure it and plead it. It would seem, however, that ultimately the Fifth Circuit will have to revisit its holding in Hodges when the appropriate mental injury case is appealed.
The ADA's preemption provision is like the ERISA preemption provision in that it preempts any state law that "relates to" the federal law, rather than preempting only those state laws which are "different from or in addition to" the federal law. This difference between the two types of preemption language is significant. The "relates to" preemption is much broader. It may not allow for the Silkwood/Medtronic line of reasoning that allows a state law claim that is "parallel" to the federal claim. A state law claim that is "parallel" to the federal laws would certainly "relate to" the federal laws and thus be preempted. The "relates to" preemption has been more difficult for the courts to resolve. The lack of a federal remedy has forced the courts to focus on congressional intent as to the type of relationship necessary and to narrowly define the subject matter to which the state laws must "relate." In the case of ERISA, courts have narrowly construed the "relates to" language to make room for claims. In the case of Aviation, courts have narrowly construed "service" and "relates to" to allow a remedy for wrong done.
Eventually, a claim, which is clearly preempted, will reach the courts. Then and only then will the courts need to grapple with the creation of a federal remedy. In this instance one should plead that the court adopt state law remedies as federal law, because "federal courts look to state law if federal common law fails to address the allegations.164 "In may cases, relevant factors may indicate that the federal court should follow or 'adopt' state law as the rule of decision, although it will be doing so as a matter of federal law."165 This is the exact opposite of allowing the federal standard to be adopted as "parallel" state law. The Ninth Circuit may have eliminated this problem by holding that § 41713 preemption does not extend to run of the mill tort claims.
- Ninth Circuit
Harris v. American Airlines166 was probably the most egregious example of precedent for injustice. In the Ninth Circuit, this case left many injured victims of wrongful airline conduct without a remedy. In what should have been run-of-the-mill tort claims, many plaintiffs found their claims to be preempted by the ADA. Under Harris, the court adopted the plain language approach to the definition of the word "services" in § 41713. It took the literal meaning of the word. Courts below had no choice but to accept the definition and preempt claims, which related to almost anything the airlines did. After all - what does "service" mean? Following a long series of appeals wherein the lower courts were criticizing Harris, the Ninth Circuit took another look at ADA preemption. In Gee v. Southwest Airlines,167 the Ninth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Hodges. But, as Justice Jolly pointed out in his concurrence in Hodges, and Justice O'Scannlain predicted in his concurrence in Gee, the test was unworkable. It relied on artificial distinctions between "services" and "operation and maintenance."168 This resulted in the dismissal and retention of similar cases based solely on wordplay.
PICTURE (B) TO BE INSERTED AROUND HERE WITH CAPTION AS FOLLOWS: The author again made the news with his victory in Charas. The Ninth Circuit finally got it right.
Not until Charas v. TransWorld Airlines169 was the Ninth Circuit able to remedy this semantic game. Charas, was actually a consolidation of several cases involving airline passenger injuries, ranging from injuries caused by falling overhead baggage to injuries sustained while attempting to board a plane-to-plane shuttle bus. This author argued on behalf of all of the plaintiffs at an en banc rehearing. The court thereafter expressly overruled both Harris and Gee.170 In so doing, the court reviewed the history of ADA preemption cases in the Supreme Court and various circuit courts. The court then embarked on a plain language approach that encompassed a consideration of congressional purpose. The court cited Medtronic, Wolens, and Morales for the proposition that preemption analysis begins with a presumption against preemption and in favor of state police power171 The court also recognized that "the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case."172
The Charas court also cited the insurance provision of the ADA as evidence that congressional purpose did not include snuffing out tort claims. However, the court did not suggest that the insurance provision defined the scope of preemption, as did the Fifth Circuit in Hodges.173
The savings clause in the Federal Aviation Act, which read: "[n]othing . . . in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law . . .," was left intact after the ADA's changes.174 This also showed congressional purpose to preserve state law tort remedies.175
The court also retreated on the "relates to" language of § 41713. Citing the Supreme Court opinions in Dillingham and Travelers, the court moved from a literal "relates to" to a congressional purpose "relates to."176
Finally, the Charas court abandoned a broad definition of "services" in favor of a term of art approach. The court adopted the meaning of the term as it is used in the aviation industry. That is, "service . . . refers to such things as the frequency and scheduling of transportation, and to the selection of markets to or from which transportation is provided (as in, 'This airline provides service from Tucson to New York twice a day.')."177
Aviation attorneys practicing in the Ninth Circuit have a workable precedent within which to analyze their cases. It is plaintiff friendly. In all likelihood, personal injury cases will not face any threat from the express preemption provisions of the ADA. That does not, however, mean that their claims are entirely safe. Obviously one of many aviation regulations could conflict with the plaintiff's claims. Moreover, the specter of implied preemption still looms for all aviation practitioners, particularly those in the Third Circuit.
- Third Circuit
In a revolutionary case, the Third Circuit determined that the Federal Aviation Act and the comprehensive scheme of federal aviation safety regulations had preempted the entire field of aviation safety - not expressly, not by conflict, but by occupation of the field. In Abdullah v. American Airlines178 a number of passengers brought an action under the territorial common law of the Virgin Islands. They claimed that they were injured as a result of turbulence. They alleged that the pilot not only chose to fly through bad weather, but that he had warned the flight attendants while failing to warn the passengers. Upon jury trial, a verdict was rendered for the passengers. American Airlines filed a post-trial motion contending that the court had erroneously instructed the jury on a territory common law standard of care, instead of a federal standard. The District Court ruled in the airline's favor and ordered a new trial.
Upon plaintiff's motion, the following issue was certified for appeal: "Does federal law preempt the standards for air safety, but preserve State and Territorial damage remedies?"179 The Court of Appeals answered both parts of the question with a "yes."180 The court noted that some courts have found certain discrete areas of aviation law, such as noise abatement, and pilot qualifications, to be occupied by federal law.181 But the Third Circuit went further, determining that there was an "overarching general standard of care under the FAA and its regulations."182 According to the Abdullah court, "This standard arises in particular from 14 C.F.R.§ 91.13(a): 'No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.'"183 The court likened the new standard to a negligence standard filling the gaps where specific legislation or regulation is absent. "In a case then were there is no specific provision or regulation governing air safety, § 91.l3(a) provides a general description of the standard required for the safe operation of aircraft."184
Even though the standard of care was broadly preempted in its view, the Abdullah court did not extend such preemption to the issues of causation and damages.185 The court relied heavily on Silkwood in finding that "traditional state and territorial law remedies continue to exist for violation of those [federal] standards."186 The court used the insurance clause and the savings clause of the FAA as support for its holding: "...it is evident in both the savings and the insurance clauses of the FAA that Congress found state damage remedies to be compatible with federal aviation safety standards."187
To its credit the court addressed the apparent conflict of its holding with such cases and Hodges, as well as a number of other arguments against preemption. The court held that the absence of a conflict with state law was irrelevant because occupation of the field does not require a conflict. Even consistent state law is displaced.188 As to the reservation of state police powers in the constitution, the court cited the supremacy clause and had this to say: "...because we have found that the entire field of aviation safety is federally preempted, we need not consider whether the regulation of aviation safety falls within the traditional police powers of the states and territories."189
The problem with Abdullah is that the standard it espouses only concerns the "operation" of "aircraft." As pointed out by the Ninth Circuit in Charas, many airline torts arise out of conduct that is not "operation" of the aircraft. The author believes the Third Circuit standard will ultimately lead to semantic games on both sides of litigation trying to characterize a particular claim as arising out of aircraft "operations" or not arising from aircraft "operations," depending on venue and legal strategy. The word "operations" has already proved elusive, prompting the Ninth Circuit to overrule is own Gee case and reject the Fifth Circuit's Hodges case. Query: How does the Third Circuit's new standard govern a case in which a flight attendant spills hot coffee on a passenger? Hot coffee, while causing painful burns, is hardly "endangering the life" of "another." Moreover, a flight attendant serving coffee is hardly "operating the aircraft." It stretches credibility to place the claim under the Abdullah umbrella. Moreover, there are no federal regulations that directly affect the manner in which coffee is handled in flight. Abdullah should not preempt either such a claim. State law should still govern it. But because the Abdullah courts proclamation that all matters of aviation "safety" are preempted, then the court will struggle to find a standard of care under federal law which truly applies to the facts.
The Abdullah 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) standard, on its face, only applies to pilot operation of aircraft. How can it possibly assist a trier of fact in a jetway slip and fall, or in a case where a hand is caught in the baggage X-ray machine? These are the typical injury cases arising from airline operations, not airplane operations. It all depends on what the court meant when it used the term "aviation safety" to describe the breadth of the preemption. It may only encompass part of airline operations. Many airlines engage in activities not related to "aviation," such as keeping the floor clean and serving food and beverage. These things could be done in a restaurant and have no direct relation to operation of the aircraft.
Third circuit practitioners confronted with a case clearly arising out of aircraft operations in taxi or flight will have to deal with the Abdullah holding. A plaintiff wishing to stay in state court might try to plead his case as a state law "parallel" claim, arising entirely at state law. Then he would have to convince the court that the federal standard established by Abdullah is being enforced by state law, and that the case does not "arise under" federal law for removal purposes. Remember: Abdullah does not address removal jurisdiction.
A third circuit practitioner whose claim clearly does not arise out of aircraft operation (i.e., a slip and fall in the gate area) should plead his entire case under state law and claim that it is beyond the scope of the preemption in Abdullah. Abdullah preempted only aviation safety (i.e., flying the aircraft in an unsafe manner) not gate area maintenance. Again just make the complaint specific and incapable of misinterpretation. For example:
Plaintiff was injured when he slipped and fell on a wet area of the defendant Airline's premises. The airline had a duty under state law to prevent the accident by keeping the floor dry and/or warning the plaintiff of its dangerous condition. Plaintiff's claim does not arise out of "aviation safety" because it has nothing to do with operation of the "aircraft in a careless or reckless manner." Therefore, the holding of Abdullah v. American Airlines does not preempt plaintiff's claims and plaintiff's claims arise entirely under the law of the state of XXX. Any attempt by the defendant to remove this case to federal court would be necessarily frivolous.
By keeping one's pleadings clear and detailed regarding the state or federal laws relied upon, preemption confusion can be avoided.
A defendant, on the other hand, might very well rely on Abdullah for a removal action. The removal should state that the claim is federal in nature and that plaintiff's artful pleading of no removal jurisdiction should be ignored. The removing defendant should argue that the Abdullah preemption encompasses all aspects of "aviation safety," regardless of the court's citation the general standard of care for operation of aircraft in the federal regulations. (14 C.F.R. §91.13(a)) This section was not a preemption limiting citation by the Abdullah court. It was just the standard that happened to encompass the facts of the case at hand, a pilot flying into turbulence. The court used aviation safety and "safety of an airlines operations" interchangeably,190 and semantic limiting of the scope of preemption is not what the court intended.
This author predicts that Abdullah will create a firestorm of argument as to its meaning. Whether other circuits will adopt its reasoning is unclear. Because of the nature of aviation, the practitioner who represents clients in this arena should be conversant in the federal laws and regulations. If he is not, he is sure to eventually make a mistake that will prejudice his client.
52.6 Looking Forward
In the new millennium, preemption will become the rule of the day. The ever-increasing complexity and technological advancement of our society is reducing the practical importance of state boundaries. In paradigms that know no locality, federal (not state and local) regulation will be the norm. Because most lawsuits are based on state common law, creeping federal regulation will increasingly conflict with and overwhelm sate law standards of care. Because most federal law is devoid of remedy creating devices for wrongful conduct, the increasingly federalized conduct regulation will create federal standards of care without means of civil remedy.
A suitable trend is emerging to solve this problem. A common theme in cases such as Silkwood, Medtronic, and Abdullah is that even in instances of pure conflict preemption, federal standards of conduct should not preclude the enforcement of state law "remedies" through damages actions. This federal standard of care and state law damages dichotomy is schizophrenic. Other than a few ephemeral comments in treatises, it has never been explained how the common law can be torn in half. Yet the schism has an appeal in a federal system which makes the federal laws "supreme" yet emphasizes the "police powers" of the state.
In the new millennium, practitioners must be aware of increasing federal regulation of daily life. Plaintiff's attorneys must be careful to craft claims which provide relief for their clients. The arsenal of a defense attorney will be constantly restocked with preemption ammunition. In this shifting paradigm, the most creative practitioners will prevail.
* The author wishes to recognize his law clerk, Alycia Harvey for her assistance in the research and compilation of material for this chapter.
1 U.S. Const. art. VI cl. 2.
2 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 210-211 (1824).
3 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1997).
4 Lousiville and Nashville R.R v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (for a detailed discussion of the well pleaded complaint rule see Richard E. Levy, Federal Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 634).
5 Id. at 152.
6 Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum Inc., 780 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1986).
7 Stewart v. American Airlines, 776 F.Supp. 1194 (S.D. Tex 1991).
8 Id. at 1196.
9 Merrill Dow Pharmaceutical v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
10 Id. at 817.
11 T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964); see also Shoshone Mining Co. v. Reutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900).
12 See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968).
13 Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Preemption Presumption that Never was: Preemption Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1379, 1384 (1998).
14 Savage v. Jones, 225 US 501, 535 (1912) (quoting Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 623 (1898)).
15 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
16 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); see also Raeker-Jordan, supra, at 1385.
17 Id. at 230.
18 Hines, 312 U.S. at 74.
19 Raeker-Jordan, supra note 13, at 1388.
20 Rice, 331 U.S at 230.
21 Id. at 233.
22 See Abdullah v. American Airlines 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3rd Cir. 1999) (discussing list of cases preempting "discrete" aspects of air safety); see also Rice, 331 U.S. 218, 236-37 (preempting certain claims but leaving others governed by state law).
23 French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
24 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 374 (citations omitted).
25 See Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Cipollone v. Ligget Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995); see also Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1149, 1176 (1998).
26 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486.
27 See, e.g., Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
28 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1998) (emphasis added).
29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
30 Baugh v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
31 Id.
32 O'Carrol v. American Airlines, 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1989).
33 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
34 O'Carrol, 863 F.2d at 13.
35 See, e.g., Kiefer v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 882 S.W. 2d 496 (Tex App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994), aff'd, 920 S.W. 2d 274 (Tex. 1996).
36 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
37 Id. at 78.
38 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-5 (1978).
39 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
40 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
41 Id. at 250-251.
42 Id.at 243.
43 Id. at 243 n.6.
44 See, e.g., Abdullah, 181 F.3d 363.
45 Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256.
46 29 U.S.C. §1001 et. seq.(1997).
47 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 29 USCS § 1161 et.seq. (1999).
48 See generally William T. Payne, Judith P. Broach, Anne E. Moran and Howard Shapiro, ERISA: It's More Places Than You Thought It Could Be; The Federal Law that Most people Know By Its Acronym Does More than Protect Retirement Incomes, 83 A.B.A. J. 62 (1997).
49 Natalie Zellner, Duking It Out: Beating the Complete Preemption of ERISA, 14 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 925, 937 (1998).
50 Cynthia Ransburg-Brown, The Ultimate Jigsaw Puzzle: ERISA preemption and Liability in the Utilization Review Process, 28 Cumberland L. Rev. 403, 405 (1998).
51 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1990).
52 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1990).
53 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1990); see also Troy A. Pierce, Preemption "Between the Poles": ERISA's Effect on State Common Law Actions Other then Benefit Claims, 19 U. Ark. Little Rock L. J. 541, 547 (1997).
54 Alessi v. Raysbestos-Manhattan Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
55 Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 789 F.Supp 1453 (D. Nev. 1992).
56 Donald J. Zahn, Perversions of Preemption, 1998 Det. C.L. Mich. St. U. L. Rev. 175, 178 (1998).
57 Id. at 179.
58 Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983), Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
59 Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency Service Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
60 Id. at 830; see also Zahn, supra note 56, at 180.
61 Scott D. Pomfret, Emerging Theories of Liability for Utilization Review Under ERISA Heath Plans, 34 Tort & Ins. L. J. 131, 135 (1998).
62 NY State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995).
63 Id. at 654-55.
64 Id. at 662.
65 Id. at 655-56.
66 Id. at 658.
67 California Division of Labor Standards v. Dillingham, 519 U.S. 316 (1997); see also Pierce, supra note 53, at 556.
68 Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 336.
69 Bannister v. Sorenson, 103 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Pierce, supra note 53, at 557.
70 Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
71 Id. at 353.
72 Id. at 356.
73 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
74 Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 356.
77 Scott D. Pomfret, Emerging Theories of Liability for Utilization Review Under ERISA Heath Plans, 34 Tort & Ins. L. J. 131, 157 (1998).
78 Id. at 156.
79 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 59 (1990); Ingersol-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990); District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 131 (1992); see also id.
80 S. 1344 106th Cong. (1999), S.326 106th Cong. (1999).
81 John D. Titus, Note, Federal preemption and the Cigarette Act-the Smoke Gets In Your Eyes, 20 Ariz. St. L. J. 897, 907 (1988).
82 15 U.S.C § 1334 (1993).
83 Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504.
84 Id. at 508.
85 Id. at 519-20 (Plurality opinion with Justices Blackmon, Kennedy, and Souter concurring at 531, 533-34).
86 Id. at 520-30 (Plurality opinion with Justices Scalia and Thomas concurring.).
87 Id. at 548 ("State law" embraces the common law).
88 Id. at 530-31; see also Stephen D. Lichtenstein and Gerald R. Ferrara, Airbag Products Liability Litigations: State Common Law Tort Claims Are Automatically Preempted By Federal Legislation, 45 Clev. St. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1997).
89 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518.
90 Michael D. Green, Cippolone Revisited: A Not So Little Secret About the Scope of Cigarette Preemption, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 1257, 1258 (1997).
91 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 519-20 (opinion of Court with concurrence at 533-34).
92 Green, supra note 90, at 12.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 13.
95 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
96 Id.
97 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101, et. seq.
98 Lichtenstein, supra note 88, at 17.
99 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
100 See, e.g., Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1989); and Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988).
101 Lichtenstein, supra note 88, at 16.
102 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (1999).
103 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1993).
104 Lichtenstein, supra note 88, at 16.
105 Tebbets v. Ford Motor Co.; 665 A.2d 345 (N.H. 1995). See also Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N.E. 2d 327 (Ind. 1995).
106 Id. at 348.
107 John Gerald Gleeson and Larry W. Davidson, Federal Preemption as a Defense in Pesticide Poisoning Litigation, 56 Def. Couns. J. 318, 321 (1989).
108 7 U.S.C § 136-136y (1999).
109 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1999).
110 Gleeson, supra note 107, at 320.
111 Id.
112 Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993).
113 Id. at 518.
114 Jenkins v. Amchem Products, Inc., 886 P.2d 869 (Kansas 1994).
115 Id. at 872.
116 Id. at 873.
117 Worm v. American Cynamid Co., 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993) (Worm II).
118 Jenkins, 886 P.2d at 878 (citing Worm II at 747-48).
119 Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
120 Id. at 1541.
121 Id. at 1543.
122 7 USCS § 136v(b) (1999).
123 King v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1993); Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504.
124 See, e.g., Tyler v. Dow Chemical, Inc., 683 N.Y.S.2d 619 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept. 1998); Hottinger v. Trugreen Corporation 665 N.E.2d 593 (Ind. App. 1996).
125 Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768.
126 21 U.S.C § 331 et.seq.
127 Id.
128 21 U.S.C §§ 360c-360m (1999).
129 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360e(b)(1)(A), 360c(f)(2)(A), 360e(b)(1)(B) (1999).
130 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1999).
131 Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
132 Id. at 495, 513.
133 Id. at 475.
134 Id. at 487, (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
135 Id. at 496.
136 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 437 U.S. 837 (1984).
137 Medtronic, 518 U.S. 509 (O'Connor, dissenting).
138 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 520-21. See also Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 805, 811 (1998).
139 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
140 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et. seq.).
141 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1982).
142 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1990).
143 Diaz Aguasviva v. Iberia Lineas Areas de Espana, 902 F. Supp. 314, n.1 (D. Puerto Rico 1995). See also American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, n.1 (1995).
144 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
145 Morales, 504 U.S. at 388-89.
146 American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
147 Id at 227-28.
148 Id. at 228-29.
149 Id. at 231 n.7.
150 Id. at 234 n.9 ("JUSTICE O'CONNOR's 'all is pre-empted' position leaves room for personal injury claims, but only by classifying them as matter not 'relating to [air carrier] services.' See post, at 242-243.").
151 Id. at 242 (O'Connor dissenting).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 236-237 (Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154 Hodges v. American Airlines, 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995).
155 Id. at 337. For a discussion of the pre-Hodges state of affairs, see Stuart Starry, Federal Preemption in Commercial Aviation - Tort Litigation Under 49 U.S.C. § 1305, 58 J. Air L. & Comm. 657, 683-84 (1993)
156 Id.
157 Id. at 338.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 340.
161 Id. at 335.
162 Id. at 342 n.7 (Justice Jolly, specially concurring).
163 Id. at 340 (Justice Jolly, specially concurring).
164 Daniel Petroski, Airlines Response to the DTPA - Section 1305 Preemption, 56 J. Air L. & Comm. 125,149 (1990).
165 Id. at 149 n.164 (citing 19 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4514 (1982)).
166 Harris v. American Airlines, 55 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995).
167 Gee v. Southwest Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1997).
168 Id. at 1410 (O'Scannlain concurring).
169 Charas v. TransWorld Airlines, 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998)(en banc).
170 Id. at 1266.
171 Id. at 1264-1265.
172 Id. (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).
173 Id.
174 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 40120).
175 Id. at 1265.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1265-1266.
178 Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir. 1999).
179 Id. at 364.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 370 (discussing Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974); British Airways Bd. v. Port Authority of New York, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977); French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989)).
182 Id. at 365.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 371.
185 Id. at 367 (citing In re TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated II, 940 F.2d 832, 859 (3rd Cir. 1991) (TMI II), and In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 1106-07 (3d Cir. 1995) (TMI III)).
186 Id. at 375.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 373-374.
189 Id. at 375.
190 Id. at 373 (discussing the ADA).